The Story of the Malakand Field Force by Winston S. Churchill (100 books to read in a lifetime TXT) 📖

This obscure and undisturbed retreat was the residence of a priest of great age and of peculiar holiness, known to fame as the Hadda Mullah. His name is Najb-ud-din, but as respect has prevented it being mentioned by the tribesmen for nearly fifty years, it is only preserved in infidel memories and records. The Government of India have, however, had this man’s personality brought vividly before them on several occasions. About thirteen years ago he quarrelled with the Amir and raised the Mohmands against him. The Amir replied by summoning his rebellious subject—for Hadda, the Mullah’s home and birthplace, is a village of Afghanistan—to answer for his conduct at Cabul. But the crafty priest, who was well acquainted with Afghan legal procedure, declined the invitation, and retired to the independent Mohmand territory, where he has lived ever since.

 

Content with thus inflicting the punishment of exile, the Amir was disposed to forget the offence. In a letter to his Commander-in-Chief, the “Sipah Salar,” a great friend of the Mullah, he described him as a “light of Islam.” So powerful a light, indeed, he did not desire to have in his own dominions; but across the border it was fitting that respect should be shown to so holy a man. He therefore directed his officials to cherish and honour him. Thus he retained a powerful weapon—to be used when desirable. Whether by instigation or from personal motives, the Hadda Mullah has long been a bitter foe to the British power. In 1895 he sent the fighting men of the Mohmands to resist the Chitral Relief Force. Since then he has been actively engaged, by preaching and by correspondence with other Mullahs, in raising a great combination against the advancing civilisation.

 

In 1896 he terminated a long religious controversy with the Manki Mullah of Nowshera and Spinkhara—a comparatively tame Mullah, who now supports the Indian Government—by publishing a book setting forth his views, and demolishing those of his antagonist. This work was printed in Delhi and had an extensive sale among Mahommedans all over India. Complimentary copies were sent to the “Sipah Salar” and other Afghan notabilities, and the fame of the Hadda Mullah was known throughout the land. Besides increasing his influence, his literary success stimulated his efforts.

 

While the Mad Fakir was rousing Swat and Buner, this powerful priest incited the Mohmands. Though he was known to be a physical coward, his sanctity and the fact that he was their own particular holy man, not less than his eloquence, powerfully moved this savage tribe. A Jehad was proclaimed. How long should Islam be insulted? How long should its followers lurk in the barren lands of the North? He urged them to rise and join in the destruction of the white invaders. Those who fell should become saints; those who lived would be rich, for these Kafirs had money and many other things besides, for which a true believer might find a use.

 

The combined allurements of plunder and paradise proved irresistible. On the 8th of August a great gathering, nearly 6000 strong, crossed the frontier line, invaded British territory, burned the village of Shankargarh, and attacked the fort of Shabkadr. This place is an advanced post in the defensive system of the frontier, and is situated some nineteen miles to the northwest of Peshawar. Its ordinary garrison consists of about fifty Border Police. It is strongly built, and is intended to attract the attention and delay the advance of a raiding-party, until the Peshawar garrison has had time to take the field. Both of these objects it admirably fulfilled in this case.

 

As soon as the news of the incursion of the Mohmands was received in Peshawar, a flying column was mobilised and proceeded under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J.B. Woon, 20th Punjaub Infantry, in the direction of the fort. At dawn on the 9th of August they found the tribesmen in force in a strong position near Shabdakr. The force at Colonel Woon’s disposal was small. It consisted of:—

 

4 Guns 51st Field Battery.

2 squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers … . . 151 lances.

2 Companies Somersetshire Light Infantry . . 186 rifles.

20th Punjaub Infantry … … 400 “

 

A total of about 750 men. The enemy numbered 6000. Nevertheless it was decided to attack at once.

 

As the action which followed is but remotely connected with the fortunes of the Malakand Field Force, I do not intend to describe it in detail.

The infantry in advancing could only attack on a front of 600 yards. The enemy’s line, being much longer, quickly turned both flanks. The fire became severe. Numerous casualties occurred. A retirement was ordered. As is usual in Asiatic warfare, it was considerably pressed. The situation at about nine o’clock appeared critical. At this point Brigadier-General Ellis, commanding the Peshawar District, arrived on the field. He immediately ordered the two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers to move well to the right flank, to charge across the front and check the enemy’s advance. The “cease fire” sounded as on a field day. Then there was a pause. The movements of the cavalry were concealed from most of the troops, but suddenly all noticed the slackening of the enemy’s fire.

Then the tribesmen were seen to be in retreat and disorder. The power of cavalry had been strikingly displayed. The two squadrons, ably led, had executed a fine charge over what theorists would call impossible ground for a distance of one and a half miles along the bed of a great nullah, and among rocks and stones that reduced the pace to a trot. The enemy were driven from the field. Sixty were actually speared by the Lancers, and the rest retreated in gloom and disorder to their hills across the frontier.

 

The casualties were as follows:—

 

British Officers.

Wounded severely—Major A. Lumb, Somersetshire Light Infantry.

” ” Captain S.W. Blacker, R.A.

” ” 2nd Lieut. E Drummond, Somersetshire Light Infantry.

Wounded slightly—Lieut. A.V. Cheyne, 13th Bengal Lancers.

 

British N.C.O.‘s and Soldiers.

Killed. Wounded.

51st Field Battery, R.A… . . 0 2

Somersetshire Light Infantry … 3 9

 

Native Ranks.

 

13th Bengal Lancers … . . 1 12

20th Punjaub Infantry … . . 5 35

Followers … … . 0 1

 

Total Casualties, all ranks—72.

 

That such an outrage, as the deliberate violation of British territory by these savages, should remain unpunished, “Forward Policy” or no “Forward Policy,” was of course impossible. Yet the vacillation and hesitancy which the Government of India had displayed in the matter of the Bunerwals, and the shocking and disgraceful desertion of the forts in the Khyber Pass, were so fresh in all men’s minds, that the order to advance against the Mohmands was received with feelings of the greatest relief throughout the forces. The general plan of the operations as arranged by the Commander-in-Chief was as follows:—

 

1. Sir Bindon Blood with two brigades of the Malakand Field Force and due proportions of cavalry and guns was to move through South Bajaur to Nawagai, and on the 15th of September invade the Mohmand country from that place.

 

2. On the same date Major-General Elles with an equal force would leave Shabkadr, and entering the mountains march northeast to effect a junction.

 

3. This having been done, the combined forces under the supreme command of Sir Bindon Blood would be brought back through the Mohmands’

territories to Shabkadr. Incidentally they would deal with the Hadda Mullah’s village of Jarobi, and inflict such punishment on the tribesmen as might be necessary to ensure their submission. The troops would then be available for the Tirah Expedition, which it had by this time been decided to organise.

 

The fact that after leaving Nawagai, nothing was known of the configuration of the country, of which no maps existed; nor of the supplies of food, forage and water available by the way, made the preparations for, and the execution of, these operations somewhat difficult. Wide margins had to be allowed in the matter of rations, and in order to be prepared for all contingencies and obstructions of ground, Sir Bindon Blood equipped his 2nd Brigade entirely with mule transport. The 3rd Brigade with camels would follow if the road was passable.

 

The following was the composition of the forces employed:—

 

I. MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.

 

Commanding—Major-General Sir Bindon Blood.

 

2nd Brigade.

 

Brigadier-General Jeffries, C.B.

The Buffs.

35th Sikhs.

38th Dogras.

Guides Infantry.

No.4 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners.

No.7 Mountain Battery.

 

3rd Brigade.

 

Brigadier-General Wodehouse.

The Queen’s Regiment.[This regiment had replaced the Gordon Highlanders in the 3rd Brigade.]

22nd Punjaub Infantry.

39th Punjaub Infantry.

No.3 Company (Bombay) Sappers and Miners.

No.1 Mountain Battery, R.A.

 

Cavalry—11th Bengal Lancers.

 

Line of Communications. 1st Brigade.

 

Brigadier-General Meiklejohn.

Royal West Kent.

Highland Light Infantry.

31st Punjaub Infantry.

24th Punjaub Infantry.

45th Sikhs.

No.7 British Mountain Battery.

And the following additional troops:—

1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.

2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry.

 

II.THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE.

 

1st Brigade.

 

1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry.

Maxim Gun Detachment, 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment.

20th Punjaub Infantry.

2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas.

Sections A and B No.5 British Field Hospital.

Three Sections No.31 Native ” “

Section A No.45 ” ” “

 

2nd Brigade.

 

2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

9th Gurkha Rifles.

37th Dogras.

Sections C and D No.5 British Field Hospital.

No.44 Native Field Hospital.

 

Divisional Troops.

 

13th Bengal Lancers.

No.3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No.5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.

No.5 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners.

28th Bombay Pioneers.

1st Patiala Infantry.

Sections C and D No.63 Native Field Hospital.

 

To record the actual movements of troops in a campaign, is among the most important duties of one who undertakes to tell its tale. For the sake of clearness, of brevity, and that the reader who is not interested may find convenience in skipping, I shall at once describe the whole of the marches and manoeuvres, by which Sir Bindon Blood moved his brigades across the Panjkora River, and after the Malakand Field Force is safely camped at Ghosam, the reader will be invited to return to examine the scenery, and remark the incidents of the way.

 

During the end of August, the 2nd Brigade, equipped with mule transport, was at Khar in the Swat Valley. The 3rd Brigade was at Uch. On the 2nd of September, definite orders to advance were received from Simla. In pursuance of these instructions, Sir Bindon Blood ordered Brigadier-General Wodehouse with the 3rd Brigade, which in anticipation had been moved from Uch a few days previously, to take over the bridge across the Panjkora from the Khan of Dir’s Levies, and secure the passage. On the 6th, the 3rd Brigade marched from Sarai to Panjkora, and obtained possession of the bridge just in time to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy, who had already gathered to seize it. The 12-pounder guns of the 10th Field Battery were placed in a strong position commanding the passage, and the brigade camped on the left bank. On the same day, Brigadier-General Jeffries with headquarters marched from Khar to Chakdara. On the 7th he proceeded to Sarai, and on the 8th effected the passage of the Panjkora, and camped on the further bank at Kotkai.

On the 10th, both brigades marched to Ghosam, where they concentrated.

On the line of communications to the Malakand, stages were established at Chakdara and Sarai, with accommodation for sick and wounded. An advanced depot was formed behind the Panjkora, to guard which and to hold the passage, an additional force was moved from the Swat Valley.

 

This concentration at Ghosam, of which the details had worked out so mechanically, had been necessitated by the attitude of the tribesmen of Bajaur and the adjoining valleys. Great gatherings had