William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

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    without interruption until they began to think themselves

    justifiable in what they were doing, and by stopping up the

    mouth of the Thames they were suspected of designs for which Mr.

    Graham and Mr. Williams can by no means give them credit. The

    want of beer and fresh beef prompted them to revenge, and that

    and nothing else induced them to interrupt the trade of the

    river. It was done on the spur of the occasion, and with a view

    of obtaining a supply of fresh provisions. Another thing, namely

    the systematic appearance with which the delegates and the

    sub-committees on board the different ships conducted the

    business of the mutiny may be supposed a good ground of

    suspecting that better informed men than sailors in general are

    must have been employed in regulating it for them. This Mr.

    Graham and Mr. Williams at first were inclined to believe too;

    but in the course of their examinations of people belonging to

    the fleet they were perfectly convinced that without such a

    combination and with the assistance of the newspapers only

    (independent of the many cheap publications to be had upon

    subjects relating to clubs and societies of all descriptions)

    and the advantage of so many good writers as must have been

    found among the quota-men, they were capable of conducting it

    themselves.

 

Graham and Williams arrested at Sheerness three strangers, Hulm,

McLaurin, and McCan, who were making mischief. Nothing seems to have

come of these arrests; and, despite the opinion of Pitt, expressed in

his speech of 2nd June, we may dismiss the charge against the London

Corresponding Society. It is clear, however, that busybodies circulated

newspapers and pamphlets at Sheerness, Chatham, and Maidstone. The

reports of the parliamentary debates of 3rd, 8th, 9th, and 10th May

would alone have encouraged the mutineers; and the chiefs of the

Opposition must bear no small share of responsibility for the disastrous

events at Spithead and the Nore. They were warned that their nagging

tactics would cause trouble in the navy. They persisted, in the hope of

discrediting the Ministry. They succeeded in paralysing the navy; and

the only excuse for their conduct is that their hatred of Pitt blinded

them to the obvious consequences. From this censure I must except

Sheridan, whose speech of 2nd June was patriotic; and he further is said

to have suggested the plan of removing the buoys beyond the mutinous

fleet.

 

For a brief space disquieting symptoms appeared in the army. An

inflammatory appeal to the troops was distributed at Maidstone by Henry

Fellows; and the same man addressed a letter to some person unnamed,

asking him to send on 100 copies of the Ulster Address, 50 of

"Boniparte's [_sic_] Address," 50 of "the Duke of Richmond's Letter,"

and 50 of Payne's "Agrarian Justice." The last named was found among the

papers of John Bone, a member of the London Corresponding Society.[458]

It is not unlikely that this propaganda was connected with that at

Chatham barracks, where a seditious handbill was left on 21st May 1797,

urging the men to cast off the tyranny misnamed discipline, to demand

better food, better clothing, and freedom from restraint in barracks.

"The power is all our own," it concludes. "The regiments which send you

this are willing to do their part. They will show their countrymen they

can be soldiers without being slaves ... Be sober, be ready."[459] The

paper was probably connected with the mutiny at the Nore. There were

also some suspicious doings in London barracks. One of the incendiaries

there was, "wicked Williams," who certainly had run through the whole

gamut of evil. First as a clergyman, he ruined himself by his excesses;

then as a penitent he applied to Wilberforce for relief, and, after

disgusting even that saintly man, he in revenge carried round to certain

barracks the signature of his would-be benefactor appended to a

seditious appeal. Busybodies lacking all sense of humour therefore

buzzed it about that the abolitionist leader sought to stir up a mutiny.

On 13th May Pitt sent to him to sift any grains of truth that there

might be in this peck of lies. The following unpublished letter from

Wilberforce to Pitt shows that he advised him to use Williams so as to

get at the grains:

 

                               2.20 Saty mng. [_May 1797_?][460]

 

    Williams has been with Windham and is to wait on him again. The

    latter has been with me, and I have been guarding him about

    Wms's character, telling him that we wish to enable some proper

    person to watch Wms's motions by becoming acquainted with his

    person. Now, if this watch should be at or near Windham's, this

    point could be obtained. My other means of making the discovery

    have failed, and I can devise no other. Williams avowed to

    Windham that he had been employed in endeavouring to inflame the

    soldiery, but that his mind was not prepared to go the lengths

    he found it would be required to go. I am pretty sure the best

    way would be to give Williams money, a little, to infuse a

    principle of hope. I dare say he is hungry. You must place no

    dependence whatever on him, but if he would act for you, he

    would be a useful agent, and I think a little money in his case

    indispensable. I intreat you not to neglect this. I suppose

    there will now be no use in my seeing Ford.

 

In a second letter, written an hour later, Wilberforce urges Pitt not to

neglect this note. Williams some years ago sought to make a mutiny; he

was skilled in intrigue, had "held Jacobinical language, and was going

on in the most profligate and abandoned way." This is all the

information that the Pitt MSS. yield upon this question. But in the

private diary of Wilberforce there is the significant entry: "Pitt

awaked by Woolwich artillery riot and went out to Cabinet." The cool

bearing of Lord Harrington, commander of the forces in London, helped to

restore confidence. On 3rd June Government introduced and speedily

passed a Bill for preventing seduction of the soldiery. There were

rumours of an intended mutiny in the Guards; but fortunately the troops

remained true to duty, and some of them helped to quell the mutiny at

the Nore.

 

A survey of Pitt's conduct during these critical months reveals the

limitations of his nature. He was wanting in foresight. He seems to have

been taken unawares both by the Bank crisis and the mutinies. He met the

financial crisis promptly when it became acute, though by means which

caused incalculable inconvenience at a later time. The mutinies also

ought to have been averted by timely concessions to the sailors, who

needed increase of pay fully as much as the soldiery. For this neglect,

however, the Admiralty Board, not Pitt, is chiefly to blame. When the

storm burst, Ministers did not display the necessary initiative and

resourcefulness; and the officials of the Admiralty must be censured for

the delay in bringing forward the proposals on which Parliament could

act. The Opposition, as usual, blamed Pitt alone; and it must be

confessed that he did not exert on officials the almost terrifying

influence whereby Chatham is said to have expedited the preparation of a

fleet of transports. The story to that effect is of doubtful

authenticity.[461] But there is no doubt that Chatham's personality and

behaviour surpassed those of his son in face of a national crisis. The

eagle eye of the father would have discerned the growth of discontent in

the navy, and his forceful will would have found means to allay or crush

Before the thunder of his eloquence the mewlings of faction must

have died away. The younger Pitt was too hopeful, too soft, for the

emergency. But it is only fair to remember the heartache and ill health

besetting him since the month of January, which doubtless dulled his

powers during the ensuing period of ceaseless strain and anxiety.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[436] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," i, 177-81. Tomline asserted that

a lady of the highest rank desired to marry Pitt. Various conjectures

have been made on this topic. Lord Rosebery suggests that the Duchess of

Gordon was hinted at.

 

[437] "Auckland Journals," iii, 356, 363, 369, 373-4.

 

[438] Wordsworth, "Prelude," bk. xiv.

 

[439] Pretyman MSS. Quoted in full, with Pitt's second letter and one of

Auckland, by Lord Ashbourne ("Pitt," 241-4).

 

[440] Pellew, i, 183.

 

[441] Ashbourne, 162, 179; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 410, 429.

 

[442] "Auckland Journals," iii, 359. George III, who disliked Auckland,

ordered the appointment of Chatham.

 

[443] _Ibid._, iii, 387.

 

[444] See Appendix for the sums borrowed, expended on the army and navy,

and raised by the Permanent Taxes in 1792-1801.

 

[445] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1297-1347; Pitt MSS., 102. Pitt to Boyd, 4th

January 1796.

 

[446] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 276.

 

[447] W. Newmarch, "Loans raised by Pitt (1793-1801)," pp. 16, 25-33.

 

[448] On 2nd December 1796, Thomas Coutts, Pitt's banker, wrote to him:

"Mr. Dent, Mr. Hoare, Mr. Snow, Mr. Gosling, Mr. Drummond, and myself

met today, and have each subscribed £50,000.... I shall leave town

tomorrow, having staid solely to do any service in my power in

forwarding this business, which I sincerely wish and hope may be the

means of procuring peace on fair and honourable terms. P.S.--We have

subscribed £10,000 in your name, and shall take care to make the

payments" (Pitt MSS., 126). Mr. Abbot ("Lord Colchester's Diary," 76)

states that fear of a compulsory contribution helped on the Loyalty

Loan.

 

[449] Pitt MSS., 272.

 

[450] Ann. Reg. (1797), 130-42.

 

[451] Sir J. Sinclair, "Hist. of the Public Revenue," ii, 143.

 

[452] Pitt MSS., 272; "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1517; Gilbart, "History ...

of Banking" (ed. by E. Sykes), i, 46. On 25th February 1797 Pitt wrote a

memorandum (Pitt MSS., 102), stating that the crisis was due to the too

great circulation of paper notes by banks having limited resources.

Their stoppage affected larger Houses and paralysed trade. He had wanted

to meet the City men, who met on the 22nd to discuss the situation, but

failed to agree on any remedy. Finally they agreed to meet at the

Mansion House to discuss the issue of Exchequer Bills. Coutts, on 19th

March 1797, informed Pitt that gambling in the Prince of Wales'

Debentures, which exceeded £432,000, ruined the market for ordinary

securities (Pitt MSS., 126). Sinclair had vainly urged Pitt to compel

bankers to find and exhibit securities for the paper notes which they

issued ("Corresp. of Sir J. Sinclair," i, 87).

 

[453] H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of

England," ch. ii, have proved this.

 

[454] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 473-516; "Hist. of the Mutiny at Spithead

and the Nore" (Lond. 1842), 61-2; "Dropmore P.," iii, 323.

 

[455] Pitt MSS., 102. Lord Mornington deemed the surrender to the seamen

destructive of all discipline in the future ("Buckingham P.," i, 373).

 

[456] Holland, i, 84-91.

 

[457] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 137.

 

[458] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 23; App., v, vi.

 

[459] From Mr. Broadley's MSS.

 

[460] Pitt MSS., 189. See, too, "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 217; Windham

("Diary," 363) saw Williams on and after 13th May.

 

[461] J. Corbett, "England in the Seven Years' War," i, 191.

 

CHAPTER XV (NATIONAL REVIVAL)