William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

 

    A common feeling of danger has produced a common spirit of

    exertion, and we have cheerfully come forward with a surrender

    of part of our property, not merely for recovering ourselves,

    but for the general recovery of mankind.--PITT, _Speech of 3rd

    December 1798_.

 

 

The desire of Pitt for peace with France led him in the autumn of 1796

to renew more formally the overtures which he had instituted early in

that year. His first offer was repelled in so insolent a way that the

King expressed annoyance at its renewal being deemed necessary to call

forth the spirit of the British lion. Pitt, however, despatched Lord

Malmesbury on a special mission to Paris; and the slowness of his

journey, due to the bad roads, led Burke to remark: "No wonder it was

slow; for he went all the way on his knees." Pitt's terms were by no

means undignified. He offered that France should keep San Domingo and

her conquests in Europe except those made from Austria. The French

reverses in Swabia and the check to Bonaparte at Caldiero made the

French Directory complaisant for a time; but his victory at Arcola (17th

November), the death of the Czarina Catharine, and the hope of

revolutionizing Ireland, led it to adopt an imperious tone. Its

irrevocable resolve to keep Belgium and the Rhine boundary appeared in a

curt demand to Malmesbury, either to concede that point or to quit Paris

within forty-eight hours (19th December).[462]

 

It argued singular hopefulness in Pitt that, despite the opposition of

the King, he should make a third effort for peace in the summer of the

year 1797, when the loyalty of the fleet was open to grave doubt, when

rebellion raised its head in Ireland, and Bonaparte had beaten down the

last defences of Austria; but so early as 9th April he urged on George

the need of making pacific overtures to Paris, seeing that Austria was

at the end of her resources and seemed on the point of accepting the

French terms. The untoward events of the next weeks deepened his

convictions; and to a letter of the Earl of Carlisle, pressing on him

the urgent need of peace, he replied as follows:

 

    [_Draft._] _Private._

                                 Downing St., _4 June 1797_.[463]

 

    I can also venture to assure you that I feel not less strongly

    than yourself the expediency of taking every step towards peace

    that can be likely to effect the object, consistent with the

    safety and honour of the country; and I have no difficulty in

    adding (for your _private_ satisfaction) that steps are taken of

    the most direct sort, and of which we must soon know the result,

    to ascertain whether the disposition of the enemy will admit of

    negotiation. On this point the last accounts from Paris seem to

    promise favourably. You will have the goodness to consider the

    fact of a step having been actually taken, as confidentially

    communicated to yourself.

 

Three days previously Pitt had sent to Paris suggestions for peace.

Delacroix, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose asperities were so

unbearable in 1796, now replied with courtesy. Pitt therefore

persevered, declaring it to be his duty as a Christian and a patriot to

end so terrible a war. On the other hand Grenville pronounced the

negotiation mischievous at the present crisis, when the French

Government would certainly proffer intolerable demands. Much, it was

true, could be said in favour of concluding peace before Austria

definitely came to terms with France; and if Russia and Prussia had

shown signs of mediating in our favour, the negotiation might have had a

favourable issue. But neither of those Courts evinced good-will, and

that of Berlin angered Grenville. He therefore strongly opposed the

overture to France, and herein had the support of the three Whig

Ministers, Portland, Spencer, and Windham. The others sided with Pitt,

Lord Liverpool after some hesitation. On 15th June there were two long

and stormy meetings of the Cabinet, the latter lasting until midnight;

but on the morrow, the day after the collapse of the Nore Mutiny, the

Cabinet endorsed the views of Pitt. Thereupon Grenville entered a

written protest, and wrote to the King, stating that he would offer his

resignation if the times were not so critical. George thanked him, and

in a highly significant phrase urged him to remain at his post so as "to

stave off many farther humiliations."[464]

 

Malmesbury proceeded to Lille and entered into negotiations with the

French plenipotentiaries, Letourneur, Pléville, and Maret. The last was

he who came on a fruitless errand to London in January 1793, and finally

became Duc de Bassano, and Foreign Minister under Napoleon. It soon

appeared that the only hope of peace lay in the triumph of the Moderates

over the Jacobins at Paris. The former, who desired peace, and had an

immense majority in the country, at first had the upper hand in the

Chambers. They were willing to give up some of the French conquests on

the Rhine and in the Belgic Provinces, if their distracted and nearly

bankrupt country gained the boon of peace. Their opponents, weak in

numbers, relied on the armies, and on the fierce fanaticism which clung

alike to the principles and the conquests of the Jacobins. Pitt was

willing to meet France half-way. He consented to leave her in possession

of her "constitutional" frontiers, _i.e._, Belgium, Luxemburg, Avignon,

Savoy, and Nice, besides restoring to her and her allies all naval

conquests, except the Cape of Good Hope and Trinidad. Ceylon, a recent

conquest, was to be reserved for exchange. So far, but no farther, Pitt

consented to go in his desire for peace. Later on he assured Malmesbury

that he would have given way either on Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope.

But this latter concession would have galled him deeply; for, as we

shall see, he deemed the possession of the Cape essential to British

interests in the East. Spain's demand for Gibraltar he waived aside as

wholly inadmissible, thus resuming on this question the attitude which

he had taken up in the years 1782-3.[465]

 

Far though Pitt went on the path of conciliation, he did not satisfy

the haughty spirits dominant at Paris. It was soon evident that the only

means of satisfying them were subterranean; and a go-between now offered

himself. An American, Melvill, who claimed to be on intimate terms with

the most influential persons at Paris, assured Malmesbury that he could

guarantee the concession of the desired terms, on consideration of the

payment of £450,000 to the leading men at Paris. Malmesbury at first

believed in Melvill's sincerity and sent him over to see Pitt. They had

some interviews at Holwood at the close of August, apparently to the

satisfaction of the Prime Minister; for, after referring the proposal to

Grenville, he laid it before the King. His reply, dated Weymouth, 9th

September, advised a wary acceptance of the terms, provided that France

also gave up her claim of indemnity for the ships taken or burnt at

Toulon in 1793.

 

The King did not then know of the _coup d'état_ of Fructidor 18 (4th

September), whereby Augereau, the right hand of Bonaparte, coerced the

Moderates and installed the Jacobins in power. The work was done with

brutal thoroughness, prominent opponents being seized and forthwith

deported, while the triumphant minority annulled the elections in

forty-nine Departments, and by unscrupulous pressure compelled voters to

endorse the _fiat_ of the army. Thus did France plunge once more into a

Reign of Terror, and without the golden hopes which had made the former

experiment bearable. Such was virtually the end of parliamentary

government in France. It is indeed curious that critics of Pitt, who

label his repressive measures a "Reign of Terror," bestow few words of

regret on the despicable acts of the "Fructidorians," whose policy of

leaden repression at home and filibustering raids abroad made the name

of Liberty odious to her former devotees.

 

The new tyrants at Paris withheld all news of the _coup d'état_ until

they could override the policy of the French plenipotentiaries at Lille.

There it seemed probable that peace might ensue, when, on 9th September,

the first authentic news of Augereau's violence arrived. Even so, Pitt

hoped that the triumphant faction would be inclined to enjoy their

success in peace. It was not to be. A member of the French embassy at

Lille discerned far more clearly the motives now operating at Paris,

that the new Directory, while making peace with Austria, would continue

the war with England in order to have a pretext for keeping up its

armies and acquiring compensations. In any case the successors of the

pacific trio with whom Malmesbury had almost come to terms, demanded

that England should restore every possession conquered from the French

or their allies. This implied the surrender of the Cape, Ceylon, and

Trinidad, besides minor places on which Pitt and his colleagues held

firm. Brief discussions took place, Malmesbury continuing to show tact

and good temper; but on Sunday, 17th September, the French

plenipotentiaries requested him, if he could not grant their demands, to

leave Lille within twenty-four hours. He departed early on Monday,

reached London by noon of Wednesday, and saw Grenville and Canning

immediately. Pitt, owing to news of the death of his brother-in-law,

Eliot, was too prostrate with grief to see him until the morrow. It then

appeared that the Directory on 11th September issued a secret order to

its plenipotentiaries to send off Malmesbury within twenty-four hours if

he had not full powers to surrender all Britain's conquests.[466]

 

Even now there was a glimmer of hope. By some secret channel, Melvill,

O'Drusse, or else Boyd the banker, Pitt received the startling offer,

that Talleyrand, if he remained in favour at Paris, could assure to

England the Dutch settlements in question if a large enough sum were

paid over to Barras, Rewbell, and their clique. Pitt clutched at this

straw, and on 22nd September wrote to the King, stating that for

£1,200,000 we could retain Ceylon, and for £800,000 the Cape of Good

Hope. While withholding the name of the intermediaries, known only to

himself and Dundas, he strongly urged that £2,000,000 be paid down when

a treaty in this sense was signed with France, provided that that sum

could be presented to Parliament under the head of secret service.

George, now at Windsor, cannot have been pleased that Pitt and Dundas

had a state secret which was withheld for him; but he replied on the

morrow in terms, part of which Earl Stanhope did not publish. "I am so

thoroughly convinced of the venality of that nation [France] and the

strange methods used by its Directors in carrying on negotiations that I

agree with him [Pitt] in thinking, strange as the proposal appears, that

it may be not without foundation."

 

George, then, was more sceptical than Pitt; and Grenville and

Malmesbury soon had cause to believe the offer to be merely an effort of

certain Frenchmen to speculate in the English funds. Nothing came of the

matter. Melvill, O'Drusse, and Talleyrand on the French side, and Boyd

in London, seem to have been the wire-pullers in this affair, which was

renewed early in October; it may have been only a "bull" operation. The

secret is hard to fathom; but Pitt and Dundas were clearly too

credulous. Such was the conclusion of Malmesbury. It tallied with the

pronouncement of Windham, who in one of his captious moods remarked to

Malmesbury that Pitt had no knowledge of the world, and kept in office

by making concessions, and by "tiding it over." Grenville (he said)

thought more of the nation's dignity, but was almost a recluse. In fact,

the Cabinet was ruled by Dundas, whom Grenville hated. Dundas it was who

had sacrificed Corsica, which involved the loss of Italy.[467] Windham

of course detested the author of the colonial expeditions, which had

diverted help from the Bretons. In the Chouans alone he saw hope; for

how could England struggle on alone against France if she could use all

the advantages offered by Brest and Cherbourg?

 

Much can be said in support of these contentions; for now that the

Directory threw away the scabbard, England felt the need of the stout

Bretons, whose armies had become mere predatory bands. The last

predictions of Burke were therefore justified. That once mighty

intellect expended its last flickering powers in undignified gibes at

the expense of Pitt and his regicide peace. Fate denied to him the

privilege of seeing Malmesbury again expelled from France and whipped

back "like a cur to his kennel." The great Irishman passed away, amidst

inconceivable gloom, in his 68th year, at Beaconsfield (8th July 1797).

In the view of Windham and other extreme Royalists, Burke was wholly

right, and Pitt's weakness was the cause of all his country's ills.

 

We may grant that the summer of the year 1797 was one of the worst

possible