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April 12, Trondheim assumed a new importance. It was not only an ancient capital but it was also the third largest metropolitan area in Norway, and it formed the country‘s main communications hub. Both Germans and Norwegians considered the city the key military objective.

The only strategic importance of Narvik, in Norwegian view, was as a shipping port for iron ore. Narvik is located over 400 miles north of Trondheim. The German forces in Narvik were isolated and the only realistic hope of reinforcements was overland from Trondheim. The recapture of that city and Værnes Airfield would place Narvik beyond the range of any supporting German aircraft. The Norwegian forces mobilizing in North Norway were capable of isolating the Germans and then going on the offensive. Their greatest need was air and naval support. Some Allied forces were welcomed but the Norwegians felt that they could be put to far better use for both the overall campaign and the effort in Narvik if they were used to recapture Trondheim, removing any chance of German reinforcements and eliminating their air threat.

Some within the MCC—particularly Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff—had recognized the importance of Trondheim as early as April 9. He resurfaced the idea at a meeting of the committee on April 11 but it was reluctant to undo the planning and preparations undertaken the past two days. Churchill, while agreeing that the recapture of Trondheim should be studied, stressed that no decision be made until it was known what was required at Narvik. The MCC adjourned without making any changes to the plans and preparations.

Moulton writes that Churchill, Admiral Pound and Air Chief Marshal Newall went to see General Ironside at 0100 hours on April 12. Churchill and the others who have written about the Norwegian campaign do not mention this meeting. The visitors suggested that part of the force on its way to Narvik be diverted to Namsos as part of a drive on Trondheim. Ironside reportedly argued vehemently against this solution on dubious practical grounds. His reasoning was that it was not possible to divert an invasion force destined for one location to another. This would be true under normal circumstances, but in this case the force was not ready for immediate action at either destination.

The War Cabinet met the following morning and the messages from the political/military mission to Sweden and from Sir Cecil Dormer had arrived. Churchill argued for no action against Trondheim that would threaten the success in the operation against Narvik. He conceded that if that city was recaptured quickly, the French alpine troops could be diverted for operations against Trondheim. Chamberlain was impressed with the views expressed by the Swedes and Norwegians and suggested that forces to recapture Trondheim should be put ashore in Namsos. Churchill was quick to point to the lack of information on the military situation in that part of the country and that such information was vital before undertaking any operations. Apparently, none of those present had the courage to point out to Churchill that there was an equal scarcity of information about the military situation in the Narvik area. The decision to make Narvik the priority target was left standing, but not for long.

The War Cabinet met again in the afternoon. This time both Chamberlain and Halifax argued for the political necessity of retaking Trondheim. Ironside objected initially because the expedition would require troops that were now in France, but then he qualified his position by stating that diversion of some troops destined for Narvik would not imperil that operation. Most cabinet members now threw their support behind Chamberlain and it was decided that operations to retake Trondheim be undertaken while allowing the operation against Narvik to proceed. While Churchill and Ironside’s insistence on Narvik was strategically fallacious, no one had the wisdom or moral courage to go after the logical objective—Trondheim—with all available forces. This division of effort almost guaranteed failure of both undertakings.

We are getting a little ahead of ourselves, but when the news of the naval action on April 13 reached London, the decision makers became overconfident. They felt that the capture of Narvik would be relatively easy and only a few days away. They decided to divert the 146th Brigade—now only hours from Harstad—to Namsos to form the northern prong of the pincer movement envisioned against Trondheim. This caused additional problems and further confusion. The 146th Brigade had no maps of its new area of operation, much of its equipment was loaded on ships carrying the 24th Guards Brigade to Harstad, and the brigade commander and his staff had already landed in Harstad, over 300 miles from the brigade’s new destination.

The selection of the unit sent to Namsos also seems strange. If operations against Narvik were viewed as easy, it would make better sense to send the best troops—the 24th Guards Brigade—to Namsos instead of the poorly trained and equipped territorial brigade. As matters developed, the Guards sat in the Narvik area for weeks without taking part in operations.

Churchill intervened again. In a visit to Ironside at 0200 hours on April 14, he proposed yet another alternation to plans. He suggested a direct attack on Trondheim by landing a small force to seize the city in conjunction with landings at Namsos and Åndalsnes. Ironside, who had earlier agreed reluctantly to the diversion of the 146th Brigade, now had second thoughts about the wisdom of that agreement. He relented when Churchill pointed out that the suggestion was made in his capacity as Chairman of the MCC; in other words, as Ironside’s superior in the British wartime chain of command. The order from the Chiefs of Staff was sent out on the 14th. It covered the landings of the 146th Brigade at Namsos and called for reinforcement of that force with a half-brigade of Chasseurs Alpines (CA) that the French had reluctantly agreed to divert from Narvik.

The MCC considered Churchill’s suggestion to land inside the fjord near Trondheim on April 13. The naval staff’s assessment

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