Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

of the feasibility of such an operation was positive. They believed that the shore batteries at the fjord entrance could be dealt with easily, and plans for the operation were prepared. These plans envisioned the use of three battleships and two aircraft carriers with eighty aircraft. Bomber Command would make nightly attacks on Værnes Airfield, and the airfields at Sola and Fornebu would be given special attention just before and during the operational phase.

The plan—code-named Hammer—called for a landing near Værnes, at a village called Hell, by the 15th Infantry Brigade. This unit was part of the 5th Division located in France. A force of two Canadian battalions would land near the fjord entrance and capture the shore batteries. The 147th Infantry Brigade would serve as a reserve. Major General Hotblack, with a divisional headquarters, was designated the force commander.

In its larger scope, the plan called for the 146th Brigade and French alpine troops to advance from Namsos and link up with the 15th Brigade near Værnes. Simultaneously, the 148th Infantry Brigade would land at Åndalsnes and advance towards Dombås. Its mission was two-fold. First, it would block any push towards Trondheim by German forces in the south in case these were able to break through the Norwegian lines. Secondly, it was hoped that the Germans in Trondheim would send forces to meet this southern threat. Except for the rosy assumption that two battalions of poorly trained territorial troops, without artillery, air support, winter training, or winter equipment could traverse the 190 miles between Åndalsnes and Trondheim across snow-clad mountains, it was a good plan—the best the Allies had developed so far.

B

EACHHEAD

C

ONSOLIDATION AND

S

ECOND

N

AVAL

B

ATTLE

“I do not believe that soldiers were ever, in the history of warfare, sent against an enemy with such a useless weapon.”

ADMIRAL KARL DÖNITZ ON THE GERMAN TORPEDO PROBLEMS.

Admiralty Eagerness to Follow up on First Naval Battle

After receiving Warburton-Lee’s last message that one enemy cruiser and three destroyers were attacking him, Admiral Whitworth finally took action. He sent the cruiser Penelope, commanded by Captain Yates, and four destroyers to Warburton-Lee’s aid. They arrived too late to participate in the battle and did not enter Ofotfjord. The Admiralty sent a message directly to Captain Yates in the Penelope at 2012 hours on April 11: “If in light of experience this morning you consider it a justifiable operation, take available destroyers in Narvik area and attack enemy in Narvik tonight or tomorrow morning.”1

Whitworth apparently had his fill of the Admiralty dealing directly with his subordinates. He sent a message that did not mention the breach of the chain of command but complained that he had received three tasks, and they appeared incompatible. He mentioned that he had orders to prevent the Germans from leaving Narvik, to prevent reinforcements from reaching Narvik, and to attack the Germans in Narvik. He asked for some clarification and added that he considered an attack on Narvik risky and that it would interfere with what he saw as his primary mission of keeping reinforcements from reaching Narvik. Admiral Forbes adopted an attitude of diplomatic silence by not sending a message supporting Whitworth. The Admiralty simply ignored Whitworth’s pique.

Captain Yates appears to have had doubts about his orders. Warburton-Lee’s message about an enemy cruiser in the Narvik area worried him, and the destroyer Bedouin had reported the presence of electrically controlled mines in the fjord and possible German shore defenses on Barøy. The explosions that Bedouin reported as mines were actually torpedoes fired at it by U25. The torpedoes were not observed from the destroyer, missed their target and exploded nearby without causing any damage. So far, the British had not observed any submarines, so this threat did not add to the total of Yates’s concerns.

The Admiralty had waited over 13 hours after receipt of the message from Hostile before prodding Captain Yates to attack Narvik. Despite their own sluggishness, they were asking him to make an immediate attack, either that night or early in the morning. Yates sent a diplomatic response about three hours after he had received their suggestion:2

I consider attack justifiable although element of surprise has been lost. Navigational dangers from ships sunk today eliminate chances of a successful night attack. Propose attacking at dawn on 12th since operation orders cannot be got and issued for tomorrow in view of escorting ships’ dispositions and destroyers on patrol.

On April 12, he would face the same navigational obstacles, the same enemy, and they would have had time to make repairs and prepare their defenses in the interim. Yates may have shared the views of his superior, Admiral Whitworth, about the risks involved in an immediate attack. He used the speculative and inaccurate assessment by Lieutenant Commander McCoy in the Bedouin to end any possibility of a quick attack on Narvik. At 0930 hours on April 11, he signaled the Admiralty: “Bedouin is of the opinion that the operation on the lines of yesterday’s attack could not be carried out successfully. In light of this report I concur and regret that I must reverse my decision given in my 2310/10th.”3

The German Naval Situation

Commander Bey’s report to Naval Command West was received with dismay, despite the fact that significant losses had been expected and ruled acceptable. The operational status of the German destroyers in Narvik after the naval battle on April 10 was as follows:

Wilhelm Heidkamp. In the process of sinking. Eighty-one dead.

Dieter von Roeder. Immobile after five hits. Forward guns were still operable and the ship could be used as a floating battery. Not refueled. Thirteen dead.

Anton Schmitt. Sunk. Fifteen killed.

Hermann Künne. Undamaged but not refueled.

Hans Lüdemann. Sustained two hits. One gun destroyed and aft magazine flooded. Not refueled. Two killed.

Georg Thiele. Badly damaged by seven hits. Severe damage to hull and engines. Two guns and fire control system not reparable. Magazines flooded. Not refueled. Thirteen killed.

Bernd