Other
Read books online » Other » Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

Book online «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖». Author Henrik Lunde



1 ... 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 ... 238
Go to page:
Ringebu. The first German attack at 1130 hours on April 25 was repelled despite considerable British losses to an intense enemy artillery bombardment. The forward British company was forced to withdraw by 1600 hours after having lost 89 men. The Germans tried to envelop the defending force but the British managed to extend their left flank and frustrate the flanking movement. General Smyth was wounded early in the engagement and Lieutenant Colonel Kent-Lemon assumed command of the brigade. The York and Lancaster Battalion occupied a position behind the village through which the forward units could withdraw.

The Germans resumed their attack at 0630 on April 26. This time they sent a whole battalion around the British left flank and the companies there became heavily engaged. The Germans also attacked in the center with heavy air and artillery support. While the French-made British antitank guns proved effective, some were neutralized by enemy artillery fire. Despite supporting attacks by Norwegian ski troops sent by General Hvinden-Haug, the British were in danger of having the road behind their positions cut by the German envelopment. The situation was becoming precarious for the British, not only because of the envelopment, but also from groups of Germans who infiltrated gaps between the companies.

General Paget ordered withdrawal from Kvam at 2300 hours. The York and Lancasters, and one company from the Green Howards, were to set up a position at Kjørem, five kilometers to the north, and the British were to withdraw through these positions. Two companies on the far left of the British line were not informed about the withdrawal and had to make a perilous escape through the hills.

Generals Paget and Ruge met on April 26, and a new command arrangement was worked out. The British now had the preponderance of forces in Gudbrandsdal and it was therefore natural that all forces in that area should be under British command since British forces had operated under Norwegian command when the situation was reversed. Paget, who was worried about a German breakthrough in Østerdal presenting a threat to his rear, had suggested a withdrawal to the rugged terrain south of Dombås but this was not acceptable to Ruge. To do so would mean sacrificing TF Dahl, now on the offensive against the German left flank at Fåberg.

Both Paget and Ruge reported back to their respective governments around this time. Paget’s report on April 26 refers to the 148th having “had a dusting,” and it fed the flames of ill feeling among the Norwegians by calling some of their units “unreliable.” He also gave a greatly exaggerated estimate of German strength when he reported that the 15th Brigade faced two or three German divisions.13

General Massy’s reply on April 27 emphasized the importance of holding a bridgehead that included Dombås and a 70-kilometer stretch to the north as far as Opdal in order that a second base could be developed in Sunndalsfjord. It is difficult to understand Massy’s message in view of what was going on in London and Paris. Chamberlain had ordered plans finalized for an evacuation of Åndalsnes and Namsos on April 26 and Massy received permission from the Prime Minister and the War Office to evacuate Åndalsnes the following day, the very day on which he sent the message to Paget.

General Ruge’s report to the government on April 25 was bleak. He stated that his troops were exhausted after over two weeks of continued fighting and he expected the Norwegian and British forces to be swept aside within a day or two. He concluded that future operations had to be based in Trøndelag and North Norway.16 Ruge was apparently in the dark as to the situation in Trøndelag. On the day prior to Ruge’s report the Allies, rather than advancing on Trondheim, were in full retreat.

Kjørem was only a temporary delaying position. The British were preparing positions at Otta, 12 kilometers to the north. Kjørem was held by the York and Lancaster battalion. The Germans launched their attack shortly after 0800 in the morning of April 27. They repeated their tactics of frontal attack supported by heavy artillery at the same time as they worked on the British flanks. The front company in the British defenses was driven out of its positions when the woods around it were set on fire. Attempts to recapture the position failed.

The British had sent security well into the hills on both flanks but when the order was given to withdraw, they discovered that a German flanking movement over the mountains had succeeded in cutting the road behind their positions. The British managed to escape the trap, but sustained heavy losses. One company became separated and made its way back to Dombås after a 24-hour march through snow-covered mountains. The battalion lost about half of its original strength of 600. The Germans had only ten killed and 42 wounded.

At Otta, it was the Green Howards’ turn to try to slow the German advance. The battalion was short one company. The area southeast of Otta was excellent defensive terrain. The Germans softened up the British positions by air attacks and artillery fire before launching a ground attack. The Green Howards were well dug in and they suffered only minor losses from these attacks. The British antitank weapons again proved effective and the ground fighting, which began around 1030 hours, ebbed back and forth most of the day until the British company on the west side of the river was forced back towards the town and across the railroad bridge, which was destroyed around 2200 hours. The order to withdraw from Otta was issued about this time. Again, one of the forward companies did not get the message but it managed to disengage.

Norwegian Operations in Gausdal, Østerdal, and Valdres

After it was decided not to pull TF Dahl into Gudbrandsdal, Colonel Dahl considered two possibilities: 1) link up with Colonel Østbye’s forces fighting in Valdres; or 2) conduct delaying actions in Gausdal south of Vinstra. A reconnaissance proved that it was not possible

1 ... 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 ... 238
Go to page:

Free ebook «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖» - read online now

Comments (0)

There are no comments yet. You can be the first!
Add a comment