Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖
- Author: Henrik Lunde
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Carton de Wiart was promised forces that he never received. In addition to the 146th Brigade he was pledged the 148th Brigade, to arrive on April 17, French forces on April 18, and the 147th Brigade with artillery on April 20 or 21. The 147th and the artillery never arrived and the 148th was diverted to Åndalsnes.
The landing of British forces in Namsos, as in the other areas of the country, took place amid considerable confusion. The 146th Brigade was destined for the Narvik area when diverted to Namsos at the last moment. The brigade commander landed in Harstad and it took some time for him to rejoin his command. There were no maps of the area, only of Narvik. This brigade, like the 148th, was separated from some of its critical equipment in the confusing period after April 7 and the transports were not loaded tactically. To make matters worse, much equipment ended up in Narvik and had to be reshipped to Namsos. There was no artillery, no air support, and the skis had no bindings.20 In the hurry to get the transports out of the Luftwaffe’s reach, at least 130 tons of valuable supplies and equipment sailed away in the returning transports.
Colonel Ole Berg Getz, commanding the 5th Field Brigade, was in charge of all Norwegian troops in this part of the country as of April 16. His forces did not come under General Carton de Wiart’s authority, but as soon as the Allies landed, Getz reported to Carton de Wiart and offered whatever help and cooperation was needed. He placed all his forces at the disposal of the British and he undertook a major reorganization of his command in order to create as many ski detachments as possible. The 2/13th Inf provided one ski company and two were formed by the 3rd Cavalry.
General Fleischer, as mentioned earlier, transferred the 1/14th Inf from his control to that of Getz on April 14. This force arrived in the Namsos area on April 18–19 and was organized as a ski battalion. Getz explained to Carton de Wiart that Norwegian forces were pulled back to Steinkjer because of the amphibious threat posed by the Germans who controlled the fjord and because his troops had only a one-day supply of ammunition.21
Carton de Wiart decided to establish himself in the Steinkjer area initially, with forward security at Verdal, near the Norwegian security force. The French forces remained in the Namsos area while waiting for the arrival of equipment and supplies. The Norwegian forces assumed the mission of protecting the British eastern flank. Carton de Wiart placed strict limitations on the operational information shared with Getz because he feared leaks. Consequently, the Norwegians were unsuccessful in their attempts to coordinate their activities with the British forces. The British troops were assembled at Steinkjer on April 19 with one battalion south of that town and a one-company security force at Stiklestad. The Allied troops now numbered about 4,700.
Colonel Getz urged them to move forward and secure a defile south of Åsen and about 50 kilometers from Trondheim, before the Germans seized it. The number of Norwegian troops at Trøndelag was about equal to that of the Allies and together they had a clear numerical superiority over the Germans. The defile south of Åsen was an excellent defensive position, could be supported by the Norwegian forces at Hegra, and served as a good starting point for an offensive against Trondheim. However, it appears that the Allies felt there was no urgency.
Major General Woytasch, commander of the 181st Infantry Division, arrived in Trondheim on April 20 and he immediately initiated operations to secure his northern front. His first goal was to secure the area between Steinkjer and Snåsa, to protect Trondheim from the threat of a Norwegian–Allied offensive. He sent an infantry battalion, two companies of mountain troops, and some artillery into that area. Some of these troops advanced along the road from Trondheim while others carried out amphibious landings at Innerøya and Trones, in the right rear of the Norwegian and British forces at Verdal and Stiklestad. The landings were made from armed trawlers and seized Norwegian fishing vessels.
The Norwegian motorized machinegun troop at Verdalsøra repelled frontal attacks in the morning of April 20. After about one hour of fighting, the German unit that landed at Trones attacked the Norwegians from behind. The Norwegians lost one platoon and the rest of the troop withdrew to Stiklestad where it linked up with the British company. The British were trying to regroup their forces to defend against the German landing at Inderøy by pulling the company at Stiklestad back to the northern end of Lake Leksdal. The Norwegian troops also withdrew and, at the request of the British, most were sent to the Ogndal area to provide the British with flank protection.
The Germans infiltrated the British lines, forcing a withdrawal to Ogndal in the afternoon of April 20. That night, the Germans also made an amphibious landing near Steinkjer. General Phillips decided to withdraw his brigade to the Beistad area on the road from Steinkjer to Namsos. Getz also withdrew his forces and positioned his forward units at Stod and at another line along Lake Snåsa, in the Valøy-Øksnes area. In the short span of 24 hours, the Germans had captured the area between Åsen and Steinkjer and forced the Allies to abandon Steinkjer.
The Luftwaffe conducted continuous attacks against Steinkjer and Namsos and the Allies lost much of their supplies in these attacks. Carton de Wiart, who witnessed the destruction of Namsos, sent a message to the War Office on April 21 in which he pointed out that it would not be possible to carry out his mission as long as
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