An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) 📖

>parts of Europe, the labour of the country people was under the

direction of a local or provincial magistracy, which had no

immediate dependency upon the king’s council. But, by the

present practice, both the labour of the country people, and

whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for the

reparation of the highroads in any particular province or

generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant ;

an officer who is appointed and removed by the king’s council who

receives his orders from it, and is in constant correspondence

with it. In the progress of despotism, the authority of the

executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in

the state, and assumes to itself the management of every branch

of revenue which is destined for any public purpose. In France,

however, the great post-roads, the roads which make the

communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in

general kept in good order; and, in some provinces, are even a

good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike roads of

England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far

greater part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected,

and are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy

carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on

horseback, and mules are the only conveyance which can safely be

trusted. The proud minister of an ostentatious court, may

frequently take pleasure in executing a work of splendour and

magnificence, such as a great highway, which is frequently seen

by the principal nobility, whose applauses not only flatter his

vanity, but even contribute to support his interest at court. But

to execute a great number of little works, in which nothing that

can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the smallest

degree of admiration in any traveller, and which, in short, have

nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a

business which appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to

merit the attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an

administration therefore, such works are almost always entirely

neglected.

 

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive

power charges itself both with the reparation of the highroads,

and with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the

instructions which are given to the governor of each province,

those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and

the judgment which the court forms of his conduct is very much

regulated by the attention which he appears to have paid to this

part of his instructions. This branch of public police,

accordingly, is said to be very much attended to in all those

countries, but particularly in China, where the highroads, and

still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very

much every thing of the same kind which is known in Europe. The

accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to

Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and wondering

travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If they

had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts

of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would

not, perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which

Bernier gives of some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very

short of what had been reported of them by other travellers, more

disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too, perhaps, be

in those countries, as it is in France, where the great roads,

the great communications, which are likely to be the subjects of

conversation at the court and in the capital, are attended to,

and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and

in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the

sovereign arises almost altogether from a land tax or land rent,

which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce

of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his

revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately

connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of

its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to

render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it

is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible,

and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the

least expensive communication between all the different parts of

the country; which can be done only by means of the best roads

and the best navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign

does not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax or

land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the

greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the

land: but that dependency is neither so immediate nor so evident.

In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so

directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity

and value of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good

roads and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that

produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I

apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia

this department of the public police is very properly managed by

the executive power, there is not the least probability that,

during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed

by that power in any part of Europe.

 

Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they

cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of

which the convecniency is nearly confined to some particular

place or district, are always better maintained by a local or

provincial revenue, under the management of a local and

provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the

state, of which the executive power must always have the

management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at

the expense of the treasury, is there any probability that they

would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or

even at so small an expense ? The expense, besides, instead of

being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each

particular street, parish, or district in London, would, in this

case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and

would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of

the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit

from the lighting and paving of the streets of London.

 

The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial

administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous

soever they may appear, are in reality, however, almost always

very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take place in

the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a great

empire. They are, besides, much more easily corrected. Under the

local or provincial administration of the justices of the peace

in Great Britain, the six days labour which the country people

are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not

always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever

exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In

France, under the administration of the intendants, the

application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is

frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such corvees, as they

are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by

which those officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which

has had the misfortune to fall under their dspleasure.

 

Of the public Works and Institution which are necessary for

facilitating particular Branches of Commerce.

 

The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned,

is to facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate

some particular branches of it, particular institutions are

necessary, which again require a particular and extraordinary

expense.

 

Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with

barbarous and uncivilized nations, require extraordinary

protection. An ordinary store or counting-house could give

little security to the goods of the merchants who trade to the

western coast of Africa. To defend them from the barbarous

natives, it is necessary that the place where they are deposited

should be in some measure fortified. The disorders in the

government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like

precaution necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and

it was under pretence of securing their persons and property from

violence, that both the English and French East India companies

were allowed to erect the first forts which they possessed in

that country. Among other nations, whose vigorous government will

suffer no strangers to possess any fortified place within their

territory, it may be necessary to maintain some ambassador,

minister, or consul, who may both decide, according to their own

customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen, and,

in their disputes with the natives, may by means of his public

character, interfere with more authority and afford them a more

powerful protection than they could expect from any private man.

The interests of commerce have frequently made it necessary to

maintain ministers in foreign countries, where the purposes

either of war or alliance would not have required any. The

commerce of the Turkey company first occasioned the establishment

of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first English

embassies to Russia arose altogether from commercial interests.

The constant interference with those interests, necessarily

occasioned between the subjects of the different states of

Europe, has probably introduced the custom of keeping, in all

neighbouring countries, ambassadors or ministers constantly

resident, even in the time of peace. This custom, unknown to

ancient times, seems not to be older than the end of the

fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than

the time when commerce first began to extend itself to the

greater part of the nations of Europe, and when they first began

to attend to its interests.

 

It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which

the protection of any particular branch of commerce may occasion,

should be defrayed by a moderate tax upon that particular branch;

by a moderate fine, for example, to be paid by the traders when

they first enter into it; or, what is more equal, by a particular

duty of so much per cent. upon the goods which they either import

into, or export out of, the particular countries with which it is

carried on. The protection of trade, in general, from pirates and

freebooters, is said to have given occasion to the first

institution of the duties of customs. But, if it was thought

reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in order to defray

the expense of protecting trade in general, it should seem

equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular

branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary expense of

protecting that branch.

 

The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered

as essential to the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that

account, a necessary part of the duty of the executive power. The

collection and application of the general duties of customs,

therefore, have always been left to that power. But the

protection of any particular branch of trade is a part of the

general protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the duty of

that power; and if nations always acted consistently, the

particular duties levied for the purposes of such particular

protection, should always have been left equally to its disposal.

But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations have not

always acted consistently; and in the greater part of the

commercial states of Europe, particular companies of merchants

have had the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to

them the performance of this part of the