An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) 📖
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credit gradually declined. In 1712, their debts had become so
great, that a particular act of parliament was thought necessary,
both for their security and for that of their creditors. It was
enacted, that the resolution of two-thirds of these creditors in
number and value should bind the rust, both with regard to the
time which should be allowed to the company for the payment of
their debts, and with regard to any other agreement which it
might be thought proper to make with them concerning those debts.
In 1730, their affairs were in so great disorder, that they were
altogether incapable of maintaining their forts and garrisons,
the sole purpose and pretext of their institution. From that
year till their final dissolution, the parliament judged it
necessary to allow the annual sum of �10,000 for that purpose.
In 1732, after having been for many years losers by the trade of
carrying negroes to the West Indies, they at last resolved to
give it up altogether ; to sell to the private traders to America
the negroes which they purchased upon the coast; awl to employ
their servants in a trade to the inland parts of Africa for gold
dust, elephants teeth, dyeing drugs, etc. But their success in
this more confined trade was not greater than in their former
extensive one. Their affairs continued to go gradually to
decline, till at last, being in every respect a bankrupt company,
they were dissolved by act of parliament, and their forts and
garrisons vested in the present regulated company of merchants
trading to Africa. Before the erection of the Royal African
company, there had been three other joint-stock companies
successively established, one after another, for the African
trade. They were all equally unsuccessful. They all, however, had
exclusive charters, which, though not confirmed by act of
parliament, were in those days supposed to convey a real
exclusive privilege.
The Hudson’s Bay company, before their misfortunes in the late
war, had been much more fortunate than the Royal African company.
Their necessary expense is much smaller. The whole number of
people whom they maintain in their different settlements and
habitations, which they have honoured with the name of forts, is
said not to exceed a hundred and twenty persons. This number,
however, is sufficient to prepare beforehand the cargo of furs
and other goods necessary for loading their ships, which, on
account of the ice, can seldom remain above six or eight weeks in
those seas. This advantage of having a cargo ready prepared,
could not, for several years, be acquired by private adventurers
; and without it there seems to be no possibility of trading to
Hudson’s Bay. The moderate capital of the company, which, it is
said, does not exceed one hundred and ten thousand pounds, may,
besides, be sufficient to enable them to engross the whole, or
almost the whole trade and surplus produce, of the miserable
though extensive country comprehended within their charter. No
private adventurers, accordingly, have ever attempted to trade to
that country in competition with them. This company, therefore,
have always enjoyed an exclusive trade, in fact, though they may
have no right to it in law. Over and above all this, the moderate
capital of this company is said to be divided among a very small
number of proprietors. But a joint-stock company, consisting of a
small number of proprietors, with a moderate capital, approaches
very nearly to the nature of a private copartnery, and may be
capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and attention. It
is not to be wondered at, therefore, if, in consequence of these
different advantages, the Hudson’s Bay company had, before the
late war, been able to carry on their trade with a considerable
degree of success. It does not seem probable, however, that their
profits ever approached to what the late Mr Dobbs imagined them.
A much more sober and judicious writer, Mr Anderson, author of
the Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce, very
justly observes, that upon examining the accounts which Mr Dobbs
himself has given for several years together, of their exports
and imports, and upon making proper allowances for their
extraordinary risk and expense, it does not appear that their
profits deserve to be envied, or that they can much, if at all,
exceed the ordinary profits of trade.
The South Sea company never had any forts or garrisons to
maintain, and therefore were entirely exempted from one great
expense, to which other joint-stock companies for foreign trade
are subject; but they had an immense capital divided among an
immense number of proprietors. It was naturally to be expected,
therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion, should prevail
in the whole management of their affairs. The knavery and
extravagance of their stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently
known, and the explication of them would be foreign to the
present subject. Their mercantile projects were not much better
conducted. The first trade which they engaged in, was that of
supplying the Spanish West Indies with negroes, of which (in
consequence of what was called the Assiento Contract granted them
by the treaty of Utrecht) they had the exclusive privilege. But
as it was not expected that much profit could be made by this
trade, both the Portuguese and French companies, who had enjoyed
it upon the same terms before them, having been ruined by it,
they were allowed, as compensation, to send annually a ship of
acertain burden, to trade directly to the Spanish West Indies. Of
the ten voyages which this annual ship was allowed to make, they
are said to have gained considerably by one, that of the Royal
Caroline, in 1731 ; and to have been losers, more or less, by
almost all the rest. Their ill success was imputed, by their
factors and agents, to the extortion and oppression of the
Spanish government ; but was, perhaps, principally owing to the
profusion and depredations of those very factors and agents; some
of whom are said to have acquired great fortunes, even in one
year. In 1734, the company petitioned the king, that they might
be allowed to dispose of the trade and tonnage of their annual
ship, on account of the little profit which they made by it, and
to accept of such equivalent as they could obtain from the king
of Spain.
In 1724, this company had undertaken the whale fishery. Of this,
indeed, they had no monopoly ; but as long as they carried it on,
no other British subjects appear to have engaged in it. Of the
eight voyages which their ships made to Greenland, they were
gainers by one, and losers by all the rest. After their eighth
and last voyage, when they had sold their ships, stores, and
utensils, they found that their whole loss upon this branch,
capital and interest included, amounted to upwards of �237,000.
In 1722, this company petitioned the parliament to be allowed to
divide their immense capital of more than thirty-three millions
eight hundred thousand pounds, the whole of which had been lent
to government, into two equal parts; the one half, or upwards of
�16,900,000, to be put upon the same footing with other
government annuities, and not to be subject to the debts
contracted, or losses incurred, by the directors of the company,
in the prosecution of their mercantile projects ; the other half
to remain as before, a trading stock, and to be subject to those
debts and losses. The petition was too reasonable not to be
granted. In 1733, they again petitioned the parliament, that
three-fourths of their trading stock might be turned into annuity
stock, and only one-fourth remain as trading stock, or exposed to
the hazards arising from the bad management of their directors.
Both their annuity and trading stocks had, by this time, been
reduced more than two millions each, by several different
payments from government ; so that this fourth amounted only to
�3,662,784:8:6. In 1748, all the demands of the company upon the
king of Spain, in consequence of the assiento contract, were, by
the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, given up for what was supposed an
equivalent. An end was put to their trade with the Spanish West
Indies; the remainder of their trading stock was turned into an
annuity stock ; and the company ceased, in every respect, to be a
trading company.
It ought to be observed, that in the trade which the South Sea
company carried on by means of their annual ship, the only trade
by which it ever was expected that they could make any
considerable profit, they were not without competitors, either in
the foreign or in the home market. At Carthagena, Porto Bello,
and La Vera Cruz, they had to encounter the competition of the
Spanish merchants, who brought from Cadiz to those markets
European goods, of the same kind with the outward cargo of their
ship ; and in England they had to encounter that of the English
merchants, who imported from Cadiz goods of the Spanish West
Indies, of the same kind with the inward cargo. The goods, both
of the Spanish and English merchants, indeed, were, perhaps,
subject to higher duties. But the loss occasioned by the
negligence, profusion, and malversation of the servants of the
company, had probably been a tax much heavier than all those
duties. That a joint-stock company should be able to carry on
successfully any branch of foreign trade, when private
adventurers can come into any sort of open and fair competition
with them, seems contrary to all experience.
The old English East India company was established in 1600, by a
charter from Queen Elizabeth. In the first twelve voyages which
they fitted out for India, they appear to have traded as a
regulated company, with separate stocks, though only in the
general ships of the company. In 1612, they united into a joint
stock. Their charter was exclusive, and, though not confirmed
by act of parliament, was in those days supposed to convey a real
exclusive privilege. For many years, therefore, they were not
much disturbed by interlopers. Their capital, which never
exceeded �744,000, and of which �50 was a share, was not so
exorbitant, nor their dealings so extensive, as to afford either
a pretext for gross negligence and profusion, or a cover to gross
malversation. Notwithstanding some extraordinary losses,
occassioned partly by the malice of the Dutch East India company,
and partly by other accidents, they carried on for many years a
successful trade. But in process of time, when the principles of
liberty were better understood, it became every day more and more
doubtful, how far a royal charter, not confirmed by act of
parliament, could convey an exclusive privilege. Upon this
question the decisions of the courts of justice were not uniform,
but varied with the authority of government, and the humours of
the times. Interlopers multiplied upon them; and towards the
end of the reign of Charles II., through the whole of that of
James II., and during a part of that of William III., reduced
them to great distress. In 1698, a proposal was made to
parliament, of advancing two millions to government, at eight per
cent. provided the subscribers were erected into a new East India
company, with exclusive privileges. The old East India company
offered seven hundred thousand pounds, nearly the amount of their
capital, at four per cent. upon the same conditions. But such was
at that time the state of public credit, that it was more
convenient for government to borrow two millions at eight per
cent. than seven hundred thousand pounds at four. The proposal of
the new subscribers was accepted, and a new East India company
established in consequence. The old East India company, however,
had a right to continue their trade till 1701. They had, at the
same time, in
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