Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

the French Chasseurs could not retire along this route, the Germans could not advance along it.”

GENERAL MASSY’S DISPATCH AS QUOTED BY CHURCHILL.

The Way North

The news coming from southern and central Norway in late April caused Fleischer to be concerned. The possibility of German forces moving north from Oslo linking up with those in Trondheim was real and information about the operations in the Steinkjer area was disheartening. It was becoming more and more obvious that a threat was looming in the form of a German advance that could bring them into the southern part of Nordland Province.

The straight-line distance between Namsos and Narvik is about 480 kilometers. Much of the sparsely populated Nordland Province consists of a relatively narrow sliver of land between the Norwegian Sea and the Swedish border. The terrain is difficult. It is mountainous, was covered with snow, and the north-south route is cut by a number of fjords. Namdal, the area between Grong and Mosjøen, was especially tough to traverse. There are numerous islands off the coast and in the fjords. The Arctic Circle cuts through the province and the differences between high and low tides are very pronounced at these latitudes. Fjords with narrow entrances have treacherous currents. The north-south road, Route 50, was in poor condition. Ferries were required at several points along the route and there was no road at all for the last 140 kilometers before reaching Narvik. Most of this area was a mountain wilderness. There was no railroad north of Mosjøen and the portion between the southern provincial boundary and Mosjøen was not completed. To make matters worse, there were hundreds of lakes of various sizes and the terrain was heavily forested in some parts.

Bickering Between Norwegian Commanders

To make difficulties for a German advance in the southern part of Nordland Province, Fleischer issued orders for destruction of lines of communications in that area. On April 27, he ordered the destruction of the railroad in the Namdal area north of Grong. While the railroad was not open for use, it was believed that the railroad bed would provide the Germans with an additional line of advance to the north. The Directorate of Roads in Mosjøen was also ordered to prepare the first 30 kilometers of roads north of the provincial boundary for destruction.

While events proved General Fleischer correct in his assessment of the military situation, it is important to look at these events from the standpoint of what the commanders knew at the time. While the situation in southern Norway looked bleak, Fleischer had no indications of an imminent collapse in South Norway or that the Allies were about to evacuate either Åndalsnes or Namsos. His order was issued three days before the Germans established an overland connection between their forces in southern Norway and those in Trøndelag. Under these circumstances, an order to destroy lines of communications in Nordland Province immediately was bound to have a depressing effect on the morale of the troops fighting in Trøndelag.

Fleischer had placed 1/14th Inf at Colonel Getz’s disposal for his operations in the Steinkjer area as well as the responsibility for Nordland Province south of Bodø on April 20. Getz, as the Norwegian field commander in Trøndelag, reported directly to General Ruge. He also assumed the duties as commander of the 5th Division when General Laurantzon received a medical discharge. Fleischer had no authority to issue orders directly to Getz, or to the civil authorities within his area of responsibility. Fleischer’s orders led to serious recriminations between him and Getz.

Getz received copies of the orders to the Directorate of Roads and Chief of Railroads on April 27. An earlier forgery of an important message from General Fleischer made the 5th Brigade uneasy on this subject.1 Getz provided copies of the telegrams to General de Wiart since he assumed that the orders, if not falsified, were issued because of an imminent threat of enemy landings in the north that would menace the Allied rear and make the situation in Namsos critical. Since this possibility seemed rather remote, Getz sent a message to Fleischer asking for confirmation of the order. The following day he requested that the British undertake aerial reconnaissance of the fjords between Mosjøen and Mo in order to determine if there were any enemy activities in these areas.

It was natural for Colonel Getz to be concerned about the orders since the road from Mosjøen to Grong was not only his supply route but also a logical line of retreat if that should become necessary. Fleischer, rather than consulting with Getz, issued an order on April 28 to Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal, the military commander in Nordland, to carry out the orders conveyed in the previous day’s messages to the civilian authorities.

On the same day that Nummedal received his directive from the 6th Division, Getz was told that the order (for destruction) was to be carried out and that his authority over Nordland Province would be rescinded if he created any further difficulties. Getz answered the same day, explaining the military situation in Trøndelag and stating that if it became necessary for his forces to withdraw, they would do so towards Mosjøen and destroy the railroad and road behind them.2 In view of this, Getz asked for immediate confirmation that the 6th Division wanted the lines of communications destroyed between Mosjøen and Grong. Getz kept the Allies informed about the messages between himself and Fleischer and he claims they were equally convinced that the orders were false.3

Colonel Getz also sent a message to General Ruge asking if the Army High Command had any knowledge about what he described as “an incomprehensible message” from General Fleischer to Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal. He also stated that he viewed the message as a forgery and that he would not carry out the destruction called for before he had an answer from Fleischer giving the reasons for the order. Based on a report in June 1940, Nummedal, appears to have been