Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

equally confused about what was required by the 6th Division since the order was not implemented.4

Subsequently, Getz had a telephone conversation with Fleischer, in which he claimed that Fleischer admitted that the intention of the order was to prepare the lines of communications for destruction.5 Lindbäck-Larsen denies Getz’s version vehemently although he states that he had no part in the matter since Fleischer handled it personally.6 Lindbäck-Larsen goes on to allege that Getz tried to obtain authority from the British to sabotage the order in the morning of May 2. He does not explain this serious accusation. It is probably a reference to a letter from Getz to General Carton de Wiart on that day where Getz explains that Fleischer’s order only pertained to preparations for destruction and where he mentions that a letter from the British general to Fleischer about the affair would be helpful.7

Hovland writes that Fleischer was furious when he learned on May 2 that the Allies had evacuated Namsos without prior notification to Colonel Getz. He viewed their action as nothing short of abandoning their comrades on the field of battle. Getz was equally bitter towards the Allies. He demonstrated his anger by giving a copy of Carton de Wiart’s letter to a Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet. General Feurstein writes in his book that he met Colonel Getz on his way north and the colonel gave him a copy of the British notification of evacuation while they had breakfast together.8 Hovland also maintains that Getz tried to sabotage Fleischer’s order and that he sought Allied support for this action:

As untidy as the command relationships were, General Fleischer’s authority for the order is open for discussion. What is not open for discussion is the fact that his assessment of the situation was correct, and that Getz failure to follow orders from the only superior he had contact with at this time, had disastrous consequences for later operations in Nordland.9

Whatever the facts, it is very unlikely that successful destruction of lines of communications would have prevented the “disastrous consequences.” The Germans were prepared for heavy destruction of communications lines. This was the pattern withdrawing Norwegian forces had established in southern Norway. The Germans committed large resources to repairing and improving the road and railroad between Nord-Trøndelag and Mosjøen. Five engineer companies and a large work force were employed in opening and maintaining the Grong-Mosjøen road.

While roadblocks and blown bridges required much effort to repair, those repairs were carried out speedily. Many of the breaks were repaired within 24 hours and larger projects such as railroad bridges were opened for traffic within 48 hours.10 The composition and organization of Feurstein’s lead battle groups, Sorko and Schratz, were such that they could by-pass any lines of communications breaches and be supplied by airdrop or by seaplanes. The destruction of lines of communications was therefore only a small hindrance as long as German air superiority remained unchallenged. In their withdrawal from Mo to Posthus, the British destroyed about 30 bridges behind them. This had little effect on the speed of the German advance and goes a long way to deflate the arguments of those who claimed that Getz and Nummedal’s failure to carry out destruction of the lines of communication in the southern part of the province had catastrophic consequences. However, it was unfortunate that such relations existed between two commanders who shared a common goal and it is puzzling what motives Getz and Nummedal could have had in allegedly “sabotaging” Fleischer’s order. One explanation is that they considered it illogical to destroy lines of communications that were also their supply lines after April 26, ahead rather than behind withdrawing troops.

Colonel Getz informed General Fleischer on May 2 that he was relinquishing his authority in Nordland and that he had sent the 1/14th Inf back into that province. Getz’s remaining cavalry and infantry units covered the disengagement and withdrawal of the 1/14th. It is debatable whether Getz’s two infantry battalions could have disengaged and withdrawn via Grong after the surprise Allied evacuation. The Germans were quick to move north and occupy Grong. However, Getz should have tried. While his troops were almost out of ammunition and rations, it should have been possible for them to follow in the footsteps of the 1/14th in the hope that they would be supplied along their route of withdrawal. An order to that effect from General Ruge arrived on May 3, after the surrender and while Getz’s forces were in the process of demobilizing.11

The morale in Sundlo’s 1/14th Inf battalion was high prior to Getz’s surrender. The battalion was in position on the east side of Snåsvann and had repelled several strong German probes in that area. The news of the Allied evacuation and the subsequent surrender of Getz’s forces came as a shock to the battalion from which it never recovered. A train accident at the outset of the battalion’s transportation northward, resulting in seven killed and over 30 wounded, did not help. From just north of Grong, the battalion made its way on skis and by motor vehicles over the stretch where railroad tracks had not been laid, and arrived in Mosjøen on May 5.

The low morale among the Norwegian troops in the 1/14th, which resulted in a number of desertions as the battalion withdrew through its home area, almost became a mutiny. A soldier’s committee sent a telegram to General Fleischer on May 5 suggesting that the area not be made a war zone since the means available to the battalion were so inadequate that its position was untenable. Fleischer’s answer pointed out the importance for the operations against Narvik of a tough defense as far south in Nordland Province as possible. His message concluded, “A more important mission has never been given to a Norwegian battalion.”12

Allied Finger-Pointing

The British had considered it extremely improbable that the Germans would advance from Namsos to Narvik, and consequently they were presented with a situation for which they had not planned. However, by the