Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

best solution and led to dissatisfaction in some quarters. Fleischer had selected Governor Hans Gabrielsen from Finnmark Province to head the civilian machinery. It may have been wise for the government to continue to use that machinery by making Gabrielsen responsible to it rather than to Fleischer.

General Ruge’s earlier decision not to involve himself for the time being in the military operations in North Norway turned out to be impractical. The three northern provinces were now the only theater of operations in Norway. It was unrealistic to expect that the arrival of the government as well as the army and navy high commands would lead to harmonious relations with a commander who had little respect for some members of the government, and who disliked both General Ruge and Admiral Diesen.

The protest letter on May 17 served as a watershed in the relations between General Fleischer, the government, and especially General Ruge. While some of his objections to the reshuffling of responsibilities were valid and had merit, his uncompromising attitude led to a poisonous relationship and a failure to have some of the proposed changes accepted. His refusal to accept the new political realities and his apparent unwillingness to accept General Ruge as his superior led to a loss of influence when he tried to avoid changes that he believed would damage the war effort.

The Royal Proclamation of May 18 appointed General Ruge as Armed Forces Commander, with authority over all military branches. Diesen had passed control of naval forces to Ruge during the southern campaign. He also continued his former duties as army commander. Upon his arrival in North Norway, Ruge had two options under the regulations. First, he could continue to operate with General Fleischer as commander-in-chief within that part of the country; or second, he could take over as commander-in-chief and direct operations. It appears that his initial decision was to operate with General Fleischer as commander-in-chief. It soon proved impractical to adhere strictly to this arrangement.24

Hovland writes that Ruge kept Fleischer’s letter from reaching the government as a part of his planned assumption of command of the campaign and that he therefore showed himself to be a man without scruples who would go to any lengths to advance his interests. He claims that the establishment of a Defense High Command was accomplished on May 18 without the government being made aware of General Fleischer’s objections.

Ruge answered Fleischer’s protest letter on May 23. He pointed out that in a crisis such as the country now found itself, there should not be any competence arguments or accusations, and he wanted to clarify the situation. Among other things, he pointed to the fact that North Norway had become the main theater of war. The Armed Forces High Command (FOK) was present in this part of the country and it should then automatically assume the functions that General Fleischer had taken over because of the physical and communications separation that had existed earlier with respect to the central government. The previous arrangement could no longer continue unless the FOK and the government abandoned their duties and responsibilities for defense and administration of the country.

Ruge informed Fleischer that he had not yet made the new command relationships effective because he wanted Fleischer, who had prepared the operations against Narvik, to have the honor of being in command when Narvik was recaptured. He also told Fleischer that it was his intention to give him command of the southern front (Nordland Province) as soon as the situation around Narvik was resolved or permitted such a move. In addition, he informed Fleischer that he had retained his May 17 letter since it dealt with military matters within his prerogatives and that the changes in the civil administration had been decided before he received Fleischer’s letter. If Fleischer wanted to lodge a complaint with the government about Ruge or the new command relationships, such a complaint would be expedited. Fleischer requested this be done in a letter on May 24. General Fleischer’s letter of May 17 was accordingly sent directly to the Minister of Defense along with all other correspondence between Ruge and Fleischer about the command relationships.

Fleischer’s letter of May 24, which is missing from the archives, requested that his letter of protest be forwarded to the Defense Minister. It must have convinced Ruge that he should not wait any longer to institute the new command arrangements. He announced the reorganization in a letter to Fleischer on May 26, placing the following directly under FOK: Naval High Command, 6th Division, Norwegian Forces in Nordland Province, Sector Commanders in East and West Finnmark, and 6th District Command. Ruge noted that the District Command needed to designate and separate out a Chief of Supply and necessary service chiefs for General Fleischer. He went on to solicit Fleischer’s suggestions with respect to the administrative details involving the District Command since some issues were not yet decided. He also explained why he proposed to place the Norwegian troops in Nordland directly under FOK.

In removing Roscher Nielsen’s forces from your command, it is because I believe that sooner or later it will be necessary to have a combined commander for the troops in the Salten-Bodø area. Since the Allies have the preponderance of forces there and since we are dependent on the British Navy, it should be the British commander who takes over.

Ruge’s decision elicited an immediate response from General Fleischer on May 27. He accepted only that FOK should assume the commander-in-chief duties and that the Naval High Command came under FOK. The other points were unacceptable:

… The division requests in the most urgent manner that the dissolution of the well-established command relationships not take place.

FOK also proposes to separate out the forces in Sør Hålogaland [Nordland Province] in order to place them under the English commander. This will place Norwegian troops in a subordinate relationship to Allied troops, which is not reciprocated by any Allied forces under a Norwegian commander in other places. It will place a