Washington's Engineer Norman Desmarais (best e book reader .TXT) 📖

at headquarters. Another change occurred in August 1780, when Colonel Kosciusko departed West Point to serve as an engineer in the South with General Gates. Major Jean-Louis-Ambroise de Genton, the Chevalier de Villefranche, succeeded Kosciusko as West Point’s engineer.

5

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1780 Charleston

General Washington ordered General Greene on December 15, 1779, to cooperate with General Duportail in determining what position the army should take in case of an enemy attack and to make a report to him. They submitted their report on January 16, 1780, but the sketch map accompanying the report seems to have been lost:

To locate the army to any particular spots, may facilitate the Enemi’s getting possession of advantageous grounds, either upon one or the other of our flanks—It appears to us more proper therefore, that we move the troops upon the high and advantageous grounds, according as the motions of the enemy may indicate an intention to make an impression at particular places.

Having examined the ground in and about camp, agreeable to your Excellency’s order of the 15th of December, We are of opinion, that the range of hills marked P. O. N. is that upon which the troops may be most advantageously posted, to receive the enemy should they present themselves in front of the mountains from Morristown to Kembles. Should the enemy approach us by Baskinridge and that quarter, we must occupy the grounds from the hill P. to the hill R; but if they approach us by Pluckemin, Black River and Mendham, we must draw up in the form of two sides of a square, from the hill R. to the hill S. and from the hill F. the last of which lies a little in front of the Pennsylvania line. Should the enemy attempt to penetrate our line by the way of the York Brigade, we must take post from the hill U. to the hill N.

Some of the positions are weaker than others, and some parts of each weaker than the rest; such are the intervals between the mountain Q. to the mountain R. and between the mountain R. and the mountain S. Therefore to be safe in those positions (should we be greatly inferior to the Enemy) it will be necessary to strengthen these places by art; and for this purpose it would be well to preserve as much of the wood as possible standing, on the ground.

The several positions we have marked, being composed of a chain of hills, have the advantage, that we never can be brought to a general action; the hills being divided by deep valleys, which form each, in a manner, a distinct post.

We must govern our retreat according to the enemies approach. If they approach us by the way of Morris, we can retreat by the way of Mendham, but if they approach by the way of Baskinridge, or Mendham, we may retreat by the way of Morris. However the position of the army is at such a remove from the enemy and so difficult of access, that there is little probability of their attempting any thing against us, without a greater diminution of our force, then we have reason to expect.

The suffering of the Continental Army at Morristown during the winter of 1780 was as great as, if not more than, that at Valley Forge in 1778. Not only was there lack of clothing and provision of all kinds, but also the general depression and widespread lack of enthusiasm throughout the country threatened the very existence of the army itself. General Washington’s January 8 circular to the magistrates of New Jersey urged them to send immediate aid:

The present situation of the army with the respect to provisions is the most distressing of any we have experienced since the beginning of the war. For a Fortnight past, the troops, both officers and men, have been almost perishing for want. They have been alternately without bread and meat, the whole time, with a very scanty allowance of either, and frequently destitute of both. They have borne their sufferings with a patience that merits the approbation & ought to excite the sympathy of their countrymen. But they are now reduced to an extremity no longer to be supported. . . .

The distress we feel is chiefly owing to the early commencement and uncommon rigor of the winter, which have greatly obstructed the transportation of our supplies. . . . From present appearances it must be more than five weeks before we can have the benefit of any material supplies beyond the limits of this state. . . .

Influenced by those considerations my duty to the Public and my affection to the virtuous inhabitants of this state . . . have determined me to call upon the respective Counties for a proportion of grain and cattle to satisfy the present emergency.1

RETAINING THE SERVICES OF THE ENGINEERS

Washington wrote to the president of Congress on January 2, expressing his desire to retain Brigadier General Duportail, Colonels Radière and Laumoy, and Lieutenant Colonel Gouvion in the service of the United States for another campaign because “their conduct has more than justified the opinion expressed in my letter. . . . They have been particularly useful in the course of this last period, and have acquired general esteem and confidence. I cannot forbear adding that the better the gentleman at the head of the corps is known the more he is found to be a man of abilities, and of distinguished military merit.”2

Congress agreed to Washington’s request on January 14 that they

be retained in the service during the war or so long as is consistent with their duty to their King and agreeable to their inclinations.

Resolved, That Congress have a very favourable opinion of the conduct and capacity of General Du Portail and Messrs. Laumaoy and Gouvion and lament the untimely death of Col La Radiere who during his services in America had by his zeal and exertions highly recommended himself as