Washington's Engineer Norman Desmarais (best e book reader .TXT) 📖

You will probably have heard of the surrender of Charlestown by the time you will receive this letter. I arrived here the 25th of April at seven the morning, after having passed during the Night in the Midst of the Enemies, through the Woods with the assistance of good guides. I found the Town in a desperate State almost entirely invested by the British Army and Fleet which has passed the Bar and Fort Moultrie. They had surmounted difficulties which were generally looked upon as insuperable without experiencing scarce any resistence. The Enemy had brought their trenches upon the neck within about 120 or 130 yards from the Fortifications; in a word the fall of the Town was unavoidable unless an Army come to her assistance which then did not appear likely. After having examined the situation of things I thought an evacuation highly advisable and I proposed it—but the Council found an impracticability in the measure although for my part, it only appeared difficult and hazardous and such as we ought to risk in our present situation.

That Plan being rejected the only object was to protract the term of our Capitulation. I have done on my part every thing that was in my power to fulfill that object in the same manner that Colonel Laumoy had before my arrival, but time brought us to lose sight of the term of our resistance. The Enemy succeeded in draining part of the Ditch was in front of our intrenchments and raised nine Batteries in their third Parallel. The day they opened them they sent a flag with a Letter to summon General Lincoln to Surrender. Upon this a Council of Generals and field officers was called and after having asked whether terms ought to be proposed to the Enemy and it was carried in the affirmative by great majority, myself was of that number. As the first propositions were from the Enemy we might expect advantageous Conditions, I have even some hope that we might have saved the Garrison; besides a positive refusal to treat with an Enemy who within a few days could have been in a condition of giving us the law appeared imprudent and unreasonable. It was then determined in Council that propositions should be made, but afterwards by an extraordinary oversight they left to the General officers the care of determining what was to be proposed. This is the moment where I left off taking any part in what has been done being of a contrary opinion to that of the other Genl. officers. They agreed to propose that the Continental Troops should be prisoners of war. I opposed that measure with all my might. I represented that if even our situation required it, it was not our business to propose it & that we showed an ignorance of what is practised in those cases which would make us appear in a ridicule light. I represented that if I had been of opinion with the greatest number to propose terms to the Enemy, I mean that they should be honorable terms, both advantageous to the Army and Continent; as for instance to surrender the Town alone with the artillery store and Ships; but to save the Troops; that if the army must be prisoners of war it was more eligible to hold out in order to justify such unfavorable Conditions by a longer resistance and more distressing situation. My representations had not the desired effect the propositions were made such as you will see them. Fortunately, such as they were the Enemy would not grant them and proposed others less advantageous which General Lincoln did not however think proper to accept. The Truce was broken and the operations of the Siege vigorously continued. But the second day after the militia refused to do duty General Lincoln thought from this that the Capitulation was absolutely necessary and called the Council who countenanced the Measure. For my part I thought we ought to try before to bring the Militia to their duty by every possible means, by acts of authority, and if necessary by exemplary punishments; this was likely deemed impracticable; and the Capitulation took place to my great regret; not that I think we could have held out longer than three or four days, but that we should have put the Enemy in such a situation to render a further resistence on our part blamable to every body; then our defence would have done us much more honor. It is true that in that case the Conditions would not likely have been the same but I was for sacrificing that advantage to a little more glory. Fortunately in all this the honor of the American Arms is secure and the Enemy have not great subject to triumph. To remain forty two days in open trenches before a Town of an immense extent fortified by sandy intrenchments raised in two months without covered way, without our works, open in several places on the water side, exposed every where to attacks and defended by a Garrison which was not sufficient by half of what was necessary, before such a place I say and display all the appearance of a regular seige, is nothing very glorious.

Perhaps the English General followed the rule of prudence in conducting himself so—but at best the troops that he commanded have assuredly no reason to boast of their ardor or enterprising spirit; while on the other hand the American troops gave certain proof of their firmness to support, for more than forty days, a terrible fire—and to remain so long exposed to the danger of surprises, or attacks de vive force, which were certain of success if the enemy took its measures carefully.

M. de Laumoy and the engineers whom he has under his orders, have been so busy constructing the fortifications of Charlestown, both before and during the seige that there was no time to