Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand. This information must have convinced him that he was chasing a phantom enemy in the open waters of the North Sea while a full-scale German invasion of Norway was in progress. The question was what to do about it. Here again, we see the dramatic differences between the decentralized and swift German operations as opposed to the centralized and hesitant British response.

Forbes knew that German warships were in Bergen but he kept worrying about their strength. Although the picture of what was happening was still very murky, it was probably possible for Forbes and his staff to draw accurate conclusions about the strength of German force in Bergen, if they had pieced together accurately the reports about German naval movements that had been received since April 6. They estimated that the German force to their north (near Narvik) consisted of one battleship, two cruisers, and ten destroyers. It was actually two battleships and ten destroyers. The German force observed steering away from the Trondheim area was estimated to consist of one battleship, two cruisers, and two destroyers. It was actually one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. Information was now flowing in that one German light cruiser was in action at Kristiansand and that two heavy cruisers and one light cruiser were attacking Oslo.

The British knew that the German surface navy included two battleships, one armored cruiser (Admiral Sheer, not yet re-classified as a heavy cruiser), three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and 22 destroyers. They may have been aware that Admiral Sheer, two light cruisers, and six destroyers were undergoing repairs. However, even without possession of this fact, a review of recent intelligence reports could have let them deduce that both battleships, eight of the 10 cruisers, and 12 of the 22 destroyers were accounted for. From this, it would be logical to assume that the German naval forces in Bergen consisted at the most of two cruisers and a few destroyers. A further consideration was that it would take some time before the Germans would have the forts around Bergen operational, if they were captured, and that the Luftwaffe was not a serious threat until established at Norwegian airfields. The situation called for a quick and decisive strike against the Germans in Bergen before they were able to consolidate and the situation changed to their advantage.

Instead, Admiral Forbes entered into a discussion with the Admiralty about the situation, starting at 0620 hours. He mentioned that he contemplated making a strike against Bergen with cruisers and destroyers and asked for information about German strength in that city. About four hours passed before the Admiralty signaled approval for the attack by instructing Forbes to:

Prepare plans for attacking German warships and transports in Bergen and for controlling the approaches to the port on supposition that the defences are still in the hands of the Norwegians. Similar plans as regards Trondheim should be prepared.26

Forbes finally sent Vice Admiral Layton’s 18th Cruiser Squadron with four cruisers and seven destroyers at 1130 hours on April 9 to attack the German naval units in Bergen.

The Home Fleet was only 90 nautical miles from Bergen at 0620 hours when Admiral Forbes mentioned to the Admiralty that he contemplated an attack on Bergen. However, the Home Fleet continued on its present southward course, leading it away from Bergen. This meant that when Admiral Layton’s cruisers and destroyers were dispatched to Bergen they had to sail northward in the face of a strong northerly gale. The destroyers were only able to make 16 knots in the heavy seas. At that rate, the ships would not reach the entrance to the Bergen approaches before nightfall.

The plan called for the destroyers to attack Bergen harbor from the north and south supported at a distance by the cruisers. An aerial reconnaissance of Bergen at 1400 hours revealed that there were two German cruisers in the harbor and the British became suspicious that the Germans might already have captured the coastal fortresses. Layton began to doubt the wisdom of the plan but neither he nor Forbes had called it off when a message from the British Admiralty canceled the attack.

If Admiral Layton’s force had entered the harbor after dark as planned, it would have found only one badly damaged cruiser, one damaged naval artillery support ship, and four serviceable motor torpedo boats. There was practically no danger to the British ships from the captured Norwegian shore batteries since they did not reach partial operational readiness until April 10 and full readiness on April 13. There were some dangers from mines laid by the Norwegians but there were still Norwegian naval units in each of the approaches that, no doubt, would have been happy to lead the British safely past the minefields. Again, lack of information, and an unwillingness to take risks meant that the Home Fleet missed an opportunity to inflict significant damage on the German Navy.

If the British had continued on towards Bergen, there is also some possibility that they might have encountered the cruiser Köln and the two torpedo boats at the start of their return voyage to Germany. However, it is equally possible that German aerial reconnaissance would have spotted the approaching British squadron, in which case Köln and her escorts may have elected to remain in Bergen. These ships left Bergen after darkness and sought refuge in a fjord when they were informed that strong British naval forces were near the route they planned to take back to Germany.

The Home Fleet’s final chance to deal a blow to the German Navy in western Norway was lost the following morning when Forbes ordered naval forces away from the Norwegian coast and left the door open for the three ships to escape.

Air Power Shakes British Confidence

The Luftwaffe was not established ashore in the early hours of April 9, so this would have been the best time for the British to strike. An attack on the city late on April 9, or thereafter, may have proved