Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

25 and the two oldest 56. The lack of combat experience, inadequate training, limited periods of active duty and age are the major factors that determined the performance of this battalion in the campaign.

Lack of quarters resulted in units being spread out over relatively large areas. Combined with the severe winter weather and the lack of daylight during the winter months, the dispersion of the units made training very difficult.

The units in East Finnmark were required to patrol and outpost long stretches of the border with the Soviet Union and Finland. This mission made unit training and exercise at company and battalion level impossible for them.

The situation was better in Troms and Ofoten. Here it was possible to conduct maneuvers at battalion and brigade level. Two such maneuvers were conducted in February and March. The first was a defensive exercise, while the second involved movement to contact and attacks against prepared defensive positions. A maneuver by the 1/13th Inf, scheduled to begin on March 8, was cancelled due to continual snowstorms. A report by the 6th Division on December 18, 1939 summarizes the combat readiness of its battalions and the statements are equally applicable to the units in its command in April 1940:1

The resulting experiences are that our battalions after the end of their mobilization—despite obvious deficiencies in organization, training, and equipment—can be assigned simple tactical missions which, at the outset, should be limited to defense.

They can quickly become capable of movement through various terrains but are hardly able to undertake missions involving maneuvering in war until they have undergone extended training under favorable conditions. This is dictated by the weaknesses in the level of individual training and commanders’ exercise experience.

Despite all shortcomings, there is no doubt that the battalions involved in the neutrality watch in North Norway benefited from that experience in both operational readiness and morale. It is to General Fleischer’s credit that he managed, despite serious obstacles, to bring the 6th Division to a state of readiness that permitted the start of offensive operations within a relatively short time after absorbing the first shocks of war. Fleischer wrote, “The units suffered much hardship but developed toughness, became skilled at operating together, and learned to manage on their own. They became units that could be used in war.”2

For these reasons, the campaign in North Norway started out with advantages that were not present in other areas of the country. General Fleischer was able to begin operations almost immediately with mobilized units and fully functional and provisioned supply and support organizations. Except for the units that lost their supplies and equipment when the Germans captured Elvegårdsmoen, the 6th Division was able to mobilize according to plans without any serious enemy interference.3 The units in southern and central Norway had their mobilization disrupted by the immediate loss of depots and population centers. In addition, they had to cope with enemy air supremacy and a rapid build-up of his forces.

General Fleischer had his headquarters in Harstad, but he and his chief of staff had departed for an inspection of the forces in East Finnmark on April 3, 1940. They were at Nybergsmoen near Kirkenes on April 8 to observe an exercise by the Varanger Battalion. Colonel Lars Mjelde, the 6th District Commander, supervised the division staff during Fleischer’s absence.

North Norway was divided into five sectors, but battalion-size or larger formations were located in only three area commands on April 8, 1940:

1) East Finnmark Command under Colonel Wilhelm Faye. This command’s mission was to guard the eastern border during the Winter War. It was kept mobilized afterward, at the request of the Finns. The Finns wanted the Norwegian forces in East Finnmark maintained until the Soviets withdrew from areas scheduled for return to Finland. Faye’s command consisted of the Varanger Inf Bn at Nybergsmoen; 1/12th Inf; 2/14th Inf; a reinforced garrison company in Sør Varanger; two motorized artillery batteries (one split up and used in static positions); a platoon each from the 6th Signal Company, 6th Engineer Company, and 6th Transportation Company; and the 6th Field Hospital.

2) Troms Command under Colonel Kristian R. Løken, who also commanded the 6th Field Brigade. The following units were assigned to him: The 6th Field Brigade Staff; 2/15th Inf at Setermoen; 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn at Målselv consisting of two horse-drawn field artillery batteries and one motorized battery; 6th Signal Company minus one platoon; 6th Transportation Company less one platoon; 6th Medical Company; 6th Veterinary Unit; and the 6th Division NCO School.

3) Nord-Hålogaland Command under Colonel Konrad Sundlo. Sundlo was assigned as commander of the 15th Inf Regt when he was promoted to colonel in 1933. The following units were under his command on April 8, 1940: 1) Regimental staff. This was a skeletal, peacetime organization as opposed to the staffs of the other two major operational units under General Fleischer’s command. It lacked adequate personnel in intelligence, communications, and civil affairs and no staff or telephone journals were kept due to lack of personnel. In addition, several officers on the staff were absent on April 9. The inadequate staffing was testified to at Colonel Sundlo’s trial in 1947. 2) 1/13th Inf. This unit was located at Elvegårdsmoen with one company and one machinegun platoon in Narvik. The units in Narvik were ordered there by General Fleischer on February 17, 1940 in the wake of the Altmark affair. 3) 6th Engineer Co of the Hålogaland Engineer Bn, minus one platoon. This reserve company was mobilized in October 1939. Its mission was to construct bunkers and other defensive positions in Narvik and along the Ofot Railway.

4) 6th Anti-Aircraft Battery with four 40mm cannons and two machinegun platoons, each with three antiaircraft machineguns. This battery was mobilized on January 8, 1940.

5) An armored train unit from the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn. 6) A guard detail on the Nordal Railway Bridge between Narvik and the Swedish border.

A functional radio net was established shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939 and it was in operation until October