Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

division did not agree and Sundlo later clarified that when he had expressed the opinion that elaborate prepared defense positions were not needed, he referred to the covering force. Whatever the case, the difference in views between Fleischer and Sundlo apparently extended to precisely how that defense should be carried out.

It is difficult to determine the thinking behind the location of the first two bunkers. There was 3,000 meters between them and they were therefore not mutually supporting. The distances from the Fagernes and Framnes bunkers to the central harbor area were 1,800 and 1,000 meters, respectively. The central parts of the harbor were therefore outside the effective range of machineguns and small arms.

Major Sigurd Omdal, the regimental executive officer, recommended that a number of machinegun nests be built in the harbor area. The division plan for construction of defensive positions in Narvik, however, involved only the expansion and strengthening of the bunker system. It called for the construction of four additional reinforced concrete bunkers: one on the west side of the Framnes Peninsula, one near Vassvik, one at Ornes, and one at Ankenes on the west side of the harbor. The plan also called for supporting machinegun positions near at least two of these bunkers. The engineer company was tasked with building the bunkers. The regiment requested that the engineers also build the machinegun positions, but the division directed that infantry be used for that purpose. It appears that Colonel Sundlo also wanted to build machinegun positions along Rombakfjord. During his trial, Sundlo stated that he believed an enemy attack would come from the north side of town and he did not think a landing would take place directly in the harbor.8

Major Omdal’s recommendation for the construction of machinegun positions in the harbor area was not acted on. Instead, infantry troops were to patrol or occupy posts along the 3-kilometer harbor area separating the two bunkers. There was only one prepared position between the two bunkers. This was a covered infantry position at the south end of the Iron Ore Pier. Infantry positions were also dug or blasted out of rocks along the north side of Framnes Peninsula, between Kvitvik and Lillevik.

There are differing reports on the general plan for defensive preparations. Colonel Sundlo still wanted to place the main defensive effort along the high ground on the city’s northeastern side with a forward covering force, including machineguns, in the harbor area. General Fleischer did not agree. According to Sundlo, Fleischer wanted the defense to be concentrated on the western side of the city and as part of that decision, Sundlo was ordered to prepare positions for an infantry company along the northwestern slope of the Framnes Peninsula. According to Sundlo, Fleischer confirmed this decision when he visited Narvik in early 1940. The division chief of staff, Major Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, stated later that the division did not tell the regimental commander how he should conduct the defense of the town and he found it unlikely that Fleischer would have ordered Sundlo to prepare infantry positions on Framnes Peninsula against the colonel’s wishes and without telling the chief of staff. Lindbäck-Larsen stated that he was surprised to find defense works on that peninsula.

Fleischer inspected the Narvik defenses on March 7 and 8, 1940 and expressed his satisfaction with the progress. It seems strange that he would have approved the defense works on Framnes Peninsula if it were not his intention that they should be located there. According to his own testimony about the inspection, the chief of staff protested sharply the fact that there were no defensive positions in the harbor area. Fleischer did not support his arguments, stating that it was Sundlo’s decision as to how he conducted the defense. According to Lindbäck-Larsen, this discussion led to a decision to place machineguns in the harbor area and to prepare a position at the southern end of the Iron Ore Pier.

The division directed the engineers to build bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes on March 18, and to construct an artillery bunker on Fagernes. The bunkers’ exact locations were to be determined by Colonel Sundlo and the commander of 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn. Only the machinegun bunkers at Fagernes and Framnes were placed under the control of the regiment and occupied by infantry prior to April 8. The construction of the bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes had started. Those at Kvitvik and Ankenes were nearly complete but control had not been transferred to the regiment. Construction of the artillery bunker at Fagernes had not begun. The infantry positions in the Kvitvik-Lillevik area were to be completed by mid-April.

The defensive plans required that a reinforced infantry company maintain a state of readiness that would allow it to occupy all defensive positions in Narvik within three hours. The need for a higher readiness level was recognized after the navy announced that it could not provide three hours of early warning. The reinforced company earmarked for Narvik was located at Elvegårdsmoen in the inter-war period, not at Narvik. The tense situation after the Altmark incident and the need for a higher readiness level caused General Fleischer to move the reinforced company from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik on February 17, 1940. He ordered Colonel Sundlo to prevent landings by foreign troops, regardless of nationality.

In hindsight it is easy to see where mistakes were made. The plan to mount the defense of the Ofot Railway in Narvik, particularly before all defensive works were completed, ignored a number of basic defensive principles.

An attacker would have dominance of the fjords and every part of the defense would be exposed to the devastating effects of close-range naval gunfire. The forces in Narvik were separated from the areas north of Ofotfjord and therefore from any reinforcements. There were no lines of communications through the mountain wilderness to the south. The positions in Narvik could easily be enveloped by enemy landings on the south side of Rombakfjord. These landing forces would isolate Narvik from the outside world. From the landing sites, an