Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

attacker could advance to the Swedish border virtually unopposed. He could also occupy the high ground east of Narvik, eliminating any realistic possibility of holding the town. If these military objections were not sufficient, there was the humanitarian factor. Why turn Narvik, with its 10,000 civilians, into a bloody battlefield when that was not necessary for defending the Ofot Railway?

The considerations enumerated above, along with the knowledge that the capture of Narvik was only important militarily to an enemy if it also included control of the railroad to the Swedish border, should have dictated a defense that did not involve trying to hold the town. It was not a prudent decision to meet an attack by an enemy with naval dominance at the water’s edge. The attacker would have the advantage of selecting the point of attack, forcing the defender to spread his forces to meet threats from all directions. A fixed forward defense is usually unwise unless the defender has strong fortifications and sufficient reserves that can be moved quickly in response to a dangerous development. The inability of the Germans to move their reserves quickly to counter the landings in Normandy, because of Allied air dominance, virtually eliminated the value of their defensive works. In Narvik, there were neither strong defensive works nor any reserves.

A defense in the interior, along the railroad, would have had several obvious advantages. It would have spared the civilian population in Narvik, removed Norwegian forces from the reach of naval gunfire, made envelopment difficult, and forced an enemy to operate in a severe climate and unfamiliar terrain. From an interior position, contact could be established and maintained with Norwegian forces to the north.

Approximately 450 Norwegian troops were located in Narvik on April 8, but there were few infantry among them. The railroad gun had a crew of 8-10, the antiaircraft battery consisted of about 120 men, and the engineer company strength in Narvik was about 110. There was also a supply depot detachment of nine men. After making allowances for the skeleton regimental staff, Colonel Sundlo had approximately 190 infantry under his command in Narvik, but many of these were ordered away on April 8.

Naval Activities on April 8

April 8, 1940 was a busy and confusing day for the 3rd Naval District, as it was for the rest of the country’s political and military leadership. The events started with British violations of Norwegian territorial waters early in the morning. The Norwegian patrol vessel Syrian, patrolling the outer area of Vestfjord, spotted several foreign warships on a southerly heading. These warships turned out to be eight British destroyers. Captain Kaaveland, Syrian’s skipper, challenged the warships and demanded that they leave Norwegian territorial waters.

There was not much the 298-ton Syrian, with its crew of ten men armed with one 3-inch gun, could do to enforce its demands. The British destroyer Hunter answered the Norwegian challenge. The Hunter’s signal read, “We will not leave territorial waters. You are heading towards a minefield. Stop immediately and await my further instructions.”9

The British sent an officer aboard the patrol boat and the Norwegians were told that a minefield had been laid in the area and that British destroyers would remain in territorial waters for 48 hours to warn merchant vessels. Kaaveland received a map of the rectangular shaped minefield and a request to keep civilian vessels from approaching the minefield from the south. Kaaveland repeated his protest and stated that the mining operation would undoubtedly bring Norway into the war.

Syrian sent several messages to the 3rd Naval District about the British activities in Vestfjord and Captain Askim issued orders to stop all traffic in the area. The patrol boat Svalbard II, located in Bodø, was sent to guard the southern approaches to the minefield while the patrol boat Kvitøy was dispatched to Tjeldsund to stop southbound traffic. One ship stopped by Kvitøy was the German tanker Jan Wellem. The German plan called for this ship to sail from “Basis Nord” near Murmansk with fuel for the German destroyers. The ship was allowed to proceed to Narvik after the patrol boat skipper conferred with his superiors. Askim also directed that four patrol boats proceed to Ramsund Naval Depot to take aboard minesweeping equipment and prepare to sweep the British minefield.

The two coastal defense ships Norge and Eidsvold were anchored in Narvik on April 8. The submarines B3 and B1 were also in Narvik along with the submarine tender Lyngen and the patrol vessel Senja. The patrol boat Kelt was on patrol at the Ofotfjord entrance and the patrol vessel Michael Sars was in Lødingen, at the southern entrance to Tjelsund.

The British mining led Captain Askim to conclude that Norway would soon become involved in the war between Germany and Great Britain. He suspected that the British mining operation was only a first step and he expected a naval attack on the German ore ships in Narvik. Askim ordered his ships in Narvik to prepare for action. He also ordered Captain Brekke, the 3rd Submarine Division commander, to take his submarines and Lyngen to Liland on the north side of Ofotfjord. Brekke suggested that the submarines take their assigned positions in the fjord to launch torpedoes at any intruder. This suggestion was turned down and Brekke was later ordered to position the submarines inside Bogen to insure that they were not seen from the fjord.

The 3rd Naval District received the various intelligence reports discussed in Chapter 3. These reports were passed to subordinate units and to the 6th District Command. The report from the British Naval Staff that German naval forces were northbound and could reach Narvik by 2200 hours on April 8 had the greatest significance for Norwegian forces in North Norway. However, the report was passed to the 3rd Naval District with the comment that no one on the Norwegian Naval Staff believed it to be accurate.

Narvik was not a restricted area10 and Askim contacted Admiral Diesen at 2345 hours to find out if there were any special