Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

proclamations that were displayed prominently, and through leaflets dropped in virtually all areas of the country. While most disregarded the admonitions and threats from Quisling and the Germans, they caused a number of breakdowns in the will to resist among both military and civilian authorities.

The German Breakout from Oslo

The Germans were temporarily thrown off balance by their failure to capture Oslo quickly and by the unexpected determination by the Norwegians to resist. Reports of Norwegian mobilization were flowing into von Falkenhorst’s headquarters and he adopted a more cautious approach than that envisioned in the original plan, which called for sending a battalion to Bergen and one to Trondheim by rail. For now, he took a guarded attitude pending the arrival of sufficient forces to undertake major offensive operations. Only local operations, primarily to the southeast, were undertaken. In the two days following the landing, the main elements of the 163rd and 196th Divisions were brought to Oslo by the 1st and 2nd Sea Transport Echelons and by air.

Having failed to bring about a Norwegian surrender, the Germans needed to move into the interior quickly, disrupt Norwegian mobilization efforts, prevent them from organizing a defense, and link up as quickly as possible with the other isolated beachheads. Von Falkenhorst impressed on his subordinates the absolute need for speed and relentless pressure in order to keep the staggering Norwegian defense from regaining its balance. German forces in Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim were directed to limit themselves to local offensive operations until reinforced.

Group XXI’s orders for the breakout from the beachhead were issued on April 12 and 13. The major units for the offensive from Oslo were the reinforced 163rd and 196th Infantry Divisions. The 196th Division, commanded by Major General Richard Pellengahr, would drive through the two great north-south valleys of Gudbrandsdal and Østerdal with the ultimate mission of linking up with the forces in Trondheim. This division was also assigned the sector east and southeast of Oslo. One battalion was to advance south along the east side of Oslofjord to capture Sarpsborg, Fredrikstad, and Halden. Another battalion operated further to the east, towards Mysen and the Swedish border.

The 163rd Division, commanded by Major General Erwin Engelbrecht, operated further west with the ultimate goal of opening land communications with the forces in Kristiansand and Bergen. Since it consisted of four regiments, two of its own and one each from the 69th and 181st Divisions, it had the secondary mission of securing the area around Oslo and to the southwest of that city. There were no serious threats in this area and large forces were not required to carry out this additional task. The immediate missions were to capture the rail junction at Hønefoss and the weapons and ammunition-manufacturing town of Kongsberg along the Oslo-Kristiansand railroad.

The Germans adopted a flexible approach, a method that was to prove very effective not only in Norway but also in their later campaigns in other parts of Europe. They did not operate as battalions and regiments but switched to a system of tactical groupings, known as battle groups, which were named either after their commanders or in relation to their operational areas. These battle groups varied in strength and composition, as dictated by the terrain and Norwegian opposition, almost on a daily basis. For maximum speed, the battle groups were motorized with the help of requisitioned vehicles. The Norwegians, primarily due to the disruption of their mobilization effort, eventually adopted similar tactical groupings.

The German advance was rapid and relentless. The southeastern thrust disrupted the mobilization of the 1st Division and captured Fredrikstad, Sarpsborg, and Halden by April 14. By the same date, the eastern drive captured the border fortresses with their skeleton crews. These multiple drives captured over 1,000 Norwegian troops. Major General Erichsen and the remnants of the 1st Division, about 3,000 men, were driven across the border into Swedish internment. Southeastern Norway was in German hands five days after they landed in Oslo.

The 163rd Division captured Kongsberg on April 14 and the 3rd Norwegian Infantry Regiment surrendered the following day. Hønefoss was also captured on April 14 and a motorized column reached the southern end of Lake Mjøsa.

These drives, in all directions from Oslo, secured the beachhead and set the stage for further German advances into the interior, bringing them into areas where General Ruge intended to make his major delaying efforts. The Germans were reinforced for the next stage of operations by the arrival of a tank battalion, three motorized machinegun battalions, and a motorized infantry battalion.

The Germans in Kristiansand advanced north through the Setesdal Valley. The Norwegians gave up their forward positions without engaging the Germans and a panic developed in units of the 3rd Division as it withdrew. The Norwegians regrouped but German units appeared in front of their positions on April 12. Neither side opened fire. General Liljedahl agreed to a cease-fire and a demarcation line was established north of Evjemoen. A German parliamentarian appeared on April 13 and demanded that hostilities cease. Liljedahl agreed to a 24-hour extension of the cease-fire. He explained the situation to General Ruge and stated that his units were “depressed,” combat ineffective, and the valley was full of hungry refugees. In his reply, Ruge stated that complete capitulation would be very detrimental to the army’s morale and defeat and captivity was better for the country than willing capitulation. If the fight could not continue, Ruge directed Liljedahl to allow those who were willing to carry on the fight to join units in other areas.

Liljedahl held a conference with his officers and it was agreed not to continue the fight. At the same time, Liljedahl was notified that the soldiers in position at the line of demarcation had given notice that they would cease hostilities within 20 minutes. The only word to describe this is “mutiny,” and that by a unit that had seen little or no combat. General Liljedahl initiated negotiations with the Germans and surrendered his forces on April 15.

General Ruge’s Dilemma

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