Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

April 15, the future looked bleak for the new Norwegian Commander-in-Chief. The Germans were well into their breakout from Oslo. Almost half the Norwegian forces in the area south of Trondheim were already lost because of disrupted mobilization, the internment of the remnants of the 1st Division in Sweden, the surrender of Colonel Einar Steen’s 3rd Infantry Regiment near Kongsvinger, and General Liljedahl’s surrender in Setesdal. The 8th Infantry Regiment was isolated east of Stavanger, as was the 4th Field Brigade at Voss. Except for some scattered and ad hoc units, the 2nd Division was the only force at General Ruge’s disposal, but it had withdrawn precipitously from its main defensive line along the Nittedal River, north of Oslo. The mobilization apparatus was still functioning, but in total disorder in some places.

Any thoughts of recapturing the capital were out of the question. There were about 5,000 German troops in Oslo by the end of April 9. By April 14, German forces in and around the city had grown to two divisions, major elements of a third division, and several separate battalions. General Ruge realized that he could not undertake offensive operations with the meager and disorganized troops at his disposal.

Ruge recommended to the government that the highest priority be given to the recapture of Trondheim. The recapture of the country’s ancient capital would have an important and positive psychological effect on the Norwegian people. Furthermore, the city had an excellent harbor suitable for Allied reinforcements and a good airfield of vital importance in contesting German air superiority. The recapture of the airfield would also remove any possibility of the Germans providing air support for their forces in Narvik.

Ambassador Dormer managed to link up with the Norwegian Government on April 12. The ambassador passed on Ruge’s urgent appeal for assistance, especially the recapture of Trondheim, to London. Mr Foley from the British Embassy reached General Ruge’s headquarters on April 13. Neither the French nor the British had army attaches living in Norway. Officers designated as attachés, Commandant Bertrand Vigne and Lieutenant Colonel King Salter, arrived on April 15.

On the morning of April 9, the British Government had promised the Norwegians full assistance “forthwith.” There was still no evidence of this assistance. In a message to the British Prime Minister on April 13, Ruge stated that Norway had decided to resist based on the British Government’s promise that it would send assistance quickly. Unless immediate assistance was received, primarily in the form of air assets and limited ground forces, Ruge warned bluntly that the Germans could secure the country within a week. He had placed his trust in the British promise and he must not be let down. This was followed by messages from the Allied military representatives at Ruge’s headquarters on April 14 that stressed the need for assistance and the urgent necessity of recapturing Trondheim. These messages also vouched for the new commander-in-chief’s determination and steadfastness. The numerous appeals and warnings from Norway about a possible collapse if aid was not received quickly resulted in a message from Neville Chamberlain on April 14 that read, “We are coming as fast as possible and in great strength. Further details later.”8

General Ruge’s plan, outlined in a directive he issued on April 15, was to delay the German advance in the south while the Allies, in conjunction with Norwegian forces, eliminated the German bridgehead in Trondheim. From there, General Ruge intended to build up his forces for a continuation of the war with Allied help. The operational directive laid out the objective for his forces. “Assistance [from the Allies] is in preparation and promised soonest. In these circumstances, our task in East Norway is to win time.”9 Ruge intended to fight successive delaying actions and to destroy lines of communication in order to allow time for the arrival of Allied assistance.

General Ruge intended to establish a defensive line at the southern entrance to the three great valleys of Østerdal, Gudbrandsdal, and Valdres. Since the recapture of Bergen with Allied help did not seem likely, Ruge directed the 4th Field Brigade, mobilizing at Voss, to move to eastern Norway.

Some recent writers, among them General Hovland, question the wisdom of Ruge’s decision to conduct delaying actions. The disadvantages of delaying actions in a situation where the enemy is able to build up his strength quickly are obvious but no alternatives are suggested. Offensive operations were out of the question until the Norwegian Army could mobilize sufficient forces. The problem, however, was that the German buildup was much quicker than Norwegian mobilization and the discrepancy in combat power had become decisive by April 15. The German consolidation and expansion of their bridgehead in the first five days disrupted mobilization and led to the loss of major Norwegian combat formations. A rigid defense would no doubt have led to the destruction of the 2nd Division and this would have opened wide the road to Trondheim and Bergen.

Allied Reactions on April 9—Confusion and Discord

News about events in Norway began to filter into the various government offices in London in the early hours of April 9, but the information was fragmentary and confusing. That there would be a German reaction to the mining of Norwegian waters was fully expected, but it was believed that it would take the Germans considerable time to mount effective countermeasures. The fact that the Germans had a simultaneous operation underway against Norway came as a surprise. The British Admiralty was convinced that the German naval movements underway since April 6 were attempts to break out into the Atlantic, not an invasion of Norway.

The British command authorities had blind faith in the supremacy of their sea power and concluded that a German attack on the western Norwegian shoreline was impractical. The suddenness and scale of German naval operations in these areas dealt a hard blow to their earlier preconceptions. However, the British continued to believe that the British Navy could deal with the attackers, even after receiving news of the German invasion on April