The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (most important books of all time .txt) 📖
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Note.-This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates
rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
of the external body ; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly ;
whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For
instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
from us about two hundred feet ; in this judgment we err, so long
as we are in ignorance of its true distance ; when its true
distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination
; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
thereby : wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we
said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
real position ; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings ; but the
contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings
; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
Proof.-We are said to be passive, when something arises in
us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we
are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
other parts. Q.E.D.
PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is
limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes.
Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For,
when man is given, there is something else-say A-more powerful ;
when A is given, there is something else-say B-more powerful than
A, and so on to infinity ; thus the power of man is limited by
the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes. Q.E.D.
PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
adequate cause.
Proof.-The power, whereby each particular thing, and
consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.) ; not in so far as it is infinite, but
in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
(III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible,
that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist ; this
would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
either finite or infinite ; namely, either of man’s power only,
inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
changes which could spring from external causes ; or of the
infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But
the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
we have shown) necessarily exist ; such a result must follow from
the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It
is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
the nature of things demands.
PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its
persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
an external cause compared with our own.
Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
rest of a man’s activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
obstinately fixed to him.
Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its
persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore
(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man’s power, &e. Q.E.D.
PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
controlling emotion.
Proof.-Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
Emotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is
assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
diminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
from its cause the force for persistence in its being ; which
force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.) ;
wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
the existence of the former emotion ; thus an emotion cannot be
destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
emotion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can
only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
undergo.
PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof.
Proof.-We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
hinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive
that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
evil ; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this
idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
to body (II. xxi.) ; that is, there is no real distinction
between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
the body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of
good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.
PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
the cause to be with us.
Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is
therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
of the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object ; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
us. Q.E.D.
Note.-When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
thing in question itself ; for the thing’s nature is unchanged,
whether we have conceived it or not ; I did not deny that the
image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
things which exclude the present existence of the future object :
I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
my work.
Corollary.-The image of something past or future, that is, of
a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present
; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
towards something present.
PROP. X. Towards something
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