Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (the speed reading book txt) 📖

In the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. In some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on merit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "At first," says an officer of some distinction in the British navy, in speaking of promotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils. In England, where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political influence; but in this country we are taught to consider merit as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege.

The various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the French service, and the various results of these changes, both on the character of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline.

Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain grades of the noblesse; merit and service being excluded from consideration. But the constituent assembly changed this order of things, and established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, after a concours, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without concours; the captains and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; maréchaux-de-camp and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was restored. In 1796 and the wars that followed, merit was the only qualification required, and Bonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in command of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services, not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the baptism of blood, as it was called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in leaving Egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while Menou was a general of division. Everybody knows that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded in the command; and that Egypt, saved by the selection of Kleber, was lost by the seniority of Menou.

Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on merit. His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795; his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only ones used. The following extract from the Reglement de Campagneof 1809, (title XX.,) gives the spirit of this system:—"The next day after an action the generals of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty."

On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the maison militaire du roi, and court favoritism was substituted for merit and service. But the revolution of 1830 produced a different order of things. "The laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions in the army.

The existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightly for different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can be appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a corps d'armée. In time of peace, no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (chef-d'escadron and chef-de-bataillon,) till he has served two years in the next lower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower grade; no one can be made maréchal-de-camp, lieutenant-general, or marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lower grade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For the grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the chef-de-bataillon and chef-d'escadron, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection; for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the concours. The recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably followed by the government in its selections. This combined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the heads of abler and better men.

If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years by the present system of political influence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[50] And if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim, secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party politics. Such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been overslaughed, and will soon entirely disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?

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