Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (the speed reading book txt) 📖

"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides two killed and two wounded in the Arrow, by the bursting of her two 68-pounder Lancaster guns."

"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of ordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and fifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with a fair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders of the French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than 32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. On the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so intense as it would have been at shorter range."

"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an opportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or 68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire."

"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for though the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet the distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six 50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close order."

"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the Devastation), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half inches,—still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the ports,—and the majority of damage to the French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three floating-batteries."

Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and ill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * * The Fort of Kinburn surrendered, not because it was breached—not because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be unable to protract the contest,—but simply because the guns and gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the calibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any great damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed."

The guns in the low open batteries were exposed to a ricochet and vertical fire, to which latter the French admiral attributed, in good part, the surrender of the place. The buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over," were set on fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns almost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1,400, only 157 were killed and wounded—a very small loss under all the circumstances. If the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still less; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force.

With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, Commander Dahlgren very judiciously remarks:—

"The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in
attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their
asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn
answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive
power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the
heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which
concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder
shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future
be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the
artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn.
Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable
element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of
absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide
against its employment."

The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of land-batteries, which breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliary fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very little effect. But after the work had been reduced, an experimental firing was made by the Edinburgh, armed with the largest and most powerful guns in the British navy.

In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of Bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the Edinburgh, Sir Howard Douglas remarks:—

"This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally,
but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships,
and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and
ought to attempt elsewhere."

"But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the
fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack
was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover
shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant
this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like
the Edinburgh, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500
yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without
being fired at! The firing of the Edinburgh, at 1,060 yards, was
unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and
most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun
of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.;—from 68-pounders of 95
cwt., and 32-pounders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns;—from 10-inch shell
guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs.;—from 8-inch shell guns of
65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury
to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired.
A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely
bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and
other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained—no
practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted,
taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000
lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at
480 yards."

Surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of the capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the Pacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks.

Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime attack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund.

Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of New York," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund was poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very little effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires.

With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards completion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and the settlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending our line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of other points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of New York and San Francisco—one the key point of the Atlantic, and the other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards of Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted too many points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence. However this may have been at the time the system was adopted, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to the present relative importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work of Major Barnard:—

"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed
a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive
system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,
wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any
impression by an invasion of our territory,—our great maritime places
like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater
proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack."

"The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of
New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at
the present day."

"The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate
my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of
these nations to wage war against the United States."

"No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was
made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results
would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks
upon maritime places—great seaports—seats of commercial and naval
power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and
prosperity of a nation—by the large populations and immense amount
of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime
attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive
results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn,
Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in
succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first
named became, indeed, the true seats of war."

"Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources,
and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have
turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided there, Cronstadt
would have been the next field of combat,—for which, indeed, the
allies had made the most enormous preparations."

"Is it not certain that in future all war of maritime powers against
the United