William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

Rhine.

 

As always happens between discordant allies after defeats, Berlin and

Vienna indulged in a war of words, amidst which the Coalition would

probably have broken up but for the efforts of British diplomacy. The

Pitt Ministry had despatched to Berlin the ablest of British

diplomatists, Lord Malmesbury, with a view to strengthening the accord

between the three Powers; and the mingled charm and authority of his

presence did much to thwart the petty prejudices and intrigues prevalent

at that capital. He took Brussels and Frankfurt on his way to Berlin,

and his diary shows the listlessness or discontent which had infected

the officers of the British army. Many of them openly brought against

the Duke of York the most outrageous and unfounded charges, and it seems

that about fifty of them went on furlough to England, where they spread

those slanders and played into the hands of the Opposition.[339]

Malmesbury's converse with the Duke and others at Ath convinced him that

the commander-in-chief was striving manfully and generously against a

situation full of difficulty.

 

At Frankfurt, and again at Berlin, Malmesbury found signs that Frederick

William was ashamed at the ignominious issue of the campaign, and

professed a desire to take up the duties which the Duke of Brunswick had

so haltingly fulfilled. The King seemed rather pleased than otherwise at

the Austrian reverses in the north of Alsace, but by no means indisposed

to renew the attack upon France, always provided that England paid him a

sufficient subsidy. He assured the envoy that his _chef-d'oeuvre_, the

Triple Alliance of 1788, was still a reality, but he declared, on the

faith of an honest man, that the state of Prussia's finances would not

enable him to face a third campaign. In point of fact, out of the

reserve fund of 80,000,000 crowns which Frederick the Great had handed

on, only 20,000,000 or perhaps only 14,000,000 remained in the early

days of 1794.[340]

 

Other difficulties beset the Prussian monarch. Want of work had driven

the weavers of Silesia to a state of frenzy and tumult almost resembling

a _Jacquerie_; and there and elsewhere serfs and peasants talked openly

of casting off the restraints and burdens of Feudalism. In such a case

the veriest autocrat must pause before he commits his country to the

risks of a loan (that of 1792 had exhausted Prussia's credit), or to a

campaign where the losses were certain and the gains doubtful. On this

last topic various schemes had been bandied to and fro between Berlin

and Vienna. The debt of honour certainly bade Frederick William help to

secure to his rival a counterpart to Prussia's acquisitions in Poland;

but, apart from this consideration and the need of stamping out the

French pest in the Rhineland, the politicians of Berlin found few

reasons for prolonging the war. What wonder, then, that they set on foot

intrigues with the regicides of Paris? Marshal Möllendorf, the commander

whom Frederick William substituted for the weary and disgusted Duke of

Brunswick, proved to be a partisan of peace.[341]

 

Royalist at heart, but beset by advisers and mistresses who fanned his

jealousy of Austria and love of ease, Frederick William wavered under

the whims of the hour or the counsels of the last comer. Malmesbury thus

summed up the question now at issue in his letter to Pitt of 9th January

1794: "Can we do without the King of Prussia or can we not? If we can,

he is not worth the giving of a guinea for. If we cannot, I am afraid we

cannot give too many." Malmesbury saw no means of keeping Frederick

William steady up to the end of the war. Pitt and Grenville, however,

devised the following expedient. They offered the sum of £2,000,000 for

bringing 100,000 Prussians into the field. Of this sum Great Britain

would furnish two fifths (or £800,000), and Austria and Holland each one

fifth, the last fifth being advanced by Prussia herself until she

reimbursed herself from France at the general peace. The device was

suggestive of that of the rustic who tempts his beast of burden onwards

by dangling a choice vegetable before his nose.

 

Frederick William alone might have been attracted by the offer; but his

advisers haggled long and obstinately over details. Chief among the

objectors was a Councillor of State, Haugwitz, an oily, plausible

creature, whose Gallophil leanings were destined finally to place his

country under the heel of Napoleon and deal a death-blow to Pitt. For

the present, he treated Malmesbury with a moderation and courtesy that

deftly veiled a determined opposition. The British envoy was fully his

match. Finding that Haugwitz ascribed all difficulties and delays to the

Austrian embassy, he advised him to propose the transfer of the

negotiations to The Hague, where these annoyances would cease. Vain and

always prone to take the easiest course, Haugwitz swallowed the bait and

succeeded in carrying a point which was all in Malmesbury's favour,

especially as it saved time in communicating with Downing Street. After

annoying delays they set out on 23rd March; and with the aid of

twenty-two horses at each post traversed the 326 (English) miles to The

Hague in 120 hours during the days, 23rd-30th March, when the campaign

ought to have opened.

 

The prospects at Vienna were equally gloomy. Morton Eden's reports to

Grenville form an unrelieved jeremiad. Even amidst the alarms caused by

the disasters at Toulon and in the Palatinate, jealousy of Prussia was

the dominant feeling. The utmost efforts of our ambassador failed to

convince Francis II and Thugut of the need of humouring Prussia by

meeting her demand for an additional subsidy and by guaranteeing bread

and forage for the 20,000 men who formed her contingent in the Austrian

service. Into these wearisome quarrels we need not enter, further than

to note that they were envenomed by the acerbity of the Prussian

ambassador at Vienna. The Marquis Lucchesini, born at Lucca in 1752,

early entered the service of Frederick the Great, to whom he acted as

reader. He advanced rapidly under his successor. His commanding

demeanour and vivacity of speech, added to great powers of work, and

acuteness in detecting the foibles of others, made him a formidable

opponent. Further, his marriage with the sister of Bischoffswerder,

until lately the King's favourite adviser, added to his influence,

which, as was natural with a foreigner, inclined towards the attractive

and gainful course. Long afterwards the saviour of Prussia, Baron vom

Stein, classed him among the narrow, selfish, insincere men who had been

the ruin of nations.[342] Certainly he helped to ruin Poland; and now

his conduct at Vienna clogged the efforts of Morton Eden and Malmesbury

to strengthen the Coalition against France. Eden complained that he

behaved as an intriguing subaltern rather than as an ambassador; and

rumour credibly ascribed his tortuous and exasperating conduct to French

gold.

 

In the midst of his irritation against Prussia and her envoy, Thugut

heard with astonishment the British proposals, presented at Berlin early

in February, to bring 100,000 Prussians into the field. Urgently he

remonstrated with Eden, pointing out that Prussia had played them false

in two campaigns, and would do so again, witness her late contention

that France must not be weakened. On no account, then, must Frederick

William head a compact mass of 100,000 men in the Palatinate. He would

be the arbiter of the situation. He would be between the Austrian army

in Brabant and the Hapsburg States. Nay, he might march into Swabia,

reach the Danube, take boats at Ulm, and, sailing down that stream, have

Vienna at his mercy![343] So pressing were these anxieties that, at the

close of February, Thugut sent a special request to Catharine II to

guarantee the security of Austria's possessions in case Frederick

William withdrew from the Coalition.

 

Despite the utmost efforts of the British Ministry and its envoys, no

plan of vigorous co-operation could be arranged between the two German

rivals; the sole link connecting them was the clause of the treaty of

1792, whereby Austria, as having been attacked by France, claimed the

help of 20,000 Prussians. Frederick William decided that this force

must remain at Mainz, in order to guard the Empire from a French raid.

He promised 80,000 more troops to Great Britain and Holland, provided

that they were paid for. On one point alone the four Allies came near to

agreement, namely, that the main Prussian army should operate in

Flanders, so as effectively to defend the Dutch territory, secure

conquests in the North of France, and, above all, preclude the quarrels

which must ensue if it acted near the Austrians.[344] Thugut of course

assented, his great aim being to remove the Prussians as far as possible

from Swabia. Disputes on these subjects went on up to the end of March

1794, the time when an advance into French Flanders promised great

results.

 

The reader will naturally ask--Can this be called a Coalition? A

Coalition implies some power of coalescing. But among the four Powers

there was far more of disunion than union. In fact, England was the sole

link between these wrangling confederates, and that, too, solely by

means of what Carlyle called the cash nexus. Grenville, using a more

homely metaphor, averred that the German princes turned towards England

as an inexhaustible milch-cow. The animal in this case could dictate her

terms; and thus the relations of the three Powers resembled those of a

rich but somewhat exigent employer to grumbling and distrustful

employees. Holland also, in return for her sacrifices in men and money,

demanded from Austria a better frontier on the side of Dutch Flanders

and Maestricht, to which the Viennese Court opposed a quiet but firm

resistance.

 

It speaks volumes for the confidence inspired by Pitt and Grenville, and

for the tactful zeal of Malmesbury and Eden, that they induced the

German rivals to make one more effort. The Duke of York also played an

important part in the formation of the plan of campaign; for he it was

who persuaded Colonel Mack to accompany him to London, and there discuss

with Ministers the alternative schemes. The mention of Mack will excite

surprise among those who know of him only by the futile Neapolitan

campaign of 1799, and the frightful disaster of Ulm. In regard to

strategy and the theory of war he displayed much ability; and his

administrative talents and energy as Quarter-Master-General in 1793

should have screened him from the criticism that he discoursed

brilliantly on war in _salons_, and in the council rhetorically

developed specious and elegant plans.[345]

 

Mack's plan of operations was first submitted to the judgement of the

Archduke Charles, the Prince of Coburg, Count Mercy, the Prince of

Orange, and the Duke of York, at Brussels. Next, he proceeded, along

with Counts Stahremberg and Merveldt to London, and on 13th February

unfolded his plan to Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas. The Duke of York had

preceded him by two days, but was absent from this conference. It became

piquant when Pitt "playfully" remarked to Mack that a great general had

recently arrived at London whose appointment to the command of the

British force in Flanders would doubtless meet with his warm approval.

After a little more fencing, Pitt gave the name of the Marquis

Cornwallis, who had just returned from his Viceroyalty in India. Mack by

no means welcomed the proposal, and made the irreverent remark that the

best General, after fighting elephants in India, would be puzzled by the

French. Pitt thereupon observed that the Duke of York had not the

confidence of the army, to which Mack and Merveldt replied by praising

his character, and decrying his critics as a set of influential but

inexperienced youths.

 

The matter then dropped, and the Duke was present at the conference on

the morrow. Finally, Austria and England bound themselves to make great

efforts, the latter with at least 40,000 men, either British or German

auxiliaries. The Prussian and Dutch forces were to be increased so as to

bring the grand total to 340,000 men. Of this large number 170,000 were

to operate in Flanders with a view to a march on Paris; 35,000 held the

country along the right bank of the Meuse; 15,000 protected Luxemburg;

65,000 Prussians prolonged the line eastwards to the Rhine, which was

guarded by 55,000 Austrians. Certainly the plan called for a third of a

million of men, if all the frontier strongholds of Flanders were to be

taken before the march to Paris began. In regard to details, Pitt,

Grenville, and Dundas urged that Cornwallis should command the British

and subsidiary forces defending West Flanders--a suggestion which

George III warmly approved, on condition that the Duke of York, serving

with the main body nearer the centre of the long line, had a number of

troops proportionate to his rank and talents.

 

Thus the effort of Pitt and his colleagues to shelve the Duke of York

was foiled. On another and weightier matter he had his way. Coburg's

conduct had been so languid and unenterprising as to lead to urgent

demands for his recall; and it was understood that the