William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

Emperor Francis

would take the command, with Mack as Chief-of-Staff and virtual director

of the campaign. Pitt expressed to Mack his marked preference of this

arrangement to the alternative scheme, the appointment of the Archduke

Charles; for the extreme youth of the Archduke might hinder a good

understanding between him and his subordinate and senior, the Duke of

York. Seeing, then, that Mack declined absolutely to serve under

Coburg,[346] nothing but the presence of the Emperor could end the

friction in Flanders.

 

But alas for the monarchical cause! At the very time when the Kaiser was

to set out for Brussels, alarming news came from Cracow. The temper of

the Poles, heated by the wrongs and insults of two years, burst forth in

a rising against the Russian and Prussian authorities. Kosciusko, the

last hope of Poland, issued an appeal which nerved his countrymen to

dare the impossible. Rushing to arms, they astonished the world by

exhibiting in the last throes of their long agony a strength which, if

put forth in 1791, might have saved their land from spoliation. Even now

their despairing struggles turned towards Warsaw much of the energy

which should have trended towards Paris; and thus, once again, and not

for the last time, did the foul crimes of 1772 and 1793 avenge

themselves on their perpetrators. The last struggles of Poland helped on

the French Republic to its mighty adolescence. Finally, on 2nd April,

Francis II departed for Brussels. Thugut set out nine days later; and in

the interval, on the plausible pretext that Prussia would seize more

Polish land, he stopped the reinforcements destined for Flanders. He

also urged the Czarina on no account to allow a partition of

Poland.[347]

 

While the Continental States were thus pulling different ways, British

diplomacy won two notable triumphs at The Hague. By dint of threatening

Haugwitz with the rupture of the whole negotiation, Malmesbury induced

that Minister to countermand the order for the retirement of the

Prussian troops, which had already begun. He thereby saved the Allies in

the Palatinate and Flanders from very serious risks in view of the

gathering masses of the French.[348] Further, on 19th April, he induced

Haugwitz to sign a treaty which promised to revivify the monarchical

cause. Prussia agreed to furnish, by 24th May, 62,400 men, who were to

act conjointly with the British and Dutch forces in Flanders. For this

powerful succour the two Maritime States would pay a subsidy of £50,000

a month, besides the cost of bread and forage, reckoned at £1 12_s._ per

man per month, and £300,000 for initial expenses. As Great Britain and

Holland wholly supported this army, they prescribed the sphere of its

operations, and retained any conquests that it might make. The treaty

was for the year 1794; but its renewal was stipulated in a separate

article. Prussia of course still supplied to Austria the 20,000 men due

by the treaty of 1792.

 

If Malmesbury had not induced Haugwitz to sign the treaty then, it would

never have been signed at all. Almost alone in the Court of Berlin,

Frederick William desired to continue the struggle. His uncle, Prince

Henry, had always opposed war with France, and long before Valmy, had

prophesied that her untrained but enthusiastic levies would be a match

for any professional army. His influence and that of the Duke of

Brunswick, Lucchesini, and Möllendorf, were still cast against the

western crusade, so that Grenville believed Prussia to be dragging on

the negotiation solely in order to embarrass her Allies by throwing it

up early in the campaign.[349] Moreover, Malmesbury's treaty contained

its own death warrant. A Great Power can ill afford to hire out its

troops to non-military States, unless they lessen the humiliation of

such a proceeding by according the utmost possible freedom. But the

Hague Convention specified that the subsidized Prussian army must

operate where the paymasters directed; and they now decided on removing

it from the Palatinate to the valley of the Meuse near Dinant, or even

further west, provided that Austria could fill up the gap thus left in

the Palatinate.[350] In passing, I may note that this important decision

was due to George III, as appears in Grenville's final instruction to

Malmesbury: "The King's determination is finally taken not to agree to

any plan by which the Prussians would be employed more to the left than

the country of the Meuse."[351] No one who knows the rigour of the

King's resolves can doubt that he was responsible for a determination

fraught with unexpected issues.

 

It is alien to my purpose to recount the ensuing disputes. I can glance

only at the part played by Pitt. At one point his conduct was weak and

dilatory. Early in May, when Malmesbury proceeded to London for the

purpose of securing the ratification of the treaty and the payment of

the first subsidy to Prussia, he encountered most annoying delays. Pitt

and Grenville left him severely alone, probably because they were then

so occupied with the coercion of the English Jacobins as to have no time

for the plans which promised the overthrow of the French Jacobins.

Another topic engaging their attention was the hoped-for coalition with

the Portland Whigs, which shrouded from their gaze the needs of the

European Coalition. However we may explain the fact, it is certain that

during sixteen days (6th to 22nd May) Malmesbury, despite his urgent

entreaties to Grenville, could procure neither instructions as to his

future conduct, nor a promise for the payment of the first Prussian

subsidy. News of a British disaster in Flanders at last quickened the

laggards of Whitehall. On the 23rd Malmesbury gained his heart's desire,

and set out for the Prussian headquarters on the following day.[352]

Meanwhile, owing to this long delay (one of the most discreditable

incidents in the careers of Pitt and Grenville), Prussia took no steps

to carry out the terms of the compact. It so happened that on 24th May

her army in the Palatinate, commanded by Möllendorf, gained a victory

over the French at Kaiserslautern in the Palatinate; but that event set

them the more against Malmesbury's treaty, which implied a march of some

120 miles through difficult country, and across an enemy's front.

 

Moreover, as has been hinted, reverses had by this time overtaken the

right wing of the Allies, in West Flanders. At the centre, near the

Sambre, the campaign opened with promise, the British cavalry gaining a

brilliant success at Bethencourt. But Carnot, having drawn upon the

French troops in Lorraine and the Palatinate, threw his heaviest columns

at points on the extreme west of the French front, the result being that

at Turcoing the Republicans shattered the isolated corps of the Duke of

York and General Otto (18th May). The successes of the Prussians and of

the Austrian army, on the Sambre, saved the situation for a time. But

the prospects even in that quarter were overclouded by the resolve of

the Emperor Francis to leave his army and return to Vienna. News of the

critical state of affairs in Poland prompted this decision, the results

of which soon appeared in quarrels at headquarters and discouragement in

the rank and file. The Austrian soldiery saw in the withdrawal of the

Kaiser the end of his rule in the Netherlands. They were right. The

counsels of Thugut had now prevailed. South Poland was to be the prize

of the Hapsburgs. The tiresome and distant Netherlands were to be given

up, the pecuniary support of England, however, being assured as far as

possible by a feint of defending them.

 

Here we have the explanation of the half-hearted effort made by the

Austrians at Fleurus. There was every reason why Coburg, now again the

commander of the main Austrian force, should strike vigorously at the

French force besieging Charleroi. A decisive victory in front of

Charleroi would not only save that place, but would give pause to the

French forces further west, now advancing rapidly towards Ghent.

Accordingly Coburg, advancing as far as Fleurus, hard by the village of

Ligny, attacked the Republicans. He had on the whole the best of the

fight, when the arrival of news of the surrender of Charleroi led him

most tamely to call off his men and fall back. The retirement took place

in discreditably good order, not a single gun being lost (25th June

1794). A bold leader would have beaten the enemy and probably would have

saved Charleroi. With the same excess of prudence Coburg conducted his

retreat, several positions and strongholds being abandoned in craven

fashion.

 

Meanwhile Pitt and Dundas made great efforts to save West Flanders. In

haste they despatched reinforcements to Ostend; and among the regiments

which landed there on 25th and 26th June was the 33rd, commanded by

Colonel Wellesley. The future Duke of Wellington found the small

garrison of Ostend in a state of panic; and his chief, the Earl of

Moira, deemed it best to meet the French in the open. By great good

fortune Moira, with most of the regiments, reached Bruges, and beyond

that town came into touch with Clerfait's force. Wellesley, taking ship,

sailed round to Antwerp and reached that column by a safer route and

earlier than his chief. His action is characteristic of a judgement that

never erred, a will that never faltered. In this campaign, as he

afterwards said, he learnt how not to make war. But success not seldom

crowns the efforts of him who has the good sense to probe the causes of

failure. Certainly it rarely comes to British commanders save after very

chastening experiences; and Wellesley now took part in what was, for the

Austrians, a fore-ordained retreat. Despite the manly appeals of the

Duke of York, Coburg declined to make a stand on the fateful ridge of

Mount St. Jean; and the name of Waterloo appears in the tepid records of

1794 at the head of a plan for arranging the stages of the retreat (5th

July) which the nervousness of Coburg soon condemned to the limbo of

unfulfilled promises.[353] Is it surprising that, two days later, the

Duke of York declared to him that the British were "betrayed and sold to

the enemy"? Worse still, the garrisons of Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy,

and Landrecies, amounting to nearly 11,000 men, were now left to their

fate.

 

Indirectly Pitt and Dundas were responsible for these disasters. They

weakened the British force in Flanders by sending large drafts to the

West Indies, as will in due course appear. They also allowed Corsica to

be occupied in the spring of 1794, and yet they made little or no use of

that island for expeditions against the Riviera, which the royalist

natives would readily have undertaken under an inspiring leader. They

also relied too much on the Austrians and Prussians, though the former

were known to care little for their Netherlands, apart from the prospect

of gaining the Barrier fortresses of French Flanders in order to further

the Belgic-Bavarian exchange. Above all, as we have seen, Pitt's conduct

towards Prussia was annoyingly halting. Malmesbury's treaty could have

no effect unless it led the Prussians to move at once. The delay of

sixteen days at Whitehall must rank as one of the causes of the failures

just recounted; and though Grenville was technically guilty, Pitt must

be blamed for not ensuring the needful despatch in an all-important

decision. It is curious that he never realized his responsibility.

Speaking at a later date of the campaign of Fleurus, he said that it

turned upon as narrow a point as ever occurred: that England was

unfortunate, but the blame did not rest with her.[354] This probably

refers to the surrender of Charleroi and the retreat from Fleurus. But

Pitt did not understand that the timely advent of part of the Prussian

force on the Meuse, or even its advance into Lorraine, would have

changed the situation; and for their inactivity he was in some measure

responsible.

 

At times Pitt lived in dreamland. On 15th July, while the Austrians were

quietly withdrawing from Central Belgium, he drew up a Memorandum as to

the course of events. By the close of the year Austria was to bring

100,000 men into Flanders, a close alliance being framed on the basis of

her acquisition of the French border districts (Valenciennes had not yet

surrendered). England was to retain all conquests in the two Indies. The

Prussians were to march towards Flanders, which they obstinately refused

to do. Dutch and other troops were to be engaged by England, the

presumption being that the year 1795 would see the losses of 1794 more

than retrieved. The mistake of 10,000 in adding up the totals of the

troops (78,000 instead of 88,000) enables one to conjecture at what time

of the day this sketch was outlined.[355] One would not take it

seriously had not the Foreign Office soon despatched Earl Spencer and

Mr. Thomas Grenville as special envoys to Vienna to propose very similar

plans, Austria being urged on by the prospect of acquiring the French

Barrier fortresses from Lille to Sedan.[356]

 

They aroused