William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

in Thugut a spirit of greed, not of honourable emulation.

In a private letter to Pitt, dated Vienna 16th August, Spencer warned

him that that Government was "neither possessed of sufficient energy and

vigour, nor sufficiently actuated by the true principles on which the

cause in which we are engaged ought to be conducted" to justify the

demands of Thugut. They included British subsidies for Austria, though

she could well support the war, and the sacrifice of British maritime

conquests at the general peace as a means of ensuring the recovery of

her losses on land. As to Belgium, added Spencer, Thugut looked on it

"as irrecoverably lost and not worth regaining, unless with the addition

of a very strong and extended barrier, composed of fortresses which he

to-day plainly told us he did not think there was the least chance of

taking in the course of the war, but that they must be obtained as

cessions from France at the peace."[357] Thus Thugut expected that, while

the Austrians were ignominiously evacuating the Netherlands, the

British fleet should win French colonies valuable enough to induce

France both to retire from Belgium, and to surrender to Austria her

northern fortresses from Lille to Sedan or Thionville.

 

The capture of Valenciennes and the slaughter of the _émigrés_ in the

Austrian garrison was the retort of the French to these day-dreams (29th

August). The fall of Robespierre a month earlier, and the enhanced

authority now enjoyed by Carnot enabled the authorities at Paris to

press on the conquest of Belgium with an energy which set at defiance

the boyish miscalculations of Pitt and the wavering plans of the

Hapsburgs.

 

Towards the close of July Pitt and Grenville saw the need of abating the

rigour of their demands on Prussia. For of what use was it to move

60,000 Prussians more than 100 miles to defend West Flanders when that

province was lost? Malmesbury therefore was empowered to pay the monthly

subsidy of £50,000 on behalf of Great Britain and Holland, provided that

Möllendorf's army attacked the French about Trèves, thus lessening the

pressure on Coburg's left wing. On 27th July he framed such an agreement

with Hardenberg. This statesman was destined to be one of the saviours

of the Prussian State in its darkest days, 1810-12; but now, as always,

his conduct was shifty; and it is questionable whether he, any more than

Haugwitz, dealt honourably with England. It must suffice to say that

Möllendorf made not even a demonstration towards Trèves. His inactivity

was in part due to the withdrawal of several regiments towards Poland,

though Great Britain and Holland still paid for the maintenance of the

full quota on the Rhine.

 

So flagrant was the breach of faith as to elicit heated protests from

Malmesbury; and Pitt, justly indignant at the use of British money for

what was virtually a partition of Poland, decided to remonstrate with

Jacobi, the Prussian ambassador at London. Summoning him to Downing

Street, at the end of September, he upbraided him with this

dishonourable conduct, declaring that, unless the Prussians moved

forward at once, the British and Dutch subsidy for October would be

withheld. Much as we may sympathize with this indignant outburst, we

must pronounce it unwise. For firstly, Pitt was intruding upon the

sphere of Grenville in making this declaration, which was far more acrid

than the despatches of the Foreign Secretary. Secondly, it was made in

the presence of Dundas, with whom Grenville was already on bad terms. Is

it surprising that the Foreign Secretary wrote sharply to Pitt

protesting against his acting on a line different from that previously

taken at Downing Street? In his despatch of 30th September to Berlin,

Grenville was careful to make the withdrawal of the subsidy strictly

conditional, and his protest was probably less sharp than that which

Pitt addressed to Jacobi.

 

So annoyed was Grenville at Pitt's interference during his own temporary

absence that he wrote to express his willingness to retire from the

Foreign Office if this would solve the difficulties caused by the

appointment of Earl Fitzwilliam to the Irish Viceroyalty. To that topic

I shall recur in a later chapter on the Irish troubles which now became

acute. Here it must suffice to say that Pitt declined to accept

Grenville's offer, and affairs at Downing Street righted

themselves.[358] But at Berlin the mischief was irremediable. Jacobi, a

born intriguer, and ever hostile to England, represented the words of

Pitt in the worst possible light. Accordingly Frederick William affected

great indignation at the conduct of Pitt, accused him of ending the

alliance, and discovered in his own ruffled feelings the pretext for

giving rein to the dictates of self-interest. He gave orders to end the

campaign on the Rhine; and though Grenville sought to patch matters up,

compromise was clearly impossible between Allies who had lost that

mutual confidence which is the only lasting guarantee of treaties.

 

At the autumnal equinox of 1794 Pitt was confronted by a far more

serious crisis than at the beginning of the war in February 1793. The

Republicans, after throwing back Clerfait beyond the River Roer, towards

Aix-la-Chapelle, compelled the Duke of York to abandon the natural line

of defence of Holland, the River Waal; and in the early days of October

the British retired behind Bergen-op-zoom and other Dutch fortresses.

These were found to be totally unprepared to sustain a siege. The

sluggishness of the Orange party, dominant in Holland since 1787, stood

in marked contrast to the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots to help the

invaders. Consequently in a few weeks the friends of the Stadholder saw

their hopes fade away.

 

There was but one chance of rescue. The Duke of Brunswick, who so

skilfully led the Prussians to Amsterdam in 1787, might be expected to

impart some courage to the Dutch garrisons and some show of discipline

to the disordered relics of York's and Clerfait's forces now drifting

slowly northwards. His position as a Field-Marshal of the Prussian army

also promised to interest the Court of Berlin in recovering some part,

at least, of the supremacy of the Allies in the Dutch Netherlands. As

the crisis in Holland had served to unite the two great Protestant

Powers, so now it might prevent the dissolution of that salutary

compact. Further, George III, though greatly disliking the substitution

of Cornwallis for the Duke of York, favoured the appointment of the

veteran Brunswick to the supreme command. Family considerations, always

very strong in the King, here concurred with reasons of state. Not only

had Brunswick married the sister of George III; but their daughter, the

Princess Caroline, was now the reluctant choice of the Prince of Wales.

The parents, both at Windsor and at Brunswick welcomed the avowal by the

royal prodigal of the claims of lawful wedlock. The Duchess of Brunswick

fell into raptures at the brilliant prospects thus opened out for her

daughter; and it seemed that both Hymen and Mars, for once working in

unison, conspired to bring from his inglorious retreat at Brunswick the

man whom that age still acclaimed as its war-lord.

 

Malmesbury therefore proceeded to Brunswick for the double purpose of

arranging the marriage and urging the Duke to take the command of the

allied forces on the Lower Rhine. Overjoyed at leaving the atmosphere of

intrigue at Möllendorf's headquarters, the envoy journeyed into the

northern plain in hopes of assuring the safety of part of Holland. Early

in November Pitt and his colleagues received a refusal from the Duke,

but now they sent through Malmesbury an offer to subsidize a corps of

20,000 or 30,000 Austrians in that quarter. These, along with the

British, Hanoverian, and Hessian troops, when marshalled by Brunswick,

might surely be trusted to stay the French advance. The crisis was

momentous. Brunswick well understood that in reality the fate of North

Germany was at stake; for the French, if masters of the Rhine and Ems

valleys, could easily overrun the northern plain, including his own

duchy. Self-interest, pride in the German name, hatred of French

principles, and, finally, satisfaction at the marriage alliance, bade

the Duke draw his sword before it was too late.

 

But here again the malign influence of Berlin thwarted the plans of

Pitt. In vain did Malmesbury ply the Duke with arguments and the Duchess

with compliments. On 25th November the Duke informed him that, as a

Prussian Field-Marshal, he was bound to consult Frederick William: and

"the answer he had received was not of a nature which allowed him to

accept of an offer otherwise so highly honourable and flattering to

him." He then handed to the envoy his formal refusal.[359]

 

Whether the elderly Duke of Brunswick could have withstood the impetuous

onset of the ill-clad, half-starved, but unconquerable peasants now

following the French tricolour in its progress through Holland, who

shall say? The exploits of Pichegru and his levies border on the

miraculous until we remember that half of the Dutch laboured on their

behalf, while the troops of York and Clerfait distrusted or despised

those leaders. This consideration it was that led Pitt to take a step

which he deemed most necessary for the public service as well as for the

reputation of the Duke of York. On Sunday, 25th November, he wrote at

Holwood a very lengthy letter to the King, setting forth most

deferentially the reasons which impelled him and his colleagues to

request the withdrawal of the Duke from Holland.[360] He touched with

equal skill and firmness on the unfortunate feeling prevalent in the

army respecting the Duke of York; and, while eulogizing His Royal

Highness, expressed the conviction of the Cabinet that, in his own

interests as well as those of the country, he should be recalled from a

sphere of action where the difficulties were wellnigh insuperable. Pitt

also suggested to the King the advisability of transferring the British

forces to a more promising sphere, Brittany or la Vendée. The King's

answer evinced considerable irritation, a proof that he saw little but

the personal aspects of the case. Pitt, however, held to his point, and

the Duke was recalled in order to become a little later

commander-in-chief, a position for which he was far better suited than

for a command in the field. At the close of the year Pitt showed his

regard for the public service by requesting from the King leave to

displace his brother, the Earl of Chatham, from the Admiralty, where his

lethargy had several times hindered the naval operations. Lord Spencer

became First Lord, the Earl of Chatham succeeding to Spencer's position

as Lord Privy Seal.

 

Pitt's magnanimous resolve to brave the royal displeasure rather than

keep a royal prince in a situation for which he was unfit met with

general approval. The times were too serious to admit of pedantic

trifling or unmanly shrinking. In quick succession there arrived news of

the definite refusal of the Duke of Brunswick to come forward, of the

incredible apathy of the Dutch, and of the demoralization of the Allies

in their continued retreat. To add to their misfortunes, nature gripped

that land of waters in a severe frost, so that the Dutch loyalists were

unable, even if they had the hardihood, to let loose the floods against

the invaders. In endless swarms these pressed on from the South,

determined now to realize Dumouriez' dream of conquering Holland in

order to appropriate its resources, pecuniary, naval, and colonial.

Pichegru it was who won immortal fame by this conquest, which in truth

needs not the legendary addition of his cavalry seizing a Dutch squadron

in the Zuyder Zee. A singular incident attended the journey of

Malmesbury with the future Princess of Wales towards Helvoetsluys, on

their way to England. Unaware of the inroads of the French horse, they

had to beat a speedy retirement, which, unfortunately for the Prince of

Wales, placed them out of reach of the raiders. A little later the Duke

and Duchess of Brunswick were fain to pack up their valuables and leave

their capital in haste.

 

Such was the French conquest of Holland and part of Hanover in the

winter of 1794-5. So speedy was it that Pitt and Dundas took no timely

means to ensure the carrying off the Dutch fleet. As no small part of it

was loyal to the Prince of Orange, who now fled to England, the

oversight is to be censured. Surely Flushing or the Brill could have

been secured. The Cabinet, however, as we shall see later, prepared to

rescue from the general ruin the most valuable of the Dutch colonies,

the Cape of Good Hope, the importance of which, for the safety of India,

Pitt and Dundas rated most highly. Meanwhile, under the command of

Abercromby, Harcourt, Cathcart, and Walmoden, the British and subsidized

German forces fell back towards the River Ems, and thence to the Weser.

Pitt, as we have seen, desired to recall the British regiments for

service in the West of France. But various considerations told against

this plan; and, as will appear later, the King obstinately opposed the

withdrawal of the British cavalry