William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

Flanders, and on the

coasts of Brittany and Provence, not to speak of the needs of Ireland

and the East Indies. He allowed Dundas to send out levies which were far

too raw to withstand the strain of the tropics. This fact, together with

the stupidity of the regulations and the inexperience, or worse, of the

medical staff, accounts for the waste of life and the barrenness of

these tedious campaigns. At no time had England in the West Indies a

force sufficient to withstand the ravages of disease and to overcome the

Republicans and their black allies. Nevertheless, while the conduct of

the West Indian campaigns is open to censure, it is difficult to see

what other course could have been adopted towards those important

colonies, in view of the resolve of the French Jacobins to revolutionize

them. The attempt was made and partly succeeded. Could Pitt and his

colleagues stand merely on the defensive, while incendiaries sought to

stir up a war of colour? Was it not the natural and inevitable step to

endeavour to extirpate those fire-brands? And when so attractive an

offer as that of Hayti was made by the royalist settlers, could the

British Government hold timidly aloof and allow that rich land to breed

revolt? Surely a servile war could be averted only by intervention at

the natural centre of influence. If from Guadeloupe, after its recapture

by the French, the seeds of rebellion were sown broadcast, would not

Hayti have become a volcano of insurrection? Finally, it is

unquestionable that the change of front of the Court of Madrid in the

years 1795-6 blighted the whole enterprise at the very time when success

seemed attainable. On Godoy, then, not on Pitt, must rest the

responsibility for the lamentable waste of life in the West Indies and

the ultimate lapse into barbarism of their most fertile island.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[384] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Bute to Grenville, 26th June 1795.

 

[385] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Jackson to Grenville, 2nd January and 11th

February 1795.

 

[386] "F. O.," Spain, 37. Grenville to Bute, 5th, 12th, and 19th June.

 

[387] Del Cantillo, "Tratados," 660.

 

[388] "Papiers de Barthélemy," vi, Introd., xv, 71, 77-85.

 

[389] "W. O.," vi, 6, which contains other despatches of Dundas cited

later.

 

[390] "Diary of Sir John Moore," i, 208, 221, 233, 243; ii, 18, 19.

 

[391] "Diary of Sir John Moore," 2 vols. Edited by General Maurice.

 

[392] "F. O.," Spain, 39, 40. Merry to Grenville, 20th and 25th December

and 19th January, 10th February, 6th and 29th March.

 

[393] "Dropmore P.," iii, 214.

 

[394] "F. O.," Spain, 44. Bute to Grenville, 10th September and 21st

October.

 

[395] For the disgust of Pitt and Dundas, see "Dropmore P.," iii, 390.

 

[396] Malouet wrote to Pitt on 24th June 1798: "The wisdom of General

Maitland's measures, the perfect order in which he has conducted the

operations have lessened the disasters attending it, and by means of a

truce and convention agreed on with the Republican chiefs, not an

inconsiderable number of inhabitants has been induced to remain on their

plantations" (Pitt MSS., 146).

 

CHAPTER XI (THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE: CORSICA: QUIBERON)

 

The French Jacobins early laid stress on the weakness of the British

Empire. An official report issued in January 1793 at Paris advocated a

close alliance with Tippoo Sahib, the Raja of Mysore, and recommended

that the French force sent to assist him should threaten or secure the

Dutch possessions at the Cape of Good Hope, and in Java and Ceylon.

"There," it continued, "you would meet only with men enervated by

luxury, soft beings that would tremble before the soldiers of liberty."

The French conquest of Holland and the capture of the Dutch fleet in the

winter of 1794-5 brought these schemes within measurable distance of

fulfilment. Failing to save a single Dutch fortress or warship, Pitt and

his colleagues became alarmed about the Dutch colonies; and when the

lethargic Stadholder and his consort Wilhelmina landed in England,

Ministers conferred with him on this topic.

 

On 7th February 1795, shortly after his arrival at Kew House,

thenceforth the scene of his debauches, he drew up an order for the

Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, bidding him welcome the arrival of a

friendly British force, which would save Cape Town from the French. That

important post belonged to the Dutch East India Company, then virtually

bankrupt, and altogether unable to maintain its neutrality amidst the

struggles for a world-empire now entering on a new phase. The officials

of the Company at Amsterdam on 3rd February issued warnings to all Dutch

ships in British ports to set sail forthwith, and further requested the

French Government to secure Dutch vessels from attacks by its war

vessels or privateers.[397] A few days later the invaders of Holland

laid hands on British ships and detained even the packet-boats. In fact,

though the Dutch did not frame an alliance with France until 16th May,

it existed in effect from the month of February.[398] These facts

explain the action of the Prince of Orange, which is otherwise

unjustifiable. It was a natural retort to the conduct of the Dutch

authorities. The British archives also show the alarm of our India Board

and of its president, Dundas. On 5th February he urged the British East

India Company to send in duplicate urgent messages to India. On 8th and

10th February he inquired whether the extra troops needed for India

could sail on three of their ships now ready in the Thames; and he

requested that some of the Company's troops stationed at St. Helena

should proceed to India, their place being taken by drafts from

home.[399]

 

Foremost among Dundas's plans for assuring British supremacy in India

was the acquisition of the Cape. Not that he valued the Cape and Egypt

on their own account. That generation regarded them merely as

half-way-houses to India, witness the curious statement of Sir Francis

Barings, Director of the East India Company, to Dundas, that the Cape

was of no advantage whatever to us, and might be a dangerous drain upon

our population; but in the hands of France it would most seriously

menace our interests.[400] Of how many prosperous British colonies has

not this been said? For similar reasons we took possession of large

parts of India and Canada, not to speak of Malta, portions of Australia,

New Zealand, and the Egyptian Soudan.

 

Early in March Commodore Blankett set sail from Spithead with four

ships, having on board part of the 78th regiment, besides marines. The

"Sphinx" was to join them at St. Helena. The land forces were commanded

by Major-General Sir James Craig. Early in April Rear-Admiral Sir Keith

Elphinstone sailed with a larger force, and a further expedition was in

preparation under the command of Major-General Alured Clarke. The

Cabinet expected little or no resistance, and even referred to a

friendly reception as the probable issue. They had some grounds for

hope. The Dutch force at the Cape consisted of about 800 German

mercenaries, whose pay was far in arrears. It was suggested that we

should take them into our pay, and quiet the people by the promise of

abolishing the abuses of the Dutch Company. These hopes proved

excessive. Craig, on making False Bay on 11th June, soon found Governor

Sluysken totally unaffected by the Stadholder's letter. He was a man

"of the most uncommon _sangfroid_" professing affection to England and

dislike of France, but resolved to keep a firm hold of Cape Town. He

offered to give the squadron all it wanted, and begged for time to

consider the British demand.

 

Meanwhile mounted burghers poured in from the eastern settlements, and

greatly strengthened the Dutch camp, situated in a pass half way between

the town and False Bay. These sturdy farmers hoped to win entire

independence; for indeed the Dutch East India Company cramped the life

of the settlers at every turn. Despite the wealth of that land in corn,

cotton, wine, and cattle, it made little progress. The fisheries might

have been productive but for the regulations which forbade the colonists

even a pleasure boat. The Company claimed one-tenth of the produce of

all sales and had the right of pre-emption and of fixing the prices of

goods. Settlers might not even kill their own cattle for food without

the permission of officials. Cape Town was the only market for foreign

commerce, and all products going in and out were subject to heavy

dues.[401] Far from thriving on these exclusive rights, that corporation

found its funds crippled by the very regulations which impoverished and

irritated the burghers. In fact the first aim of the Boers was to trek

beyond reach of the arm of the law. Thus came about the settlement of

the remote townships, Swellendam and Graaf-Reinet, and thus was

implanted in that virile race the resolve to secure complete

independence of the enfeebled motherland.

 

The time seemed to have come when the British force menaced Cape Town.

The Boers, no less than the Governor Sluysken, regarded the letter of

the Prince as a forgery and the whole affair a mere trick. In vain did

Elphinstone and Craig offer guarantees for good government. The

officials and soldiery were impressed by the offer of enrolment in the

British service, but the armed farmers proved intractable. Not having

artillery or sufficient troops, Craig awaited the arrival of

reinforcements from St. Helena; but on 14th July he landed about 1,600

men at Simon's Town, and somewhat later began the advance towards Cape

Town. With little difficulty his men drove the Dutch from a strong

position in the Pass of Muysenberg. On the next day the Dutch advanced

from Cape Town with all their force and eight guns, but failed to

dislodge Craig, despite his lack of artillery.

 

A period of much anxiety ensued, owing to the delay in the arrival of

the reinforcements under Major-General Alured Clarke, without which an

advance on Cape Town was perilous. The Dutch meanwhile received supplies

from interlopers, concerning whom Elphinstone wrote with nautical

emphasis: "The seas are infested with Americans, Danes, Genoese,

Tuscans, etc., or in other terms smuggling ships, mostly belonging to

Britain and Bengal, entrenched with oaths and infamy, who trade to the

French islands [Bourbon, etc.] and all the ports in India, changing

their flags as is most convenient to them."[402] He therefore forbade

any of them to touch at the Cape. On the arrival of Clarke's force Craig

took the offensive. About 4,000 strong, the British pushed on towards

Cape Town, amidst a dropping fire from the mounted burghers, until they

drew near to Wynberg. There the Dutch prepared to offer a stout

resistance; but the diversion caused by three British ships entering

Table Bay, and firing at Cape Town, unsteadied them; and, after little

fighting, they retired towards the capital, crying out that Sluysken had

betrayed them. Early on the morrow he offered to surrender; and the

Union Jack was hoisted on 16th September.

 

The conquest was delusively easy. The mounted Boers, who were the heart

of the defence, rode off with their arms, vowing vengeance against the

invaders; and some hundred of the foreign mercenaries, who entered the

British service, soon deserted. On 22nd September Craig wrote that,

except the six principal merchants in Cape Town, all the population was

hostile, and would certainly join the French, if they appeared, Jacobin

ideas being rife alike in town and country. He hoped that the