William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

abolition

of "the abominable monopolies" would have some effect. After Clarke and

most of his troops sailed on to their destination, India, Craig viewed

the future with concern, as Cape Town and the neighbouring bays needed a

considerable force for adequate defence. The population of Cape Town and

district then amounted to 4,957 settlers and their children, 6,068

servants, and 9,049 slaves. In the whole colony there were 14,929 free

settlers, 11,555 servants, and 19,807 slaves. The oxen numbered 418,817.

 

The news of the capture of Cape Town caused great relief at Whitehall.

Dundas on 16th January 1796 assured Craig that His Majesty would have

preferred a peaceful acquisition. The remark does not evince much

sagacity; for in that case the Boers would have represented the

occupation as an act of trickery concocted with the Prince of Orange. As

it was, the Cape was conquered after a fair fight. Undoubtedly in the

month of August the burghers might have beaten Craig had they been

either well led or enterprising. Dundas also instructed Clarke to leave

a strong garrison at Cape Town, and forwarded news of the capture of

Trincomalee, the Dutch stronghold in Ceylon. The Dutch soon sent a force

of 2,000 troops convoyed by six warships, for the recapture of the Cape;

but, while sheltering in Saldanha Bay, some fifty miles north of Cape

Town, it was surprised by Elphinstone's squadron and capitulated (17th

August 1796). The news of this disaster hastened the surrender of the

burghers of Graaf Reinet who had defied British authority.

 

In order to mark the permanence of British rule, Pitt decided to send

out as Governor Lord Macartney, who previously had undertaken a mission

to "Louis XVIII" at Verona. His arrival in May 1797 helped to check the

growth of discontent which was again becoming formidable. Macartney's

difficulties were great. The Dutch held sullenly aloof, in the belief

that England must give up her prize at the peace. Our military and naval

officers disliked Cape Town, owing to the lack of amusements, the

dearness of provisions, and the badness of the roadstead. Admiral

Pringle declared to Lady Anne Barnard that, as a naval station, it was

the worst that the devil could have contrived; that the people were

objectionable, and the animals vile, even the hens being unable to lay

fresh eggs. The soldiers grumbled at the high prices; for, though beef

was only fourpence a pound, and good wine sixpence a bottle, yet an egg

cost threepence and a dish of cauliflowers eighteenpence. Readers of

Lady Anne's sprightly letters will note in germ the problem that has

beset the British in South Africa.[403] They formed a restless minority

among a people curiously unreceptive and suspicious. They were bored by

the surroundings, puzzled by Dutch elusiveness, and doubtful as to the

future. The war was going far from well; and the alliance of Spain with

France in the summer of 1796 facilitated attacks from the Canaries and

Monte Video. These difficulties were enhanced by the cold and tactless

behaviour of Macartney.

 

Nevertheless Pitt resolved at all costs to hold the Cape. Signs of

disgust at the state of affairs in Corsica and the West Indies early

figure in his letters; but as to the retention of Cape Town he never

wavered. Bonaparte's capture of Egypt in 1798 showed that India was

about to be assailed by way of the Red Sea. The greater, then, was the

need to retain the stronghold which dominated the sea-route to the East

Indies. The resolve of Pitt to assure the communication with India by

one or other of the two routes will concern us later. But we may risk

the assertion that he would certainly have avoided the blunder of the

Addington Ministry in 1802 in giving up the Cape and neglecting to

secure Malta against recapture by Napoleon. Early in the course of the

Napoleonic War, Pitt resolved at all costs to retain Malta and to

re-conquer the Cape. During the negotiations of 1805 with Russia he

refused to allow the discussion of our title to Malta; and in the

parleys with Prussia a little later he distinctly excepted the Cape from

the list of the conquered colonies which Britain might be willing to

restore at the general peace.[404] Six days before Pitt expressed this

resolve, Nelson won his last and greatest triumph, thus enabling the

Prime Minister to deal with full effect the blow which won Cape Colony

for the British flag. It is clear, then, that Pitt discerned the

enormous importance of that station as an outwork of India. In fact,

after the expedition of Bonaparte to Egypt and the renewal of his

oriental schemes in 1803, no statesman worthy of the name could fail to

see that either Egypt and Malta, or the Cape of Good Hope, must belong

to the mistress of the East Indies. In the last resort, then, it was the

world-policy of Napoleon which planted the Union Jack for ever both at

Malta and the Cape of Good Hope.

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Naval campaigns almost of necessity resolve themselves into a series of

experiments; and after the failure of the attempt to hold Toulon, a blow

at Corsica was the natural sequel. At a time when Great Britain had no

post within the Mediterranean, that island was a most desirable prize.

Its supplies of naval stores to the dockyard at Toulon were of the

highest value to the French; and Nelson declared the occupation of

Corsica to be imperatively necessary, as it furnished that dockyard with

the decks, sides, and straight timbers for ships.[405] Accordingly,

after the evacuation of Toulon by the Allies in December 1793, Admiral

Hood decided to effect the reduction of the island for the royalist

cause.

 

Already, while at Toulon, he had received an urgent invitation from

Paoli, the leader of the Royalist, or British, party in Corsica, to help

the islanders in driving out the French. Victor in the long feud against

the Bonapartes, whom he expelled at midsummer, Paoli now resolved to

root out the Jacobins, and his Anglophil leanings induced him to offer

the crown of Corsica to George III. Both the King and his Ministers

received the offer favourably, Pitt and Grenville regarding Corsica as

one of the indemnities to be exacted from France. Sir Gilbert Elliot,

the King's Commissioner in the Mediterranean, was therefore charged to

administer Corsica. Disputes between Admiral Hood and General Dundas, the

commander of the British troops, somewhat hampered the sieges of the

three French garrisons still holding out; but by August 1794 Calvi, the

last hope of the French, succumbed to the vigour of the attack of

General Stuart, effectively helped by Nelson, who there lost the sight

of his right eye.

 

Subsequent events in Corsica, although of great interest, are not

closely connected with the life of Pitt; and I therefore propose to

describe them and the details of the Quiberon expedition in the volume

entitled "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies." In this chapter only the

incidents which more particularly concern Pitt will be noticed.

 

The attempt to rule that most clannish and suspicious of Mediterranean

peoples first called forth the administrative powers of Sir Gilbert

Elliot, first Earl of Minto. Acting as Viceroy of Corsica, he sought to

promote contentment by promulgating an excellent constitution and

administrative reforms. But, being hampered from the outset by the

factious behaviour of Paoli, he, with the consent of the Cabinet,

deported him to England in the autumn of 1795. An equally serious

complication was the feud between the British army and navy. These

disputes, originating at Toulon, grew apace in Corsica. Elliot sided

with Hood, and was therefore detested by Dundas, his successor, Sir

Charles Stuart, and their coadjutor, Colonel Moore. This brilliant young

officer, by nature somewhat a _frondeur_, was finally guilty of

expressions so disrespectful as to lead to his removal shortly before

that of Paoli. He carried his complaints to Pitt, who bade him set forth

his case dispassionately. Indeed, so impressed was he with Moore's

abilities, that he decided to employ him in the West Indies, and

afterwards advanced him to posts of high importance.

 

Pitt took little interest in Corsica, leaving it to the intermittent

attentions of Portland. Consequently that interesting experiment had not

a fair chance. The possession of the island was also nearly useless in a

military sense; for the British garrison could spare no detachments,

which, even with the help of the loyal Corsicans, could effectively

harass the French forces campaigning in the Genoese Riviera. Elliot

entered into relations with the Knights of Malta, and in other ways

sought to develop a Mediterranean policy; but in this he met with scant

support from London. In excuse of Pitt it must be said that he had his

hands more than full elsewhere. Moreover the peace between France and

Spain, framed in July 1795, caused him great concern, especially as the

Court of Madrid manifested deep resentment at the British occupation of

Corsica. In October 1795 Pitt inclined strongly towards peace, and

thenceforth carried on the war mainly with a view to securing

indemnities. Corsica apparently he now looked on as burdensome; for in

his speech of 9th December 1795 he did not include it among the three

valued acquisitions of the war--Martinique, Cape Nicholas Mole (in

Hayti), and the Cape of Good Hope. Dundas always looked on the

occupation of Corsica as prejudicial to the colonial efforts which held

the first place in his thoughts. Accordingly it was not utilized in the

spring of 1796, when expeditions ought to have set forth to hamper the

march of Bonaparte's ill-equipped columns along the coast from Nice to

Savona.

 

The opportunity then lost was never to return. Bonaparte's triumphs in

Italy enabled him to prepare at Leghorn to deal a blow for the recovery

of his native island. Checked for the time by the other claims of the

war and the presence of Nelson, he kept this aim in view; and the

conquest of North and Central Italy at the close of that campaign

compromised the safety of the small British and _émigré_ force in

Corsica. The final reason, however, for the evacuation of the island was

neither the menace from Italy nor the discontent of the islanders, but

the alliance of Spain with France. As Nelson foresaw, that event

endangered the communications with England. Ministers also knew that a

plan was on foot for a French invasion of Ireland, which, as we shall

see, was attempted at the end of the year. They therefore determined to

concentrate their forces for home defence and the protection of the most

important possessions, a decision which involved the abandonment of the

Mediterranean. Accordingly, on 31st August 1796, Portland sent orders

for the evacuation of Corsica and of Elba. For a few days in the latter

half of October Ministers revoked these orders, and bade Elliot hold

firm, their hope being to tempt the Empress Catharine to active

co-operation against France by the cession of Corsica to her. Whether

that wily potentate saw through this device is doubtful; for she died on

16th November. Her death put an end to the fleeting hope of opposing

France with an equality of force; for the bent of her successor, Paul I,

was at first towards peace.

 

Despite the comparative neglect of Mediterranean affairs by Pitt at this

time, they exerted a profound influence upon his career. In view of the

many claims upon the British navy, it was perhaps impossible to exert

upon the coast of Nice and Genoa the pressure which Elliot desired; but

the failure to do so in the spring of 1796 enabled Bonaparte to win the

triumphs which changed the history of the world. Further, the British

occupation of Corsica, scarcely less than that of Hayti, aroused keen

jealousy at Madrid, and thus helped to set in motion forces which for

the time checkmated England in the Mediterranean. Not until the

Spaniards were beaten by Jervis and Nelson could she stretch forth her

trident over that sea, first from Minorca and finally from Malta. The

loss of Corsica was keenly felt. For, had England made full use of that

island as a base of operations, Bonaparte could not have carried out his

Egyptian expedition in 1798. Austria also ascribed her overthrow in

Venetia and Styria to the withdrawal of the British fleet from the

Mediterranean. That step seemed a confession of pitiable weakness,

though in reality it enabled the Government to concentrate the fleet at

points more important than Bastia and Ajaccio.

 

Amidst the disasters at the end of the Flemish campaign of 1794 Pitt

sought to divert the energies of England to a more promising field.

Thwarted on the Lower Rhine by the vacillations of the German Powers and

the torpor of the Dutch, he hoped for success among the Royalists of

Brittany and la Vendée. He framed this decision reluctantly; for it

involved co-operation with the French princes, the Comte de Provence and

the Comte d'Artois, and with the swarms of fanatical _émigrés_ who had

long pestered him with mad projects. Further, he had