William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

ship "Argonaut," whose owners now prosecuted them for

£100,000.

 

[403] "South Africa a Century ago." By Lady Anne Barnard.

 

[404] "F. O.," Prussia, 70. Pitt to Harrowby, 27th October 1805.

 

[405] "Nelson Despatches," ii, 5.

 

[406] "Corresp. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 141-3.

 

[407] Puisaye, "Mems.," ii, 594-603; Forneron, "Hist. des Emigrés," ii,

13, 14.

 

[408] Cornwallis, "Corresp.," iii, 289.

 

[409] "F. O.," France, 44. Grenville to d'Harcourt, 19th June 1795.

 

[410] On 19th January 1798 Pitt, Windham, and Canning agreed to give

£9,082 and £9,400 for the discharge of debts due for services of the

Royalists in France, incurred in England and France respectively,

leaving a balance of £8,000 for future payment. The following sums were

paid to the Duc d'Harcourt for the support of "Monsieur": in 1796,

£3,000; in 1797, £9,000; and after May 1798 at the rate of £500 per

month (B.M. Add. MSS., 37844). I have not found the sums allowed to the

Comte d'Artois.

 

CHAPTER XII (PITT AS WAR MINISTER (1793-8))

 

    Si vous affaiblissez vos moyens en partageant vos forces, si

    vous rompez en Italie l'unité de la pensée militaire, je vous le

    dis avec douleur, vous aurez perdu la plus belle occasion

    d'imposer des lois à l'Italie.... La guerre est comme le

    gouvernement, c'est une affaire de tact.--NAPOLEON, _Letters of

    14th May 1796_.

 

 

In estimating the services of Pitt as War Minister during the first

phases of the conflict we must remember that the ambition of his life

was to be a Peace Minister. Amidst the exhaustion caused by the American

War, he deemed it essential to ensure the continuous growth of savings

and investments which, under favourable conditions, advance at the rate

of Compound Interest. His success in the time of peace 1783-93, may be

measured by the fact that, despite the waste of war, the rate of

progress was not seriously checked in the years 1793-6. A Scotsman,

MacRitchie, who travelled through England in 1795[411] was surprised to

find the large towns in a most flourishing state; and it is well known

that the exports of cottons largely increased in the last decade of the

century. Seeing that the war became "a contention of purse," the final

triumph of England may be ascribed to the reserve of strength which Pitt

had helped to assure. He did not live on to witness the issue of the

economic struggle brought about by the Continental System of Napoleon.

But a study of the commercial war of the years 1806-13 shows that Pitt's

forethought enabled Britain to foil the persistent efforts of her

mightiest enemy.

 

Military critics will, however, reply that Pitt's economies in the

earlier period so far weakened her army as to lead to the failures of

the Revolutionary War. There is some force in this contention. A closer

examination, however, will reveal facts that necessarily weaken it.

Firstly, England had never kept up a large army in time of peace.

Dislike of a standing army was almost inconceivably strong; and it is

certain that an attempt by Pitt to maintain an army in excess of the

ordinary peace establishment would have aroused a powerful opposition.

He therefore concentrated his efforts on the navy; and the maritime

triumphs of the war were due in the last resort to his fostering care.

As for the army, he kept it at its normal strength until the spring of

the year 1792, when he decided to effect some reductions. In one sense

this decision is creditable to him. It proves that he neither desired

nor expected a rupture with France. In his view the risks of war were

past. After his surrender to the Empress Catharine in 1791 peace seemed

assured. Further, his decision to reduce the British Army was formed

before the declaration of war by France against Austria (20th April

1792). After the rupture of France with Sardinia and Prussia it appeared

the height of madness for a single disorganized State to enlarge the

circle of its enemies. Consequently, up to the second week of November

1792, Pitt and Grenville were fully justified in expecting the duration

of peace for Great Britain. Here, as at many points in the ensuing

struggle, it was the impossible which happened.

 

Is Pitt to be blamed for effecting economies which led to a reduction of

taxes and an alleviation of the burdens of the poor? The chief danger of

the years 1791, 1792 came not from the French Jacobins, but from their

British sympathizers; and experience warranted the belief that, with a

lightening of the financial load, the nation would manifest its former

loyalty. On 23rd August 1791 Grenville wrote: "Our only danger is at

home, and for averting that danger, peace and economy are our best

resources."[412] These considerations are political rather than

military. But it is impossible to separate the two spheres. The strength

of the army depends ultimately on the strength of the nation.

 

It is also well to remember that systematic preparation for war was an

outcome of that struggle. Conscription was a bequest of the French

Revolution. Planned first by Carnot, it was carried out by Dubois Crancé

and others in 1798. But in 1793 the days of large armies had not dawned.

It was usual to maintain small forces of professional soldiers, together

with a more or less inefficient militia. In England methods not unlike

those of the age of Falstaff still held good. War was an adventure, not

a science. In France first it became an intensely national effort. The

Jacobins evoked the popular enthusiasm; the Committee of Public Safety

embodied it in citizen armies; and the science of Carnot and Napoleon

led them to victories which shattered the old-world systems and baffled

the forecasts of Pitt.

 

Let us briefly survey the conduct of the war by Pitt in its chief stages

up to the year 1798. The first period is from the declaration of war in

February 1793, to the Battle of Fleurus, near the close of June 1794. At

the outset he is alarmed by the irruption of Dumouriez into Holland, and

hastily sends a small British force under the Duke of York, solely for

the defence of Helvoetsluys and its neighbourhood. It answers its

purpose; the French are held up at the Hollandsdiep, while the Austrians

crush their main force at Neerwinden. Thereupon Coburg claims the Duke's

assistance in driving the Republicans from the fortresses of French

Flanders. Pitt and his colleagues give their assent, because the

enterprise seems easy after the defection of Dumouriez, and Dunkirk is a

tempting prize near to hand, but mainly owing to their urgent desire

that Austria shall find her indemnity not in Bavaria, but in the French

border fortresses. Thus, for reasons which are political, rather than

military, the Cabinet embarks an insufficient force on what proves to be

a lengthy and hazardous enterprise. Further, while the British push on,

Prussia holds back; so that the Duke of York virtually takes the place

of the Prussian contingent. Unaware of the duplicity of Berlin, and

trusting that the Allies will soon master the border strongholds, Pitt

and Dundas prepare to harry the coasts of France, and to secure her most

valuable colony, Hayti. These are their chief aims in the war. But,

while preparing maritime expeditions, they also drift into a continental

campaign, from which they find it hard to withdraw.

 

The efforts put forth at Toulon and in Corsica were the outcome of the

treaties with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, which required the

appearance of a British fleet off the coasts of France and Italy. While

seeking to strengthen both the Coalition and the Royalists of Provence,

Admiral Hood's force found an unexpected sphere of action at Toulon. In

August 1793 that city admitted the British troops and a Spanish force a

few days later. Thereupon Pitt claimed the help which he had a right to

expect from his Allies. Naples and Sardinia sent contingents deficient

in quality or numbers; and the Court of Vienna, after promising to send

5,000 troops from the Milanese, neglected to do so. Quarrels and

suspicions hampered the defence; but the arrival of the Austrian

contingent would probably have turned the scale. Owing to the length of

time required for despatches from Toulon to reach London, Pitt and his

colleagues did not hear of the remissness of Austria until 22nd

December, that is, five days after the fall of that stronghold. Had they

known it a month earlier, they could have sent thither the large force,

then mustering in the Solent, which on 26th November set sail for the

West Indies.

 

This seems an unpardonable diffusion of efforts. But Ministers must

already have regretted their readiness to take up the duties incumbent

on Prussia in Flanders; and doubtless they resolved not to play the part

of the willing horse at Toulon. In the early days of every league there

comes a time when an active Power must protest against the shifty ways

which are the curse of Coalitions. Besides, Pitt had to keep in view the

interests of Great Britain. These were, firstly, to guard the Low

Countries against French aggression, and, secondly, to gain an indemnity

for the expenses of the war either in the French West Indies, or in

Corsica. The independence of the Low Countries was a European question.

The maritime conquests concerned England alone. Were Britons to shelve

their own interests for a question of international import? The

statesman who does so will not long hold the reins at Westminster.

Besides, no device for weakening France was deemed more effective than

that of seizing her wealthiest group of colonies. On the other hand,

there was pressing need of armed help for the Royalists of Brittany; and

on this ground we must pronounce the West India enterprise ill timed. A

still worse blunder was the continued inactivity of Moira's force in the

Solent and the Channel Islands. The reports of an intended French

invasion form a wholly inadequate excuse for his inaction. His troops

could have rendered valuable service either in Brittany, Flanders, or at

Toulon. The riddle of their inaction has never been solved. Ultimately

the blame must rest with Pitt, Dundas, and Lord Chatham.[413]

 

In 1794 Pitt hoped to retrieve the failures of the first campaign and to

wear down the French defence. For this purpose he liberally subsidized

Austria and concluded with Prussia a treaty which, with better

management, might have brought a second highly efficient army into

Flanders. The compacts of that springtide warranted the hope that

340,000 allied troops would advance on the north and north-east

frontiers of France. They were not forthcoming; but, even as it was, the

Imperialists and the Duke of York routed the French levies in Flanders

and seemed about to open the way to Paris. Earl Howe's victory, named

"the glorious first of June," ensured supremacy in the Channel. Brittany

and la Vendée were again aflame. The Union Jack replaced the tricolour

on the strongholds of Corsica and in the most fertile parts of the West

Indies. In April-May 1794 the collapse of the Jacobins seemed imminent.

 

But these early triumphs of the Allies were almost as fatal as their

later disasters. Indeed they were largely the cause of them. Believing

that they had the game in their hands, Prussia and Austria relaxed their

efforts at the very time when France girded herself for a mightier

struggle. Moreover, the emergence of the Polish Question in an acute

phase served once again to distract the German rivals and to weaken

their efforts in the West. Moreover, the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of May

1794 prescribing the valley of the Meuse as the sphere of action of the

62,400 Prussians subsidized by England and Holland was so rigid as to

furnish their generals with good excuses for refusing to march from the

Palatinate across the front of the French columns now pressing forward.

The upshot was that England and the Dutch Republic got nothing in return

for their subsidies, while the Prussians on their side chafed at the

insistent demands from London and The Hague for the exact fulfilment of

the bargain. The situation was annoying for military men; and the

British Government erred in tying them down too stringently to a