William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

daring and intrigue had cowed the

North German States into subservience. The terrible winter of 1798-9

largely accounts for the delays which ruined the subsequent campaign.

Whitworth remained long without news from Downing Street; and at last,

on 12th February, announced that he had received nine posts at once.

Meanwhile France, controlling all the coasts from Bremen to Genoa, not

only excluded British messengers, but carried on her diplomatic

bargaining in Germany without let or hindrance. For all his trouble,

Thomas Grenville could get no firm footing amidst the shifting sands of

Prussian diplomacy. So nervous were the Austrian Ministers as to

Prussia's future conduct that they seemed about to come to terms with

France and join in the plunder of the smaller German States. This might

have been the upshot had not French armies crossed the Rhine (1st March

1799), and shortly afterwards invaded the Grisons Canton.[512] Goaded to

action, Francis II declared war eleven days later. On 28th April

Austrian hussars seized the French envoys withdrawing from Rastatt,

murdering two of the four and seizing the papers of all.

 

Thus began the war of the Second Coalition. Bonaparte's seizure of Malta

and Egypt without a declaration of war, and the unbearable aggressions

of the French in Switzerland, Italy, and on the Rhine, stirred to action

States which the diplomatic efforts of Pitt and Grenville had left

unmoved. For none of the wars of that period was France so largely

responsible. Even now, when the inroad of the French into Germany

threatened the ascendancy of Prussia, Frederick William declined to join

the Allies; and his unstatesmanlike refusal thwarted the plans of Pitt

for the march of the subsidized Muscovite force through Prussia for the

recovery of Holland.

 

Another essential point was Switzerland. Like a bastion frowning over

converging valleys, that Alpine tract dominates the basins of the Po,

the Inn, the Upper Rhine, and the Upper Rhone. He who holds it, if

strong and resolute, can determine the fortunes of North Italy, Eastern

France, South Germany, and the West of the Hapsburg domains. Further, by

closing the passes over the Alps he can derange the commerce of Europe;

and the sturdy mountaineers will either overbear the plain-dwellers, or

will serve as mercenaries in their forces. Accordingly Switzerland, like

her Asiatic counterpart, Afghanistan, has either controlled her

neighbours, or has been fought for by them. As commerce-controller,

provider of troops, and warden of the passes, she holds a most important

position. Fortunate it is that the Swiss have loved freedom, or money,

more than dominion. For so soon as a great State possesses their land,

the Balance of Power becomes a fiction.

 

Pitt evinced sure insight in his resolve to free the Switzers from the

Jacobin yoke. To it the men of the Forest Cantons succumbed only after

desperate struggles, which inspired Wordsworth with one of the noblest

of his sonnets. There is no sign that Pitt set much store on winning

over the public opinion of Europe by siding with the oppressed against

the oppressor, as his disciple, Canning, did during the Spanish National

Rising; but help from the Swiss was certainly hoped for. So early as

August 1798 Pitt proposed to allot £500,000 for assistance to them, and,

but for the delays at St. Petersburg and Vienna, the Allies might have

rescued that brave people before it fell beneath the weight of numbers.

Even in March 1799, when the rising against the French had scarcely

begun, he set apart £31,000 per month for the purpose of equipping a

corps of 20,000 Swiss. On 15th March, after hearing of the outbreak of

war on the Rhine, Grenville urged that the Russian force subsidized by

England should march towards Switzerland, now that Prussia's doubtful

behaviour prevented a conquest of Holland by land. He also insisted that

this addition to the allied forces destined for Switzerland must not be

allowed to lessen the number of Austrians operating there.[513]

 

The Court of Vienna at once saw in the subsidized Russian army a tool

useful for its own plans, and requested that it should serve with the

Austrians in Swabia. The answer to this singular request can be

imagined. For a day or two Whitworth was also disturbed by a belated

effort of the French Directory to restore peace. It offered Poland to

the Elector of Saxony, and Saxony to Prussia for her friendly services,

Austria being led to expect Bavaria, if she would keep Russia "within

her ancient limits." Whitworth mentioned this overture to Cobenzl, and

saw him blush for the first time on record.[514] Probably, then, the

scheme had some powerful backing; but now Austria had crossed the

Rubicon.

 

At first all went well. The French had played a game of bluff which they

could not sustain. On all sides they were worsted in a way which

suggests how decisive the campaign might have been had the Allies

heartily seconded the salutary plans of Pitt. Unfortunately, despite

his efforts, no compact came about between Great Britain and Austria.

Russia and the Hapsburg State were but loosely connected; and, owing to

a long delay in the arrival of the ratification of the Anglo-Russian

Treaty, Paul did not until the beginning of May send forward the

subsidized army under the command of Korsakoff.

 

On the other hand, the auxiliary Russian force sent forward to the help

of Austria had by that time helped the white-coats to win notable

triumphs in North Italy. In the months of April and May, Melas and the

Imperialists, powerfully backed by Suvóroff's Muscovites, carried all

before them, and drove the enemy from Milan. Soon afterwards the Allies

entered Turin; and only by hard fighting and heavy losses did Moreau

with the chief French army cut his way through to the Genoese coast.

Meanwhile General Macdonald, retiring with a French corps from Naples,

left that city to the vengeance of Nelson and Maria Carolina with

results that are notorious. The French general made a brave stand in

North Italy, only to fall before the onsets of the Allies at the Trebbia

(17th-19th June). He, too, barely escaped to Genoa, where the relics of

the two French armies faced about. These successes aroused the highest

hopes at Westminster. Canning, who resigned his Under-Secretaryship of

Foreign Affairs in March 1799, wrote that he cared not whether the

Austrians were beaten; for their failure would serve as a good example

to Europe. But in June, after their brilliant successes, he expressed a

confident hope of the collapse of "the monstrous fabrick of crimes and

cruelties and abominations" known as French policy; he added that

Prussia could not be so stupid as to hold aloof from the Coalition; and

that Pitt, again vigorous in mind and body, would carry through the war

to the end.

 

But now in the train of victory there appeared its parasite, discord.

The re-conquest of Italy was so brilliant and easy as to arouse disputes

about the spoils; and when the Imperialists began to treat Suvóroff and

his heroes cavalierly, the feud became acute. His complaints to his

Sovereign that the Austrians thwarted him at every turn threw the

irascible Czar into a rage, and he inveighed against the insolence of

the Court of Vienna and its minions. Finally, in order to end these

disputes, the British Ministry proposed the departure of Suvóroff to

Switzerland in order to take command of Korsakoff's subsidized force.

In the third week of June Grenville urged this plan on the Russian Court

as securing concentration of force and unity of command, the result in

all probability being the liberation of Switzerland, whereupon the

Allies could prepare for an invasion of France on her undefended flank,

Franche Comté. England (added Grenville) disapproved of the presence of

"Louis XVIII" at the Russian headquarters; and if Monsieur, his brother,

issued a declaration, it must be drafted with care. The need of caution

appears in Monsieur's offer of pardon and clemency to the misguided

French, provided that they joined his standard.[515]

 

The Allies, it will be seen, built their hopes on a revolt of the

royalists of the East of France. In fact, widespread risings were

expected. Bordeaux had been the centre of a conspiracy for leaguing

together the malcontents of la Vendée with those of the South, these

again being in touch with the royalists of the Lyonnais and Franche

Comté. Wickham, who was sent as British agent to Switzerland in June

1799, opened up an extensive correspondence which promised to lead to a

formidable revolt whenever the Allies invaded Franche Comté and Nice.

The malcontents had as leaders Generals Précy, Pichegru, and Willot. In

due course the Comte d'Artois ("Monsieur") was to appear and put himself

at their head. Accordingly, in August 1799, he left Holyrood, came to

London, and dined at Grenville's house with him and Pitt. The Prime

Minister afterwards paid him a private visit: but the details of their

conference are not known. It is certain, however, that the Cabinet

accorded large sums of money to Wickham for use in the East of France.

Even after the failure in Switzerland, he pressed for the payment of

£365,000 in order to maintain the royalist movement.[516]

 

Pitt, then, was bent on using all possible means for humbling France;

and, in view of her disasters in the field, the discontent at home, and

the absence of Bonaparte's army in Egypt, the triumph of the Allies

seemed to depend solely on their unanimity. Much can be said in favour

of the British plan of uniting the two Russian armies in Switzerland to

act with that of the Archduke Charles, in order to strike at Franche

Comté in overwhelming force, while the Austrians in Italy invaded Nice.

If all the moves had taken place betimes, formidable forces would have

been massed for an attack upon the weakest parts of the French frontier.

The Czar agreed to the plan on 9th July; but the Emperor Francis

withheld his sanction for a suspiciously long time. Here again, as in

1794-6, the men of the pen interfered with the men of the sword.

Immersed in plans for a vast extension of Austria's domains in Italy,

Thugut turned a deaf ear to the demands of Russia and England for the

restoration of the House of Savoy to the throne of Turin. He declared

that, as Austria had recovered the continental domains of that dynasty,

she could therefore dispose of them. It soon appeared that she sought to

appropriate Piedmont, as well as Venetia, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and

the northern part of the Papal States in place of her troublesome Belgic

domains, thus liberally fulfilling Pitt's suggestion that her chief

gains should be on the side of Italy.

 

On this question Pitt and Grenville differed. The latter, sympathizing

with Russia, strongly objected to Austria annexing Piedmont. Pitt,

however, maintained that such an acquisition would not resemble the

partition of Poland or of Venetia; for Charles Emmanuel had lost his

lands through his own weakness, and now did nothing towards recovering

them. Further, it was to the advantage of Europe that the rescuing

Power, Austria, should hold them as a barrier against France. If the

Czar Paul could not be induced to take this view we might leave the two

Empires to settle the matter; but, at present this solution offered the

best chance of arriving at a compact with Austria so much to be desired.

Thus, in order to strengthen the Barrier System against France, Pitt was

prepared to sacrifice legal rights to expediency, while Grenville upheld

the claims of justice.

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Limits of space preclude an investigation of the causes of the

humiliating failure of the campaign in Switzerland. Suffice it to say

that, when Korsakoff's army finally entered the north-east of

Switzerland, the Archduke Charles was compelled by imperious mandates

from Vienna to withdraw into Swabia. He foresaw disaster; and it soon

came. While Suvóroff's army was toiling down the northern defiles of the

St. Gotthard, Masséna, after receiving strong reinforcements,

overwhelmed Korsakoff at Zurich (25th-26th September). That Pitt

expected defeat after the withdrawal of the Archduke Charles appears

from his letter to Windham:

 

                         Downing Street, _30th August 1799_.[517]

 

    I should gladly accept your proposal to join the water-party

    today, but I came to town to meet Lord Grenville; and, having

    seen him, I am preparing to return part of the way to Walmer in

    the course of the evening. I was brought to town by the

    vexatious accounts from Vienna, which give too great a chance of

    our being disappointed in our best hopes by the blind and

    perverse selfishness of Austria's counsels.

 

Grenville was equally indignant and accused Austria of treachery.[518]

Much can be said in support of that charge. Whatever may have been her

motive, her conduct ruined the campaign. South-east of Zurich, Soult

routed Hotze's Austrian corps, which might have linked the movements of

Suvóroff with those of Korsakoff, and Suvóroff on arriving at Altorff

found no other course practicable than to strike away eastwards over the

Panixer Pass to Coire in the Grisons. There he arrived after severe

hardships