William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

CHAPTER XVIII (THE UNION)

 

    I am determined not to submit to the insertion of any clause

    that shall make the exclusion of the Catholics a fundamental

    part of the Union, as I am fully convinced that, until the

    Catholics are admitted into a general participation of rights

    (which, when incorporated with the British Government, they

    cannot abuse) there will be no peace or safety in

    Ireland.--CORNWALLIS TO ROSS, _30th September 1798_.

 

 

The fairest method of dealing with the Act of Union of the British and

Irish Parliaments seems to be, firstly, to trace the development of

Pitt's thoughts on that subject; secondly, to survey the state of

affairs in Ireland after the Rebellion of 1798; and thirdly, to trace

the course of the negotiations whereby the new Lord Lieutenant,

Cornwallis, succeeded in carrying through the measure itself.

 

Firstly, it is clear that Pitt had long felt the need of closer

commercial ties between the two islands. As was shown in Chapter XI of

the former part of this work, he sought to prepare the way for such a

measure in the session of 1785. The importance which he attached to the

freeing of inter-insular trade appears in a phrase of his letter of 6th

January 1785 to the Duke of Rutland as to Great Britain and Ireland

becoming "one country in effect, though for local concerns under

distinct legislatures," This represents his first thoughts on the

subject. Obviously they were then limited to a commercial union. If the

two Parliaments and the two nations could have shaken off their

commercial jealousies, Pitt would probably have been satisfied with

fostering the prosperity of both islands, while leaving their

legislative machinery intact. But, being thwarted by the stupidity of

British traders and the nagging tactics adopted at Dublin, he wrote to

Rutland that his plan was not discredited by failure and they must

"await times and seasons for carrying it into effect."

 

Times and seasons brought, not peace and quiet, but the French

Revolution. With it there came an increase of racial and religious

feuds, which, however, did but strengthen his conviction of the need of

a closer connection between the two islands; witness his letter of 18th

November 1792 to the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Westmorland:

 

    The idea of the present fermentation gradually bringing both

    parties to think of an Union with this country has long been in

    my mind. I hardly dare flatter myself with the hope of its

    taking place; but I believe it, tho' itself not easy to be

    accomplished, to be the only solution for other and greater

    difficulties. The admission of Catholics to a share of suffrage

    could not then be dangerous. The Protestant interest, in point

    of power, property and Church Establishment, would be secure

    because the decided majority of the supreme Legislature would

    necessarily be Protestant; and the great ground of argument on

    the part of the Catholics would be done away, as, compared with

    the rest of the Empire, they would become a minority. You will

    judge when and to whom this idea can be confided. It must

    certainly require great delicacy and management; but I am

    heartily glad that it is at least in your thoughts.[530]

 

These words show why Pitt allowed proposals so imperfect as the

Franchise Bill of 1793 to become law. It enfranchised most of the Irish

peasantry, the great majority of whom were Catholics, though men of

their creed were excluded from Parliament. But he hoped in the future to

supplement it by a far greater measure which would render the admission

of Catholics to Parliament innocuous, namely, by the formation of a

united Parliament in which they would command only a small minority of

votes. Pitt's words open up a vista which receded far away amidst the

smoke of war and the mirage of bigotry, and did not come into sight

until the second decade of the period of peace, when Canning, Pitt's

disciple, was the chief champion of the measure here first clearly

outlined. Pitt, then, desired a Union as the sole means of ending

commercial disputes, otherwise as insoluble as those between England and

Scotland previous to the year 1707; but also for an even weightier

reason, because only so could the religious discords of Irishmen be

ended; only so could the chafing of the majority against the rule of a

cramping caste cease. By the formation of an Imperial Parliament, the

Irish Protestants would have solid guarantees against the subversion of

all that they held most dear.

 

The full realization of these aims was impossible. Early in 1793 came

war with France, with its sequel, the heating of nationalist and

religious feeling in Ireland; and while the officials of Dublin Castle

embarked on a policy of repression, the United Irishmen looked for help

to Paris. The results appeared in the Rebellion of 1798. The

oft-repeated assertion that Pitt and Camden brought about the revolt in

order to force on the Union is at variance with all the available

evidence. They sought by all possible means to prevent a rising, which,

with a reasonable amount of help from France, must have shaken the

British Empire to its base. When the rebellion came and developed into a

bloody religious feud, they saw that the time for a Union had come.

 

The best means of checking hasty generalizations is to peruse letters

written at the time, before ingenious theories could be spun. Now, the

definite proposal of a Union very rarely occurs before the month of June

One of the first references is in a letter of the Lord Chancellor,

Loughborough, to Pitt, dated 13th June 1798. After approving the

appointment of Cornwallis as the best means of quelling the revolt in

Ireland, he adds: "Every reasonable man in that country must feel that

their preservation depends on their connection with England, and it

ought [to] be their first wish to make it more entire. It would be very

rash to make any such suggestion from hence: but we should be prepared

to receive it and to impose the idea whenever it begins to appear in

Ireland."[531]

 

More important, as showing the impossibility of continuing the present

chaotic administration at Dublin, is the following letter from the Earl

of Carlisle, formerly Lord Lieutenant, to Pitt. It is undated, but

probably belongs to 2nd June 1798:[532]

 

    ... It may perhaps be but a weak apology for this interruption

    to own I cannot help looking at that country [Ireland] with a

    sort of affection, like an old house which one has once

    inhabited, not disliking the antient arrangement of its

    interior, and perhaps unreasonably prejudiced against many of

    its modern innovations. The innovation that has long given me

    uneasiness, and which now seems most seriously to perplex the

    Irish Government, was the fatal institution of an Irish Cabinet,

    which has worked itself into being, considered almost as a

    component part of that deputed authority. A Government composed

    of Lords Justices, natives of that country, as a permanent

    establishment, absurd as such an expedient might be, would not

    have at least that radical defect of authority disjoined from

    responsibility. We now feel all the bad effects of a power which

    should never have been confer'd, and which is strengthen'd from

    hence by many acting with you, so as to make it impossible for

    the Lord Lieutenant to manage with it or without it.

 

    You have, in my poor judgment, an opportunity offer'd to crush

    at one blow this defective system. Ireland, I scruple not to

    say, cannot be saved if you permit an hour longer almost the

    military defence of that country to depend upon the tactical

    dictates of Chancellors, Speaker of the House of Commons, etc. I

    mean to speak with no disrespect of Lord Camden; I never heard

    anything but to his honour; but I maintain under the present

    circumstances the best soldier would make the best

    Lord-Lieutenant; one on whom no Junto there would presume to

    fling their shackles, and one who would cut them short if they

    presumed to talk of what they did not understand. With this

    idea, I confess, Ld Cornwallis naturally occurs to me. Next to

    this, but not so efficacious, would be sending some one equal to

    the military duties, freed from all control, saving that, for

    form's sake, good sense would acquiesce under to [_sic_] the

    King's Deputy. But I cannot doubt but a deeper change would be

    most advisable. The disaffected to our Government (and I fear it

    is too general) may perhaps have their degrees and divisions of

    animosity against it, and some possibly may be changed by a

    change of men more than by a professed change of measures, which

    perhaps they think little about. I know they are taught to

    believe a particular set of men are their enemies; in truth I

    question if, in tyrannising over and thwarting the Castle, and

    talking so injudiciously, they ought to be considered as our

    friends....

 

Thus the man to whom in 1795 Earl Fitzwilliam poured forth his

grievances against Pitt, now advised him to end the mischievous dualism

at Dublin, which enabled Lords Justices and the Speaker of the Irish

House of Commons to paralyse the Executive. There, as at Berlin,

advisers who had great influence but no official responsibility, often

intervened with disastrous results; and not until Stein took the tiller

after Tilsit did the Prussian ship of State pursue a straight course. At

Dublin the crisis of 1798 revealed the weakness of the Irish Executive,

and naturally led to a complete break with the past.[533]

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Amidst the mass of Pitt's papers relating to Ireland there is no sign of

his intention to press on an Act of Union before the middle of the

month of June 1798, that is, in the midst of the Rebellion. The first

reference to it occurs in a memorandum endorsed by Pitt "received June

19, 1798," and obviously drawn up by Camden a few days before he

resigned the Viceroyalty in favour of Cornwallis. Pitt's letter of

inquiry is missing. Camden's reply is too long for quotation, but may be

thus summarized:

 

    The plan of a Union should be detailed as far as possible before

    it is attempted. The King's Cabinet should be at once consulted,

    also leading persons in both islands. If their opinion is

    favourable, the measure should then be brought forward. If the

    Catholic claims are to be met, the advice of their leading men,

    as for instance Lords Fingal and Kenmare, should be sought. The

    legal attainments of the Irish Chancellor, the Earl of Clare,

    and the parliamentary and commercial connections of the Speaker,

    Foster, entitle their opinions to great weight. Foster may

    perhaps be won over by the offer of an English peerage. The

    Irish Bar, as also Lords Shannon and Ely, will probably oppose a

    Union. Some persons will object to the admission of Catholics

    even to the United Parliament, though that measure cannot do

    harm. The Scottish Catholics should have the same privileges

    accorded to them, and a provision should be made for the

    Dissenting clergy. Parliamentary Reform must be considered, but

    it will not be dangerous now. The French will never make peace

    until Great Britain is weakened. The religious difficulty of a

    Union will not be great, for the Protestants will always form

    the majority in the United Parliament. Legal expenses in the

    case of Irish suits will be little more than in Scottish suits.

    As Dublin will suffer from the removal of the Parliament, the

    Lord Lieutenant's Court must be kept up in great splendour, the

    residence of influential persons in Ireland being encouraged in

    every possible way. The communications between the two islands

    must be improved, free packet-boats being provided. In a

    postscript Camden adds that he hopes Cornwallis will continue

    the