William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

on 8th October, and swore never again to act with the

Austrians. Paul, on hearing these dire tidings, registered the same vow,

and informed the Viennese Court that thenceforth he separated his

interests entirely from hers. Thus was it that Pitt's plans miscarried.

Thus was it that British subsidies were flung away into the limbo strewn

with tokens of Hapsburg fatuity.

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

The Anglo-Russian effort against the Batavian Republic is often referred

to as if it were the principal event of the year 1799. On the contrary,

it was little more than a diversion intended to help the chief

enterprise in Switzerland and Franche Comté. The Czar Paul and Pitt

probably did not intend to hold the Dutch Provinces unless the Allies

pressed France hard on the Swiss frontier and the Orange party rose in

force. If these contingencies held good, then Holland might be held as

far as the River Waal. If not, then the effort must be temporary. Even

so, its advantages were great. The seizure of the Dutch fleet at the

Texel and Helder would end all chance of invasion from that quarter.

Fears of such an attempt had prompted a counter-stroke dealt by General

Coote's force in the spring of 1798 at the sluice-gates near Ostend. Its

surrender under untoward circumstances was, perhaps, nearly

counterbalanced by the destruction of canal works necessary for the

assembly of the flat-bottomed boats at Ostend.

 

For a brief space the doubtful attitude of Prussia led Pitt and

Grenville to concert a larger scheme. They hoped to form a great array

of Prussians, Russians, Britons, and Hanoverians which would sweep the

French out of Holland; but obviously such a plan depended on the support

of the Berlin Cabinet. If it were hostile, or even unfriendly, no force

could advance through Hanover for the delivery of Holland; for it would

be at the mercy of Prussia. In order to bring her into the league, Pitt

and Grenville held out the promise of gains near the Dutch frontier; but

she held coyly aloof, doubtless from a conviction that Austria would

oppose her aggrandisement. So at least Thugut declared to Eden on his

departure from Vienna. Well might his successor, Lord Minto, remark that

the Allies spent as much time in watching each other's moves as those of

the enemy.

 

Prussia being immovable, England and Russia laid their plans for a naval

expedition to Holland. By a Convention signed at midsummer 1799 at St

Petersburg, Russia agreed to send a squadron of 11 ships, convoying an

expeditionary force of 17,500 men to the Dutch coast, England paying

£44,000 per month for their services after embarkation. The Czar hoped

that England would send some 6,000 men. The help of 8,000 Swedes was

also expected; but the King of Sweden, annoyed at England's seizure of

Swedish merchantmen, refused all assistance. For a time Pitt desired

both to attack the Island of Voorn below Rotterdam, and to effect a

landing in the estuary of the Ems, provided that 25,000 British, 18,000

Russians, and 8,000 Swedes were available. Here, as so often, Pitt's

hopes outran the actuality. Windham believed that he wished to conquer

Flanders. But Windham's moods were so various and perverse that he can

scarcely be trusted. In his view every effort not directed towards

Brittany was wasted; and certainly feints against the coasts of Brittany

and Spain promised to further the Dutch expedition.[519]

 

Early in August Pitt and his colleagues finally resolved to send the

expedition to the Dutch coast; but they had not decided as to the length

or extent of the occupation. So, at least, it appears from a letter of

Pitt to Sir Charles Grey:

 

                            Downing Street, _Aug. 23, 1799_.[520]

 

    You will not wonder that the circumstances of the present moment

    have strongly recalled to Mr. Dundas's mind and mine the

    conversations which we have at different times had with you

    respecting the possibility of a successful stroke against Brest.

    The assemblage of the combined fleets[521] in that port renders

    such an object more tempting than ever. We have a prospect, if

    the expedition in Holland should terminate speedily, of having a

    large army of 30,000 men at least, and a large body of marines,

    with any number of sail-of-the-line that may be thought

    necessary, applicable to such a service by the month of October;

    and if the Allies continue to push their operations on the other

    side of France, the bulk of the French force will find

    sufficient occupation at a distance from their coast. In all

    these respects the time seems as favourable as it can ever be

    expected to be to such an enterprise; and if it is to be

    undertaken, we shall derive the greatest confidence of success

    from seeing the execution of it placed in your hands. Many

    circumstances may undoubtedly arise in the course of the next

    six weeks which may oblige us to abandon the idea....

 

This letter proves that Pitt did not expect a prolonged occupation of

Holland, at least by British troops; but the notions of Ministers on

this topic were singularly hazy. All things considered, the expedition

at first fared well. Sir Ralph Abercromby, the leader of the first

detachment of some 12,000 British troops, effected a landing near the

forts at the Helder, and on 27th August speedily captured them. Three

days later Admiral Mitchell captured a squadron of 10 sail-of-the-line

and several frigates anchored behind the Texel. Pitt was elated by these

successes, and wrote from Walmer Castle on 5th September: "We are

impatiently waiting till this east wind brings our transports in sight

to carry the remainder of our troops, in order to compleat speedily what

has been so gloriously begun." He adds that in a short autumn session he

hopes speedily to pass by acclamation a Bill ensuring the doubling of

the regular army by another levy from the militia.[522] Other letters

bespeak his anxiety as to the safety of his brother, the Earl of

Chatham, who served on the Council of War directing the operations of

the Duke of York.

 

Abercromby's first successes were for a time maintained. At dawn of 10th

September the British force beat off a sharp attack by Vandamme at the

Zuype Canal on the way southwards to Alkmaar. Three days later the Duke

of York arrived and took the command, including that of a Russian corps

under General Hermann. Moving forwards with some 30,000 men, the Duke

attacked a Franco-Dutch force somewhat inferior in numbers but very

strongly posted at and around the village of Bergen. The onset failed,

mainly owing to the fierce but premature and disorderly onset of the

Russians on the right wing, which ended in a rout. Abercromby's flanking

movement came too late to restore the fight, which cost the British

1,000 men and the Russians more than double as many (19th September).

Hermann was taken prisoner.[523]

 

On 2nd October the Allies compelled the enemy to retreat from Bergen;

but the success was of little service. The defenders, now strongly

reinforced, held several good positions between Alkmaar and Amsterdam.

Meanwhile the Orange party did not stir. Torrents of rain day after day

impaired the health of the troops and filled the dykes. An advance being

impossible in these circumstances, the Duke of York retreated to the

line of the Zuype (8th to 9th October). There he could have held his

own; but, in view of the disasters in Switzerland, Ministers decided to

evacuate Holland (15th October). Accordingly, by the Convention of

Alkmaar, on the 18th, the Duke of York agreed to evacuate the Dutch

Netherlands by the end of November, 8,000 of the prisoners of war then

in England being restored. Most questionable was the decision of

Ministers to evacuate the Helder and the Texel. Grenville desired to

hold those posts as bases for a second attempt in 1800; but this was not

done. The only result, then, was the capture of the Dutch fleet, a prize

gained without loss by the end of September.

 

The censures bestowed on this undertaking are very natural. Success was

scarcely possible in the narrow, marshy strip of land north of

Amsterdam. In such a district victory must be costly, while defeat spelt

disaster. The whole enterprise was unwarrantable, unless the Orange

party was about to rise; but on this subject Ministers were deceived.

The Prince of Orange and his son assured them that it was necessary even

to hold back the loyalists until armed help appeared, so eager were they

to expel the French.[524] Not a sign of this eagerness appeared.

 

Undaunted by this failure, which Sheridan wittily called nibbling at the

French rind, Pitt sought to utilize the Russian force withdrawn from

Holland for the projected blow at Brest. It was therefore taken to the

Channel Islands, greatly to the hurt of the inhabitants. Pitt and

Grenville also concerted plans with the Austrian Court, which, chastened

by the disasters in Switzerland, now displayed less truculence. It

agreed to repay the loan of May 1797, to restore Piedmont to the House

of Savoy, and to give back to France any provinces conquered in the war,

on condition of the re-establishment of monarchy. Thus, a friendly

understanding was at last arrived at; and on 24th December 1799

Grenville empowered Minto to prepare a treaty, adding that on the first

opportunity the French Government should be informed of this engagement.

 

The occasion occurred at once. Bonaparte, having become master of France

by the _coup d'état_ of Brumaire (10th November), wrote on Christmas Day

to Francis II and George III proposing terms of peace. The statesmanlike

tone of that offer has been deservedly admired; but his motives in

making it do not concern us here.[525] Suffice it to say that Pitt and

Thugut saw in it a clever device for sundering the Anglo-Austrian

compact. As appears from a letter of Canning, Pitt looked on the new

Consular Government as a make-shift. Writing early in December to

Canning, Pitt stated that the new French constitution might prove to be

of a moderate American kind. To this Canning answered on the 7th that it

might perhaps last long enough to admit of Bonaparte sending off a

courier to London and receiving the reply if he were kicked back. Or

more probably, France would fall under a military despotism, "of the

actual and manifest instability of which you seem to entertain no

doubt." In answer to Pitt's statement "that we ought not to commit

ourselves by any declaration that the restoration of royalty is the

_sine qua non_ condition of peace," Canning advised him to issue a

declaration "that you would treat with a monarchy; that to the monarchy

restored to its rightful owner you would give not only peace, but peace

on the most liberal terms."

 

Clearly, then, Pitt was less royalist than Canning; but he decided to

repel all overtures from Paris (so he wrote to Dundas on 31st December),

because the condition of France did not provide a solid security for a

peace. He added that he desired "to express strongly the eagerness with

which we should embrace any opening for general peace whenever such

solid security should be attainable. This may, I think, be so expressed

as to convey to the people of France that the shortest road to peace is

by effecting the restoration of Royalty, and thereby to increase the

chance of that most desirable of all issues to the war." As Grenville

and Dundas concurred in this view, the Foreign Office sent off a reply

stating that the usual diplomatic forms would be observed; that His

Majesty sought only to maintain the rights of his subjects against a war

of aggression; and that the present time was unsuitable for negotiations

with persons recently placed in power by a Revolution, until they should

disclaim the restless and subversive schemes which threatened the

framework of society. His Majesty, however, would welcome peace when it

could be attained with security, the best pledge of which would be the

restoration of Royalty.

 

This reply ranks among the greatest mistakes of the time. It made the

name of the Bourbons odious and that of Bonaparte popular throughout

France; and the scornful references to the First Consul's insecurity

must have re-doubled the zeal of Frenchmen for the erection of a truly

national and monarchical system under his auspices. In truth, it is

difficult to see why Pitt, who held out the olive-branch to the

newly-established Directory in the autumn of 1795, should have repelled

the proffered hand of Bonaparte. The probable explanation is that he

thought more of the effect of the reply at Vienna than at Paris. On 6th

January Grenville forwarded a copy to Minto, expressing also the hope

that it would be regarded as a sign of the fidelity of England to the

Emperor. Further, Pitt's oration on 3rd February 1800 on this topic was

marked by extreme acerbity against Bonaparte. He descanted on his

perfidy and rapacity at the expense