Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

and the lack of certain necessary equipment. The troops of the 24th Guards Brigade had never operated in the Arctic and the deep snow made movement practically impossible. Faced with Mackesy’s determined conclusion that a direct attack at this time was “sheer bloody murder,” Cork gave up his plan for an immediate attack on Narvik and informed the Admiralty accordingly.

Almost all principles pertaining to command were violated at the outset of the Narvik operation. The British had developed an excellent set of principles in their Combined Operations Manual, based on many years of experience. It is incredulous therefore, that most of these principles were discarded.

1. No unity of command—no single individual was in charge of the whole operation.

2. Commanders had contradictory and uncoordinated orders–one written and one verbal.

3. Mackesy reported to the War Office while Cork dealt with Churchill via private code.

4. The two commanders sailed independently and never met until April 15.

5. The ships were loaded for an administrative landing–not tactically loaded.

6. Some equipment was on ships re-directed to Namsos at the last moment, and most of the equipment for the troops sent to Namsos arrived in Harstad.

7. The troops were not equipped or trained for operating in mountainous terrain under Arctic winter conditions. For example, they had no skis or snow shoes. However, since they did not know how to use them, it made little difference.

8. The troops had no transport, no artillery, very little mortar ammunition, no antiaircraft guns, and no landing craft.

Not only were the two component commanders independent of each other at the outset, but there was a vast difference in rank, age, and personalities. Mackesy was a relatively young Major General, an engineer with limited experience in field command, while Admiral Cork was the most senior naval officer on active duty. He was appointed commander of Allied operations in North Norway on April 20.

This was an unfortunate choice. Cork was undoubtedly a courageous officer with unusual connections and influence among Allied political leaders. However, he represented the generation that fought the Battle of Jutland and had not kept up with the advances in technology, particularly airpower, which had transformed naval warfare. He also lacked understanding of land operations, particularly in the arctic wilderness, did not have the right temperament to lead combined operations, and displayed indifference for Norwegian military and civilian authorities. Even British naval officers recognized that the Narvik expedition was predominantly an army affair and that the commander should have been an army officer.4

Ziemke and others who believe that the chances of a successful attack immediately after April 13 were good have not given sufficient weight to the condition of the three British battalions. The British units—as noted earlier—were not loaded tactically and they needed a period in a relatively secure area to organize and receive their equipment. The fault for this does not rest with General Mackesy but with the unrealistic planning involved in R4, the mass confusion caused when the Admiralty ordered disembarkation on the 8th, and with Churchill and the military services. They were so eager to do something after their humiliation on April 9 that they embarked on enterprises without any thoughts to either strategy or preparations.

The fact is that the Guards were neither trained nor equipped for Arctic warfare. The conditions are summed up in General Mackesy’s official report.

Although nobody without personal experience of Arctic winter conditions can possibly picture the climatic difficulties we experienced in the early days, a word or two of description may not be out of place. The country was covered by snow up to 4 feet or more in depth. Even at sea level, there were several feet of snow. Blizzards, heavy snowstorms, bitter winds and very low night temperatures were normal. Indeed until the middle of May even those magnificent mountain soldiers, the French Chasseurs Alpines, suffered severely from frostbite and snow blindness. Troops who were not equipped with and skilled in the use of skis or snowshoes were absolutely incapable of operating tactically at all. I had no such troops at my disposal when I first landed.5

Unless landed from destroyers or Norwegian fishing/coastal vessels directly in the harbor, British units would have to land under fire and advance against German positions through snow up to six feet deep. The two companies of Scots Guards landed behind the Norwegian lines in Sjøvegan were incapable of taking part in an offensive operation ten days after they arrived and the Norwegians gave them a symbolic defensive role.

Dietl’s forces in Narvik at this time were controlled by Major Arthur Haussels, the commander of the 2/139th Regiment. A reinforced company, not part of the 2nd Battalion, provided railroad security and it would soon be used against the Norwegians in the Bjørnefjell area. Haussels also had at his disposal the crews of the destroyers Anton Schmitt and Wilhelm Heidkamp, organized into a battalion commanded by Lieutenant Commander Erdmenger. The quality of naval personnel as infantry is questionable, but the combined German force operating from previously prepared Norwegian trenches and pillboxes presented a tough obstacle for a British landing force.

German sources give no indication that their troops were in a state of panic. The 3rd Division’s journal, which does not hide the fact that panic set in among the naval infantry during the landing at Bjerkvik about one month later, fails to mention any problems on April 13. The German losses were minor and not a single soldier was killed. Furthermore, Dietl did not consider it necessary to bring in additional forces from the two battalions in Group Windisch to shore up the defenses in Narvik. On the contrary, the following morning (April 14) he sent a reinforced company to clear out the Norwegians holding the railroad between Nordal Bridge and the Swedish border. This indicates that Dietl was not worried about the morale of his troops or their reliability.

Initial British/Norwegian Meeting

The British had still not contacted the Norwegian Army at the command level five days after the Germans captured Narvik. This is extraordinary in