Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

There was also a small guard detail at the tourist hotel, located between the two main buildings, to guard the 13 Germans captured on April 11. The company had a four-man outpost in the Katterat Mountains. The danger from Elvegårdsmoen was considered most acute since the Norwegians believed they would have adequate warnings of a German advance along the railroad. The main German force set out from Hundal across the rough Katterat Mountains in the afternoon of April 15 while a smaller force (21 men plus the company trains), commanded by Lieutenant Trautner, advanced along the railroad towards Nordal Bridge. The Germans hoped the Norwegians would focus their attention on Trautner’s men, allowing the main force to execute a successful envelopment.

A 12-man German patrol encountered the Norwegian outpost on the Katterat Mountains on April 15. In the short encounter, one Norwegian was killed and another captured. The remaining two men made their way to Co 1. A larger force was sent out to recover the body of the fallen Norwegian and it did not encounter any Germans. For unknown reasons, the outpost was not reconstituted. This left the approach through the Katterat Mountains unguarded during the night of 15–16 April.

The Germans had accurate information about the location of the Norwegian units, obtained either from patrols or perhaps from prisoners. The German launched almost simultaneous surprise attacks on the two Norwegian companies. Members of the machinegun platoon were the first to see the Germans around 0400 hours. Co 3 was unable to reoccupy its positions since the Germans had seized them and the company fought from the vicinity of their quarters. Attempts to assemble proved futile because the Germans had infiltrated some of the areas that separated their quarters. The positions of the scattered Norwegian units became untenable when the Germans began using mortars. Those who were able to do so withdrew to the north, linked up with the northwest security force, and continued the fight from a position north of Nordstrømvann.

Captain Bjørnson became separated from his men and the company executive officer, Lieutenant Torgersen, assumed command. The withdrawal continued when the enemy threatened to envelop the Norwegian positions. The Norwegians heard firing from the direction of the Bjørnefjell Railroad Station. Rather than following the planned line of retreat, Torgersen decided to go to Co 1’s assistance. The Norwegians made a mistake in the route and when they eventually came within sight of the railroad station, they saw smoke rising from it and realized that it had fallen to the enemy. This was confirmed by a Swedish border post. The company turned north, intending to join Norwegian forces in Salangsdal, but the weather turned bad with heavy snowfall. The inclement weather and the exhausted condition of the troops caused Torgersen to cross into Sweden where the troops were interned.

The Germans also launched a surprise attack around 0400 hours on Co 1. The Norwegians fought from windows in the two main buildings and the Germans did not press the attack. The firing lasted for about two hours and then the area fell quiet. The Norwegians assumed that the Germans had withdrawn but they attacked in greater force around 0800 hours.

The second attack was supported by heavy weapons, probably the antitank weapons found in each heavy weapons company. The fire forced the defenders away from the windows in the two buildings and this allowed German infantry to approach the western of the two buildings. They blew open the door, stormed into the building, throwing hand grenades and opening fire with sub-machineguns. A few Norwegians jumped from the back windows and some eventually made their way to Sweden. Major Spjældnes and a number of his men were trapped on the second floor and captured. Major Omdal and his troops in the eastern building were captured soon after the first building was rushed.

The fighting in and around Bjørnefjell resulted in six Norwegian dead, 16 seriously wounded and 45 prisoners. The rest managed to slip over the border to Sweden. Some evaded capture and were able to join Norwegian forces further north and others escaped from German captivity.8

A Norwegian humanitarian group had established a relief station in Kiruna in Sweden and personnel from this station, with German permission, fetched the 16 seriously wounded Norwegians on April 16 and brought them to their relief station. Two days later, the same organization brought the six fallen soldiers to Kiruna where they were buried on April 24 with full military honors. Occasionally, the Germans allowed seriously wounded or sick Norwegians transferred to Swedish hospitals. Major Spjældnes became seriously ill on May 5 and he was sent to a Swedish hospital after giving his word of honor that he would return to German captivity when well. Spjældnes was released from the Swedish hospital on July 20 and he turned himself in to the Germans in Halden the following day.

The Germans captured whatever supplies the Norwegians had at Bjørnefjell, including 12 machineguns and 150 pairs of skis that would prove very useful later in their operations. According to Buchner, the German losses at Bjørnefjell were one killed and seven wounded. The German success at Bjørnefjell must be viewed as a remarkable achievement. They were outnumbered almost 2 to 1, operated in unfamiliar terrain, and attacked an enemy in defensive positions.

There are several reasons for the Norwegian failure. They may have seriously underestimated German abilities to operate in the mountains to the east of the railway and rumors of German “demoralization” after the naval battle may have reached them and given a false sense of security. Major Omdal placed too much reliance on civilian warnings of any German move against Bjørnefjell. The Germans were quick to seize all communications facilities in Hundal, thus preventing any telephonic warning. It was noted in chapter 5 that the 1/13th Inf displayed serious leadership problems at virtually all levels. This was again apparent at Bjørnefjell.

The Norwegian lack of adequate early warning measures was a serious mistake for which the majors and the company commanders are primarily