Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

view of their knowledge that General Fleischer was in charge of both military and civilian functions in a 1,000 kilometer stretch of the country. Both Mackesy and Cork were apparently busy trying to bring some semblance of order to their activities in and around Harstad. Fleischer and his staff were in total darkness with respect to Allied plans. This changed somewhat on April 14 when he was asked to meet a British representative, Admiral John Cunningham. The meeting took place aboard the cruiser Devonshire in Tromsø. Cunningham, who operated directly under Admiral Forbes, had no authority over Allied operations in the Narvik area. His mission was to patrol the coast between Tromsø and Kirkenes. Cunningham was therefore primarily interested in discussing practical naval issues as they pertained to his own mission. He was unable to clarify for the Norwegians what the Allies were up to or to enlighten Fleischer about planned operations. The Norwegians came to the meeting with rather high expectations and Fleischer was both disappointed and annoyed at being called to a meeting with a British flag officer with no coordinating authority for future operations.

When Fleischer returned to his headquarters in the evening of April 14, his chief of staff, Major Lindbäck-Larsen, briefed him. The major told him about the British landing in Sjøvegan and that he had met Mackesy’s chief of staff, Colonel Dowler. Dowler and Lindbäck-Larsen had agreed that the major should come to Harstad on April 15 to meet the commander of British land forces in North Norway. Fleischer chose not to attend this meeting, in all likelihood because his honor was slighted by the meeting with Cunningham. Both sides would have benefited from the meeting, despite the fact that there was only a slim chance that Cork and Fleischer would get along. As it was, relations between the British and Norwegian militaries got off to a bad start.

Cork and Mackesy were now involved in a hot debate among themselves and with the Admiralty about whether or not to undertake an immediate attack on Narvik. Norwegian officers had seen the two companies of Scots Guards in Sjøvegan. While they were duly impressed with the professional bearings of these troops, they realized quickly that they were not experienced, trained, or equipped for arctic warfare. Fleischer had detailed knowledge of the terrain and climate and a better appreciation for enemy strengths and capabilities. While the same is true for his chief of staff, a personal briefing by Fleischer would have had a much more favorable impact on the reserved and tradition-bound British flag officers. It would have given them better arguments in their debate with the Admiralty about the wisdom of an immediate direct attack on Narvik.

Lindbäck-Larsen met a rather demoralized Mackesy in Harstad. Mackesy was obviously overwhelmed by the disorganized state of his own forces, the weather, terrain, the inconsistency in his orders, and doubts about what Admiral Cork and the Admiralty were urging on him. Lindbäck-Larsen concluded quickly that it would be difficult to arrange any agreements for operational cooperation with Mackesy under the conditions in which he and his forces found themselves. He gave the general an orientation on the situation and outlined Fleischer’s plans for offensive operations. The orientation included a detailed description of the Narvik defenses now in German hands. He pointed out to Mackesy that even though the road conditions in the area were poor, they would become much worse in a few weeks because of the spring thaw. Operations that depended on road travel would be even more impeded by the thaw conditions.

General Mackesy gave some vague hints that he planned an advance on Narvik along both sides of Ofotfjord. The Norwegian major pointed out, tactfully, that the wild and roadless terrain, intersected by deep fjords and inlets, presented great obstacles to such an advance and suggested, in line with instructions from Fleischer, that an advance in close cooperation with the 6th Division held out greater promise of success. If, on the other hand, the British wanted to stick to their plan for an advance on Narvik from the west, a direct approach was better since amphibious landings would be required in any case. Lindbäck-Larsen’s overall impression was that the British did not have any clear objectives and were not operationally ready. In the end, the only positive result of the meeting was the exchange of liaison officers.

General Mackesy sent a message to the War Office on April 16 that included a description of the Norwegian military situation and the defensive installations in Narvik. Lindbäck-Larsen’s briefing undoubtedly influenced Admiral Cork to join in reporting to the War Office later in the day that a landing at Narvik was not feasible at this time.

The British Again Consider Landing in Narvik

Churchill and the Admiralty found it difficult to accept Cork’s message on April 16 that ruled out an immediate attack on Narvik. A message from the Admiralty in the afternoon of April 17 pleaded with both Cork and Mackesy to reconsider. The message explained that Warspite would only be available for the next two or three days and that the French alpine troops, planned as reinforcements for Mackesy, should not be expected for some time since they were held in Scapa Flow as reinforcements for Namsos. Cork, who probably did not want to disappoint Churchill, held a conference with Mackesy on April 18. Derry writes that he urged the general to take a “gamble on the chance” that the enemy’s morale would break under an overwhelming bombardment from a battleship, two cruisers, and eight destroyers. Mackesy agreed reluctantly to have a force ready for landing if the situation after the bombardment made the success of such an operation possible in his estimation.

Mackesy made a reconnaissance of the Narvik area in the cruiser Aurora on April 20 and his opinion had changed radically when he returned. He informed Cork that he was convinced that the operation could not succeed and that it would lead to the destruction of the 24th Brigade. He