An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) ๐
- Author: Adam Smith
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nations of this kind, have frequently done so. In every nation,
the men of the military age are supposed to amount to about a
fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people. If the
campaign, too, should begin after seedtime, and end before
harvest, both the husbandman and his principal labourers can be
spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that the work
which must be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed
by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not unwilling,
therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign ; and it
frequently costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to
maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it. The citizens
of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served
in this manner till after the second Persian war; and the people
of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian war. The
Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in
the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman
people, under their kings, and during the first ages of the
republic, served in the same manner. It was not till the seige of
Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute something
towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European
monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman
empire, both before, and for some time after, the establishment
of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with
all their immediate dependents, used to serve the crown at their
own expense. In the field, in the same manner as at home, they
maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any
stipend or pay which they received from the king upon that
particular occasion.
In a more advanced state of society, two different causes
contribute to render it altogether impossible that they who take
the field should maintain themselves at their own expense. Those
two causes are, the progress of manufactures, and the improvement
in the art of war.
Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided
it begins after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the
interruption of his business will not always occasion any
considerable diminution of his revenue. Without the intervention
of his labour, Nature does herself the greater part of the work
which remains to be done. But the moment that an artificer, a
smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his
workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up.
Nature does nothing for him ; he does all for himself. When he
takes the field, therefore, in defence of the public, as he has
no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be maintained
by the public. But in a country, of which a great part of the
inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the
people who go to war must be drawn from those classes, and must,
therefore, be maintained by the public as long as they are
employed in its service,
When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very
intricate and complicated science; when the event of war ceases
to be determined, as in the first ages of society, by a single
irregular skirmish or battle ; but when the contest is generally
spun out through several different campaigns, each of which lasts
during the greater part of the year; it becomes universally
necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the
public in war, at least while they are employed in that service.
Whatever, in time of peace, might be the ordinary occupation of
those who go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service
would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden upon them. After the
second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to
have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting,
indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners; and
all of them equally hired and paid at the expense of the state.
From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received
pay for their service during the time which they remained in the
field. Under the feudal governments, the military service, both
of the great lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after
a certain period, universally exchanged for a payment in money,
which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead.
The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole
number of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized
than in a rude state of society. In a civilized society, as the
soldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of those who are
not soldiers, the number of the former can never exceed what the
latter can maintain, over and above maintaining, in a manner
suitable to their respective stations, both themselves and the
other officers of government and law, whom they are obliged to
maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a
fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered
the themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take
the field. Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is
commonly computed, that not more than the one hundredth part of
the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers,
without ruin to the country which pays the expense of their
service.
The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have
become considerable in any nation, till long after that of
maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the
sovereign or commonwealth. In all the different republics of
ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises, was a necessary
part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen.
In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which,
under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people
were taught their different exercises by different masters. In
this very simple institution consisted the whole expense which
any Grecian state seems ever to have been at, in preparing its
citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus
Martius answered the same purpose with those of the Gymnasium in
ancient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many public
ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise
archery, as well as several other military exercises, were
intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have
promoted it so well. Either from want of interest in the officers
entrusted with the execution of those ordinances, or from some
other cause, they appear to have been universally neglected; and
in the progress of all those governments, military exercises seem
to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the
people.
In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole
period of their existence, and under the feudal govermnents, for
a considerable time after their first establishment, the trade of
a soldier was not a separate, distinct trade, which constituted
the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of
citizens; every subject of the state, whatever might be the
ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood,
considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit likewise
to exercise the trade of a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary
occasions, as bound to exercise it.
The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all
arts, so, in the progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes
one of the most complicated among them. The state of the
mechanical, as well as some other arts, with which it is
necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to
which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But
in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is
necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation
of a particular class of citizens; and the division of labour is
as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art.
Into other arts, the division of labour is naturally introduced
by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their
private interest better by confining themselves to a particular
trade, than by exercising a great number. But it is the wisdom of
the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier a
particular trade, separate and distinct from all others. A
private citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any
particular encouragement from the public, should spend the
greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt,
both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very
well; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is
the wisdom of the state only, which can render it for his
interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar
occupation ; and states have not always had this wisdom, even
when their circumstances had become such, that the preservation
of their existence required that they should have it.
A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbmdman, in the rude
state of husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has
none at all. The first may, without any loss, employ a great deal
of his time in martial exercises ; the second may employ some
part of it ; but the last cannot employ a single hour in them
without some loss, and his attention to his own interest
naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those
improvements in husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and
manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as
little leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as
much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of
the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether
unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows
the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which, in
reality, is no more than the accumulated produce of those
improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An
industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all
nations the most likely to be attacked ; and unless the state
takes some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits
of the people render them altogether incapable of defending
themselves.
In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which
the state can make any tolerable provision for the public
defence.
It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in
spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations
of the people, enforce the practice of military exercises, and
oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain
number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to
whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on.
Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of
citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, it may
render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and
distinct from all others.
If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients,
its military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the
second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice of
military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the
soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the
state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their
subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the
occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they
derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from
some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the
labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates
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