An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) 📖
- Author: Adam Smith
- Performer: 0226763749
Book online «An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) 📖». Author Adam Smith
great wars, and three great battles, to subdue that little
kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have been still
more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last
king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient
world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble
resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The militias of some
barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The
Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the
countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most
formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the
second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too,
were always respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very
considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general,
however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they
appear to have been very much superior; and if the Romans did not
pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was
probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add
those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too
large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of
Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good
deal of the manners of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were,
like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds,
who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were accustomed
to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was exactly of the same kind
with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were
probably descended.
Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the
Roman armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those
causes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared
capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as
unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were
neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors,
besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which
guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to
their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their
own generals. In order to render them less formidable, according
to some authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine,
first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always
before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three
legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the
different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever
removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small
bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns,
and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades
men, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate
over the military character ; and the standing armies of Rome
gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected. and
undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the
German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the
western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of
those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were
for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western
empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind,
of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or
circumstantial account. It was brought about by the
irresistible superiority which the militia of a barbarous has
over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of
shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers,
and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by
militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but over
other militias, in exercise and discipline inferior to
themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia
gained over that of the Persian empire; and such, too, were those
which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that of the
Austrians and Burgundians.
The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who
established themselves upon ruins of the western empire,
continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new
settlements, as it had been in their original country. It was a
militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took
the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was
accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well
exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry
advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually
decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare
for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of
the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and
standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of
it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been
adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its
neighbours should follow the example. They soon found that their
safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia
was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.
The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen
an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage
of veteran troops, and, the very moment that they took the field,
to have been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced
veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the
valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of
the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most
experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had
enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could
at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy.
When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a
profound peace for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of
her soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long
peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon
Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate
war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes forget
their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been
kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.
When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia,
it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous
nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent
conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars,
sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the
militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A
well regulated standing army is superior to every militia.
Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and
civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against
the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by
means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any
country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any
considerable time.
As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a
civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it
that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized.
A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law
of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire,
and maintains some degree of regular government in countries
which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines with
attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into
the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve
themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing
army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all his
other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace, which
that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the
influence of that army.
Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing
army, as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the
interest of the general, and that of the principal officers, are
not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of
the state. The standing army of Czesar destroyed the Roman
republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned the long
parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the
general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the
chief officers of the army ; where the military force is placed
under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the
support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the
greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be
dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may, in some cases, be
favourable to liberty. The security which it gives to the
sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which,
in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest
actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of
every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though
supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered
by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of
bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole
authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish
every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the
contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural
aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing
army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious
remonstrances, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon
or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority
naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which
approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries
where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army.
It is in such countries only, that the public safety does not
require that the sovereign should be trusted with any
discretionary power, for suppressing even the impertinent
wantonness of this licentious liberty.
The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the
society from the violence and injustice of other independent
societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the
society advances in civilization. The military force of the
society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense, either
in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of
improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and
afterwards even in time of peace.
The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention
of firearms, has enhanced still further both the expense of
exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers in
time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both
their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A
musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and
arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta. The
powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably,
and occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and
arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily
be picked up again, and were, besides, of very little value. The
cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier
machines than the balista or catapulta; and require a greater
expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry
them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over
that of the ancients, is very great ; it has become much more
difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a
town, so as to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack of that
superior artillery. In modern times, many different causes
contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive.
The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement
have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great
revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident,
Comments (0)