An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) 📖

over that of the

soldier; in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates

over every other character ; and in this distinction seems to

consist the essential difference between those two different

species of military force.

 

Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries,

the citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been

exercised only, without being, if I may say so, regimented; that

is, without being divided into separate and distinct bodies of

troops, each of which performed its exercises under its own

proper and permanent officers. In the republics of ancient Greece

and Rome, each citizen, as long as he remained at home, seems to

have practised his exercises, either separately and

independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and

not to have been attached to any particular body of troops, till

he was actually called upon to take the field. In other

countries, the militia has not only been exercised, but

regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every

other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military

force of this kind has been established, every militiaman is,

even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops,

which performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent

officers.

 

Before the invention of firearms, that army was superior in

which the soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and

dexterity in the use of their arms. Strength and agility of body

were of the highest consequence, and commonly determined the fate

of battles. But this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms

could be acquired only, in the same manner as fencing is at

present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man

separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or

with his own particular equals and companions. Since the

invention of firearms, strength and agility of body, or even

extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they

are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less

consequence. The nature of the weapon, though it by no means puts

the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts him more nearly

so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is

supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough

acquired by practising in great bodies.

 

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities

which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards

determining the fate of battles, than the dexterity and skill of

the soldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of

firearms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man

feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within

cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be

well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to

maintain any considerable degree of this regularity, order, and

prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle. In an

ancient battle, there was no noise but what arose from the human

voice ; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of

wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did

approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him.

In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence

in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it

must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree

of regularity and order, not only in the beginning, but through

the whole progress of an ancient battle, and till one of the two

armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity, order,

and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops

which are exercised in great bodies.

 

A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either

disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well

disciplined and well exercised standing army.

 

The soldiers who are exercised only once aweek, or once a-month,

can never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are

exercised every day, or every other day; and though this

circumstance may not be of so much consequence in modern, as it

was in ancient times, yet the acknowledged superiority of the

Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very much to their superior

expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it is, even at

this day, of very considerable consequence.

 

The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once

a-week, or once a-month, and who are at all other times at

liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being,

in any respect, accountable to him, can never be under the same

awe in his presence, can never have the same disposition to ready

obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day

directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at

least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what

is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a

militia must always be still more inferior to a standing army,

than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise,

or in the management and use of its arms. But, in modern war, the

habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater

consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of

arms.

 

Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war

under the same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in

peace, are by far the best. In respect for their officers, in the

habit of ready obedience, they approach nearest to standing

armies The Highland militia, when it served under its own

chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the

Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary

shepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in

peaceable times, accustomed to follow their chieftain from place

to place; so, in time of war, they were less willing to follow

him to any considerable distance, or to continue for any long

time in the field. When they had acquired any booty, they were

eager to return home, and his authority was seldom sufficient to

detain them. In point of obedience, they were always much

inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the

Highlanders, too, from their stationary life, spend less of their

time in the open air, they were always less accustomed to

military exercises, and were less expert in the use of their arms

than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

 

A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has

served for several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in

every respect a standing army. The soldiers are every day

exercised in the use of their arms, and, being constantly under

the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt

obedience which takes place in standing armies. What they

were before they took the field, is of little importance. They

necessarily become in every respect a standing army, after they

have passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag

out through another campaign, the American militia may become, in

every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the

valour appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that

of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.

 

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages,

it will be found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority

which a well regulated standing army has over a militia.

 

One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct

account in any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of

Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians,

Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of

Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were

probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army.

When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never for any

long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It

vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle,

indeed, the gallant and well exercised militias of the principal

republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very little

struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great

Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republics, and of the

Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible superiority

which a standing arm has over every other sort of militia. It

is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which

history has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

 

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is

the second. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous

republics may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

 

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second

Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the

field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one

another in the command; Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his

son Annibal: first in chastising their own rebellious slaves,

afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa; and

lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which

Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those

different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact

discipline of a standing army. The Romans, in the meantime,

though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not,

during this period, been engaged in any war of very great

consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said,

was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal

encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia

opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable,

contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those

battles.

 

The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the

like superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose

it; and, in a few years, under the command of his brother, the

younger Asdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from that

country.

 

Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being

continually in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a

well disciplined and well exercised standing army ; and the

superiority of Annibal grew every day less and less. Asdrubal

judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole, of

the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance

of his brother in Italy. In this march, he is said to have been

misled by his guides ; and in a country which he did not know,

was surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every

respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

 

When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to

oppose him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and

subdued that militia, and, in the course of the war, his own

militia necessarily became a well disciplined and well exercised

standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to

Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it. In

order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the

standing army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently

defeated African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama,

composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal. The event of

that day determined the fate of the two rival republics.

 

From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the

Roman republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing

armies. The standing army of Macedon made some resistance to

their arms. In the height of their