Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

mid-April, to take Co 1, 1/139th to the threatened area on the right flank of the German northern front. The company started its march at 1300 hours on April 30. At Windisch’s request, the division had ordered one platoon from this company to Elvegårdsmoen on April 28. The mission of Co 1 in the Bjørnefjell area was taken over by naval Co Zenker. By an exhausting forced march, one platoon from Co 1 reinforced the detachment at the southern end of Gressvann while the rest of the company occupied Britatind on May 1 and caused much difficulty for the 6th Brigade.4

The other two German companies rushed in as reinforcements were a mixture of mountain troops and naval personnel from Narvik, Cos Brucker and Erdmenger. These units started their move in the evening of April 30 via a difficult route in order to avoid fire from British warships. They marched from Narvik along the southern shore of Beisfjord, climbed and crossed the mountains at the southern end of this fjord to Sildvik from where they were brought by train to Nordal Bridge. From there, they undertook an arduous 29-hour march through mountains covered by 3-6 feet of loose snow to the area east of Hartvigvann. Company Müller (1st Lieutenant Müller from the division staff took over command when Captain Brucker became ill) arrived at its destination at 0330 hours on May 2 followed by Co Erdmenger at 0230 hours the following day. Company Erdmenger relieved Co 11, 3/139th of its coastal defense mission in the Bjerkvik area and that company was attached to 1/139th. Company Müller occupied the area from Storebalak northeastward during the night of May 4. The 3rd Division directed Group Windisch to relieve Co 3 at Øyjord with naval personnel in order that this full-strength company of mountain troops could be used for other missions. The regimental reserve was reduced to Co 12, 3/139th.5

The 2/16th Inf began its advance at 0500 hours on May 1. It took place in difficult terrain with deep snow. The battalion commander noted in his report that his unit had been severely reduced by the time the operation began and consisted of only one reinforced rifle company, one under-strength rifle company, a machinegun platoon, and a mortar section. Two squads from this force were also sent into the mountains on the west side of Gressdal as security. To make matters worse, the battalion had never operated as a unit and the troops had not even tested their weapons.6

There appears to have been some confusion about the operational boundary between the 7th and 6th Brigades and this became a factor in the failure of the 6th Brigade to reach its objective in Vassdalen. Major Munthe-Kaas, the commander of the 2/16th Inf, assumed that the 7th Brigade was responsible for securing the high ground west of Gressdal. The 6th Brigade order appears to recognize a responsibility for the western high ground since it directed the 2/16th Inf to protect the brigade’s right flank and clear the mountainous area north of Læigasvann. The confusion was increased by a report from division that there were no German forces in the Britatind (Hill 1009) area. Munthe-Kaas probably assumed that this report was based on the 7th Brigade having captured this area or determined that it was clear of German forces.7

The 2/16th Inf reached the first phase line at 0800 on May 1 and sent Co 6 forward to take up positions at the northern end of Gressvann, near the second phase line. At 1035 hours, the battalion was ordered to attack the German forces located at the southern end of Gressvann. This was a deviation from the planned two-battalion drive, one on each side of the lake, after the 1/16th Inf had passed through the 2/16th Inf. The 1/16 was still at the first phase line and the advance became a single battalion action. Whatever the reasons for the change, it became very difficult to deploy two battalions in the narrow valley after the Germans secured Britatind.

The 2/16th, with Co 6 in the lead, progressed steadily but rather slowly because of difficult snow conditions. The Norwegians continued forward even after they met heavy German fire from the heights west of Gressvann, heights they had assumed were clear of enemy forces. The great difference in altitude made the German fire inaccurate and only a few soldiers were wounded, one seriously. The battalion was well supported by mortar and artillery fire as long as there was landline connection but when they ran out of communication wire and ammunition for the mortars, the advance came to a halt. The lead company was withdrawn after a large German force was reported southeast of Hill 1009.

The lead company of the 1/16th Inf reached phase line two at 1530 hours on May 1. The battalion continued its advance along the east side of the lake but received heavy fire from German positions at the southern end of the lake and from Britatind. The Norwegians placed effective mortar and artillery fire on the enemy positions near the cabin located at the southern end of the lake and the 16-man German detachment withdrew to positions on the northwest slope of Bukkefjell (Hill 1146). Unfortunately, the Norwegians did not press the attack. They undoubtedly did not know the actual strength of the German defenders but the fact that the Germans had only one machinegun should have told them that the force was small. Instead of pursuing, the 1/16th Inf went into night positions and sent security patrols into the mountains to the east. One patrol drove a German outpost from Rivtind (Hill 1458).

The 6th Division was concerned that the troops would soon be exhausted in the winter wilderness. The division estimated that the troops could only tolerate two nights of operations in the mountains. In the division’s view, the 6th Brigade had to reach Vassdal by the morning of May 5 or the brigades would have to retire to positions where the troops could rest. Lindbäck-Larsen wrote