Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

in blocking further French advances through Labergsdal and along Route 50, but also occupied the Snaufjell mountain between the two axes of advance. From this high ground, small German ski detachments harassed the French units constantly and made it impossible to establish any reliable contact between the two axes of advance. The German ski platoon on Snaufjell was small, only about 20 men. Lieutenant Colonel Valentini finally requested that Lieutenant Colonel Dahl clear the Snaufjell plateau with Norwegian ski troops. Captain Hanekamhaug was given this mission.

Major Celerier opposed the operation because he believed the Norwegians would take heavy casualties. Consequently, Hanekamhaug’s order was changed to a reconnaissance in force of the western, northern, and eastern approaches to Snaufjell. The company, with SES attached, carried out the reconnaissance, often under fire, in an exhaustive 25-hour march that brought them back to Labergsdal through Elvenes. In the process, Hanekamhaug’s troops drove the Germans from Hill 513, and this allowed the French in Labergsdal to establish contact with their company on Route 50. The reconnaissance resulted in a sketch map of the German positions, but this proved of little help as the Germans kept shifting their men from position to position, giving the impression that the mountain was held by a much larger force than they actually had.

French attempts to clear the Germans from Snaufjell were slow and methodical against stiff German opposition. The German forces in this isolated position were resupplied by air and General Béthouart reported that they displayed “extraordinary endurance.”9 The slow French progress was due to their lack of training in winter conditions and their shortage of appropriate equipment. Béthouart was well aware of the difficulties his troops faced. He ordered that all operations take place at night in order to minimize exposure to German air attack and to take advantage of the improved mobility provided by the night frost. Béthouart concluded that it would take a long time to reach Narvik from the north. Admiral Cork eventually ordered that French troops on the northern front limit themselves to keeping the Germans tied down until the planned landing in the Bjerkvik area drew German forces in that direction.10

The Norwegians were not informed about this decision. The result was that the hopes in the original plan of bypassing the German positions on Gratangseidet by the advance through Labergsdal never came to fruition. The Norwegians demanded better operational coordination, which was one of the reasons for Lindbäck-Larsen’s visit to the British headquarters in Harstad on May 6, discussed earlier in this chapter.

The Germans committed considerable air assets against the French-Norwegian attack through Labergsdal and along the Bjerkvik road. The coastal steamer Dronning Maud, carrying the 6th Reserve Medical Company from Sørreisa was attacked by German aircraft in the evening of May 1, as it was about to dock in Foldvik, despite clearly displayed large Red Cross markings. Nineteen were killed and 31 seriously wounded.

The 14th Bn CA relieved the 6th Bn CA in the evening of May 8. The 6th was pulled back to a rest area in Gratangen. According to Béthouart, 65% of the troops in this battalion were combat ineffective because of frostbite and snow blindness. The French troops received increased indirect fire resources when the French 75mm battery finally showed up in the period 6-9 May. The Norwegian 9th Motorized Artillery Battery, in positions near Hestvann, also provided support for the French troops.

The 14th Bn CA resumed its advance on May 9. The battalion cleared the Germans from Snaufjell that same day. Its lead elements reached Storevann where it was stopped by flanking fire from the western slopes of Roasme (Hill 856). The battalion spent the following days clearing Labergsdal. The battalion’s SES later reached the eastern slopes of Hill 1013, but the French advance was stopped by strong German positions astride Route 50.

7th Brigade’s Attack

The original offensive plan did not call for the 7th Brigade to undertake any major attacks, but to follow up the expected German withdrawal caused by the pressures exerted by the advance of the 6th Brigade and the 27th CA. The partial failure of the CA’s part of the operation forced some changes in the original concept.

The beginning of operations found the 7th Brigade at the foot of the Lægastind Massif on which the Germans had positions with excellent observation and fields of fire to the north and west. The Germans occupied both heights east of Reisevann, Hill 785 and Roasme (Hill 856) and the 6th Brigade reported that a German company had occupied the high ground around Britatind. Dahl viewed the capture of the heights east of Reisevann and Hill 785 as the objectives of most immediate importance. It was decided that the Alta Bn should remain in its current positions for the time being while the 2/15th Inf, commanded by Major Hyldmo, attacked to secure the high ground around Hill 785. One company from the Alta Bn would cover the left flank of the attacking battalion against the German force reported to be on or near Britatind.

The 2/15th began its attack at 0230 hours on May 2. The attacking companies began the ascent to Hill 785 in thick fog. The fog lifted as the units neared the top and the advance was halted by heavy German fire. Nevertheless, Co 7 managed to get close enough to the German positions to storm and secure the objective. Heavy German fire from Hill 842 prevented a pursuit. Company 7 occupied Hill 785, with one platoon about 400 meters to the south of the summit. Company 6 occupied some heights to the east with its front facing Roasme (Hill 856), southwest of Hill 785. The two companies remained in these positions for several days while the Alta Bn and the French tried to work their way forward in the valley.

Company 2, Alta Bn occupied Hill 559 (to the northeast of Hill 785) on May 2 without opposition. A security detachment was sent towards Lortvann. This detachment was later moved to the area between Britatind