Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

In the evening of May 2, after a delay of nearly 24 hours, the 6th Bde ordered the 1/16th Inf to resume its advance along the east side of Gressvann towards the area to the northeast of Storfossen. The battalion was reinforced by Co 5 from the 2/16th. Major Hunstad began his advance at 0400 hours on May 3 with two companies forward, the 1st on the left and the 3rd on the right. While Co 3 followed the east shore of the lake, Co 1 worked itself diagonally up the steep mountainside into a flanking position between Hills 1013 and 1146. Despite continued fire from German positions on the high ground to the west and on the northwest slope of Bukkefjell, the battalion reached its initial objective at the southern end of the lake.

The German positions southeast of the cabin, on the northwest slope of Bukkefjell, were the battalion’s next objective. Company 1 worked its way along the foot of Hill 1146 towards the German right flank. The company eventually reached an avalanche within 400 meters of the Germans. Company 3 occupied the high ground east of the cabin. Both companies found themselves in open terrain under heavy German fire that the artillery and mortars failed to silence. Around 2000 hours, Hunstad ordered the companies to dig in for the night. It took quite an effort to keep the troops, soaked from the wet snow, from falling asleep.

There were good reasons for the stiffened German resistance. The 16-man detachment, driven back on May 1, was reinforced that evening by a platoon from Schleebrügge’s force. The defenses in the Sorebalak-Gressvann area were taken over by Lieutenant Müller’s company in the early evening of May 3. Dietl and Windisch were sufficiently concerned about the Norwegian threat in the east to order Co 11 commanded by Captain Lömberger to move into the area between Læigastind (Hill 1335) and Britatind (Hill 1009). Company 11 had just arrived in the Storfossen area from Bjerkvik and Co Erdmenger took over its positions in that area.

The left prong of the Norwegian advance ran out of steam at the line reached by Major Hunstad’s battalion. This was five kilometers short of the 6th Brigade’s objective for the offensive. The 1/16th Inf remained in these positions until May 5 when the battalion was relieved by the 2/16th Inf and given another mission. The 1/16th was first moved to a rest area north of Hill 437 but after a couple of hours in that position, it was alerted for an advance via Lortvann to the lake on the east side of Læigastind (Hill 1335). At that point, the battalion would come under the operational control of the 7th Brigade. The withdrawal of 1/16th Inf from the Gressdal front was compensated for by the movement of 1/12th Inf to the north end of Gressvann where it became the brigade reserve.

The 2/16th Inf continued the pressure on the German positions on the ridgeline between Bukkefjell and Gressdalselven (Gressdal River), placing these positions under heavy direct and indirect fire. Because of this pressure, the Germans withdrew and the Norwegians promptly occupied their positions. The Germans carried out a series of air attacks against the 2/16th on May 7 without inflicting any serious casualties. The Norwegians continued to probe towards Storfossen and the north side of Storebalak where the Germans had now established a number of defensive positions. The Gressdal River had thawed below Storfossen and it was not possible to move ammunition, supplies, and heavy weapons forward using sleds. The Norwegians examined alternate routes over the mountain plateau east of Storebalak.

The Germans concluded that the Norwegian advance in Gressdal had ended and that they were preparing an operation to bypass Gressdal with an advance through Bukkedal and against Storebalak. These conclusions were undoubtedly based on the failure of 2/16th to resume the attack in force and observations of Norwegian activities associated with the examination of alternate routes.

There are several reasons for the failure of General Fleischer’s main effort to reach its objective. The Norwegians neglected to secure Britatind overlooking the route of advance through Gressdal. The division reported the mountain clear of German units, but the Norwegians failed to send forces to occupy it. The early and piecemeal beginning of the 6th Brigade’s offensive tipped their hand and Colonel Windisch’s quick recognition of the dangers posed by the Norwegian advance in Gressdal and Dietl’s quick dispatch of three companies to this flank averted a serious problem.

Major Schleebrügge’s grasp that Britatind was the key to the operation and his quick occupation of that objective enabled the Germans to place flanking fire on the advancing Norwegian troops. At the same time, his quick reinforcement of the German defenders in Gressdal reduced the chance of a Norwegian breakthrough.

The 6th Brigade attacked with two battalions but, as noted, the 2/16th Inf had been reduced to little more than a reinforced company when it began its advance. The weakest battalion was given the lead and there was insufficient space in the valley to deploy more the one battalion at a time.

General Dietl noted that Norwegian marksmanship was outstanding and their winter equipment and cross-country mobility was superior. However, their lack of aggressiveness when faced with obstacles demonstrated that they had still not achieved the required experience to eliminate quickly even a few determined defenders.8

There was a change in command of the 6th Brigade on May 8. Colonel Løken was reassigned to command the 6th District Command when Colonel Mjelde fell ill. Lieutenant Colonel Ole Berg, who had been a member of General Ruge’s staff, became the new 6th Brigade’s commander. This change of command came after the left prong of the Norwegian offensive ran out of steam and it could therefore not have contributed to the abandonment of the Gressdal attack.

The Germans were experiencing problems of their own. They were outnumbered by more than 6 to 1 on the northern front and they lacked