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was strictly forbidden. The advance would take place at night and the troops would rest during the day. Hengl selected the camps along the route during an aerial reconnaissance on May 29. He planned to complete the march to Narvik in nine to ten days, with the troops covering about 15 to 20 kilometers each night. The total force of about 2,500 men was to assemble when the Germans reached the Fauske area. Some of the troops would come from the lead units while others needed to be brought forward.

The soldiers were instructed to leave sub-machineguns behind and to carry only rifles and pistols. Hand grenades, helmets, and gas masks were also left behind. Each man carried 30 rounds of rifle ammunition. Four boxes of ammunition for each machinegun and 15 rounds for each light mortar were brought along. Supply was entirely by airdrop at designated rest areas and the heavy weapons and their ammunition were to be air dropped to the advancing troops when they reached a point close to Narvik. Each man carried rations for four days but these were not to be used unless the planned airdrops did not materialize. Essential Alpine equipment was brought along, such as ropes, iron climbers, ice picks, about 50 skis per battalion, and snowshoes. The men carried light sleeping bags and an additional 10 sleeping bags and five 10-man tents were to be air dropped at each rest area. These were to be left behind and new ones dropped at the next area.

The Luftwaffe was asked not to make advance airdrops since the Germans believed that a force of 500 Norwegian troops had taken the same route northward. Each company was assigned special medical personnel and litter carriers. In addition, one doctor and 25 litter carriers were to be stationed at the rest areas as these were reached, with five carriers at each location. The battalions were equipped with radios.

The Büffel force of 10 companies was assembled in the Fauske area in the evening of June 2. The June 1 evening situation report from General Dietl described the situation in the Narvik area as extremely serious. Sorko’s battalion, which was the lead element of the Büffel force, had already started on its way to Narvik, led by a special advance party of mountaineers. Inclement weather prevented Sorko’s unit from receiving the special equipment planned for the advance in time, and those units with a later starting time gave up some of their equipment to insure that the lead elements were properly equipped.

Feurstein was not optimistic about operation Büffel’s chances of success but Dietl was in dire straits and it seemed like the best of all alternatives for coming to his aid. He was not alone in his skepticism. Both Group XXI and the OKW had written off Dietl and his forces, despite all the various attempts to bring help. In fact, a force reorganization plan was prepared in early June for carrying out the conquest of North Norway after the anticipated loss of the 3rd Mountain Division. This involved the creation of a Mountain Corps under Feurstein’s command, consisting of the 2nd and 5th Mountain Divisions commanded respectively by Colonels Nake and Weiss.

In defiance of chronology, this may be the place to describe the end of Operation Büffel. By June 8, the forward elements of Sorko’s unit had reached only as far as Hellmoboten and were ready to continue to the next camp. That night, a message was received announcing the armistice and canceling the operation. Hengl considered that the most difficult part of the route was over and he stated later that there was no doubt in his mind that his regiment could have reached Narvik in a battle-worthy condition by the middle of June.17

A symbolic picked force of 20 men under Lt. Gressel was sent to Narvik over the planned route. Gressel and his men reached Skjommen and proceeded from there to their destination by boats. He reported to General Dietl on June 16.

General Feurstein did not share Hengl’s optimism about the ability of the 2,500-man force to reach Narvik and he writes that both Lieutenant Gressel, whom he discussed the issue with in Narvik, and Lieutenant Colonel Sorko shared his view.22

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“The commander finds no reason to push the advance. The commander prefers that the units first expand their supply service.”

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL FLEISCHER’S DIRECTIVE TO THE BRIGADES ON MAY 19.

Inactivity

It can be argued that a successful conclusion to the Narvik Campaign was lost in the ten-day period beginning on May 22. The delays, procrastinations, and failures of the Allies and Norwegians to coordinate their operations gave General Dietl the respite he so desperately needed to bring in additional reinforcements and to organize his new defensive line. The planned attack on Narvik, initially scheduled for May 21, suffered several postponements that delayed the operation by one week. The Norwegian and French forces on the northern front took a breather after May 22 and did not re-start offensive operations until May 30, after the operation against Narvik was completed. This failure to orchestrate their operations had ruinous consequences at a time when the flow of reinforcements to Dietl tripled, the German air activity increased, and when the Allies suffered devastating defeats in France.

Béthouart and the British Navy planned the Narvik attack. The first of several postponements took place on May 19 after a meeting at British headquarters. The reasons were that landing craft were not available because they were supporting the construction at Bardufoss Airfield and land-based air support was not available. The new date was the night of 23–24 May, or the first favorable opportunity after that date. A “favorable opportunity” depended on weather that would prevent German air operations during the landing as well as the availability of sufficient Allied land-based air support to make air cover effective.

German air activity increased significantly after the Bjerkvik

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