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landing. In addition to ground support operations, numerous attacks were carried out against lines of communications, harbor facilities in the rear areas, the town of Harstad, and naval forces. Carrier-based aircraft were not able to neutralize enemy air operations despite energetic attempts. It became obvious that land-based aircraft with the ability to remain over the target area for a considerable period was a prerequisite for any amphibious operation. The Bjerkvik landing earlier in the month was carried out in favorable weather and during a period when German air operations over Narvik were on a much-reduced scale.

At a meeting between General Béthouart and the British around noon on May 23, it was decided to postpone the attack on Narvik until the night of May 25–26, May 26–27, or May 27–28. Weather played a role in which night was selected but the deciding element was the availability of sufficient air cover. General Auchinleck had decided that it would be reckless to undertake the operation with only one fighter squadron in support. He decided, with Admiral Cork’s approval, to postpone the operation until the Hurricane squadron was available.1

The Norwegians were informed that the attack had been postponed indefinitely but they were not given the reasons. They believed the delay was caused by a leak through the national broadcasting system. A report from the front by a reporter was read over the radio at 2000 hours on May 23. The reporter stated that all civilians in Øyjord were ordered to move, as the Allied and Norwegian forces were preparing to take Narvik within a couple of days.

The Allies were furious and the Norwegians launched an investigation. It revealed that the report had been aired through a misunderstanding at the station. In a distortion of the sequence of events, Derry writes that this leak not only caused the postponement of the attack but was also a factor in the decision to keep the Norwegians in the dark about their planned evacuation.2 The broadcast took place eight hours after the Allies had decided on the final postponement, and it is now obvious that the deciding reason was Auchinleck’s view that sufficient fighter assets were not available.

The operational directive issued by the Norwegian 6th Division on May 22 resulted in a complicated and time-consuming regrouping of forces, dictated in part by logistic considerations and in part by the perceived need to give the troops a chance to rest before resuming operations. The directive, parts of which appear to have been written before the extent of the German withdrawal was known, anticipated that the Germans would be able to hold the Kuberg Plateau against attacks from the north for a lengthy period.

The Alta Battalion’s rear depot had been moved to Skoglund, about two and a half kilometers north of Bjerkvik. The farm road from Bjerkvik to Gamberg was improved to support truck traffic. Engineers had constructed a provisional bridge over the Vassdal River and supplies were moved along a track suitable for horse-drawn wagons to Fiskeløsvann, where the battalion’s forward depot was located after the repositioning of forces. The battalion’s own supply personnel brought the supplies from this point to the forward units.

The two battalions of the 16th Inf were supplied over two parallel routes from their rear depots at Lund and Lapphaugen. The 1/16th Inf had its depot at Lund. From there, the supplies were trucked to Bonnes and by wagons from there to the eastern end of Rauvann where a forward depot was established. A track usable for wagons led to the battalion receiving point at the western end of Rauvann. The battalion supply personnel brought the supplies to Bratbakken by horse-drawn wagons and from there to the front; they were carried by soldiers or, in some cases, by packhorses.

The 2/16th Inf was supplied from its rear depot at Lapphaugen. Wagons or sleds brought the supplies from there through Gressdal to the foot of Storebalak where a distribution point was established. From there, everything had to be carried by soldiers up the steep northern slope of Storebalak and on to the southern edge of the plateau. The terrain was too steep for packhorses. It was this supply route that Fleischer wanted changed and which must have been the primary factor for the strange rearrangement of forces that was made without consulting the battalion commander or his quartermaster.3

The 6th District Command had planned for some time to simplify the division’s supply operations by using the main road through Gratangen to Bjerkvik. From there, it was intended to bring the supplies by sea transport to Trældal on the north side of Rombakfjord. An adequate road led from Trældal to Cirkelvann, where battalion distribution points were to be established. However, this plan was based on two assumptions that had not been realized by May 22. First, Narvik was still in German hands and this prevented all boat traffic in Rombakfjord. Second, the French had failed to secure the road from Trældal to Cirkelvann. In the end, the supply route for the two battalions of the 16th Inf remained as before but the route for the 2/16th was extended from the old distribution point at the base of Storebalak through Vassdal via Gamberg to Fiskeløsvann. This westward extension became necessary when the 2/16th was moved off the mountains.

Military operations cannot be carried out successfully unless they can be supported logistically. To that extent, logistic considerations often dictate strategy. However, this was not the case on May 22. While the old supply lines were long and cumbersome in the roadless mountain terrain, the 6th Brigade was successfully supported during its long drive to secure the high plateau and there were no apparent reasons why this could not have continued now that the weather was improving. The middle of an offensive operation was the wrong time to experiment with new supply lines, particularly those that were dependent on circumstances that were outside General Fleischer’s control. The validity of Lindbäck-Larsen’s claim that supply difficulties “made it impossible to bring sufficient forces to bear

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