Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

The new German line was located directly south of a deep watercourse that formed a veritably impenetrable moat in front of their positions. The river between the junction of Karenelven and Holmelven varies in width from 20 feet to 150 feet and the current is rapid, particularly during the spring thaw. The Norwegians had no bridging equipment since all was lost when the Germans captured Elvegårdsmoen on April 9. A reconnaissance of possible crossing points on June 1 led the division to conclude that the river between Cirkelvann and Nedre Jernvann was so wide that it would take one full week to construct a footbridge. As Munthe-Kaas writes, this was “an unfortunate belated discovery!”

The German flanks were now more difficult to assault and roll up than they had been when they occupied the high plateau. Their right flank was anchored on the Swedish border and their left flank on Rombakfjord. The cliffs on the German left leading to Rauberget south of Lakselv are extremely steep. Dietl had little to worry about on this flank. A French attempt to advance in this area on May 25 was repelled easily by the Germans. The French lost eight killed and seven were captured.

While the new German front presented the Norwegians with what seemed a mountain bastion, the best approach was still in the area along the Swedish border, defended by Group Schleebrügge. This group consisted of a mixture of a few mountain troops, some paratroopers who were not equipped and trained for mountain warfare, and naval units of questionable reliability. Furthermore, in the first days after the withdrawal, these units had not had a chance to prepare their defensive positions. A quick thrust at the German right flank as recommended by Munthe-Kaas on May 21 presented the best chance of success and it may well have led to the collapse of the German northern front. Instead, Fleischer chose to attack the enemy bastion from the lower terrain further west via an approach that was under easy observation by the Germans on the high ground to the south. Furthermore, the attacking forces would have to find a way to cross the raging river, without bridging equipment and in the face of German fire.

Dietl was desperately trying to win time for meaningful reinforcements to reach his forces. The Norwegians and the Allies handed it to him by suspending offensive operations in the north for over a week. The number of reinforcements reaching the Germans around Narvik in the first half of May amounted to only 133 officers and men. From May 15 to May 22, the flow increased to 239 and during the last week of May, it grew to 671. In the south, Feurstein’s forces were brushing aside delaying forces and approaching Bodø.

Finally, the events that were unfolding in France and the Low Countries, should have instilled a sense of urgency in the Norwegian military leadership. It had become imperative to complete the destruction of Group Windisch before the possible transfer of Allied ground forces to the west. Dietl admitted forthrightly that he was saved from having to enter Sweden by the German attack in the west.

Fleischer could not have anticipated the frequent postponements in the operations against Narvik between May 21 and May 28. However, there was no reason to delay his operation against Bjørnefjell pending the capture of Narvik. Ziemke notes that this relative quiet on the northern front “facilitated the German withdrawal from Narvik.”6 This is an understatement. A strong attack by Norwegian and French forces on the northern front simultaneously with or leading up to the attack on Narvik was General Dietl’s worst nightmare. An offensive on the northern front would have prevented the Germans from rushing all incoming reinforcements to the Narvik Peninsula to stem the French and Polish advance. The inactivity also allowed them to pull units away from the northern front for the same purpose.

By May 26 Fleischer, who was unaware of the reasons for the postponements of the attack on Narvik, directed an urgent appeal to Béthouart, pointing out that time was now working in Germany’s favor. He also sent his chief of staff to Allied headquarters in Harstad in an attempt to speed up operations against Narvik.

Béthouart informed Fleischer that his intention was to attack Narvik the following night but he refused to enter into any agreements about future operations after Narvik was captured. He also told the Norwegian that the 14th Bn, CA was not capable of an offensive south of Cirkelvann. Cork and Auchinleck had briefed Béthouart earlier in the day about the evacuation decision, which limited Allied operations to the capture of Narvik.

Polish Operations on the Ankenes Peninsula

The 12th Bn CA took over on Ankenes Peninsula from the British in early May. This battalion operated initially in Håvikdal but in the period May 6-9, it occupied a number of heights overlooking Narvik harbor. Hill 295 was occupied on May 6, Hill 405 on May 8, and Hills 677, 734, and 668 on May 9. In the end, the Germans occupied only the high ground on both flanks: the hillside to the south and west of Ankenes and the area from Hill 606 to Skarvtuva.

Two Polish battalions were moved by sea from Bjerkvik to Ankenes Peninsula on May 14 to replace the South Wales Borderers, who were sent to Bodø. At about the same time, a Polish battalion from Harstad was to relieve the 12th Bn CA. The 4th Polish Bn and 2nd Half-Brigade Headquarters were brought south from Sjøvegan on May 19. This made Ankenes Peninsula a Polish area of operations except for a section of British field artillery and some antiaircraft guns.

Major General Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko commanded the Polish forces. He started his career in the Tsarist army and was wounded while commanding the 16th Polish Infantry Division in 1939. Lieutenant Colonel Benedykt Chlusewiez, who also started his career in the Tsarist army, commanded the 1st Half-Brigade consisting of 1st and