Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

directed to advance to the border and the railroad line. It was left up to the brigade whether this was accomplished by driving the Germans southward or over the border into Sweden. The 7th Brigade’s mission was to provide flank security for the 6th Brigade and serve as a link to the French forces that were expected to advance eastward at the same time. The 6th Brigade wished to locate its supply point at the east end of Hartvigvann but the division did not feel this solution was satisfactory. The decision was to establish a supply point for both brigades at the east end of Cirkelvann with the understanding that the brigades would fetch their supplies at this location. It was also decided that the 1/16th Inf, located on the far left, would continue to receive its supplies via Raudal.

The Germans held the northern front with the equivalent of three battalions. The exact composition of these battalions changed frequently as units were moved. Major Stautner’s battalion held the western sector from Rombakfjord to Hill 346 with Cos 2, 3, 4, and 5. Naval infantry Co Erdmenger was located behind the left wing. Major Hagemann’s battalion held the center from Hill 522 to the river junction 500 meters east of Øvre Jernvann with Cos 11, 12 (reserve), 13, 14, and 15 as well as some smaller units. Group Schleebrügge constituted the right wing of Windisch’s front from where it tied in with Hagemann’s troops to the Swedish border via Hill 620. He had a mixture of units under his command, including three companies of mountain troops (Co 1, 139th, and Cos 2 and 3 of the 138th), one parachute company (Co 1, 1st Regiment), ski platoons Adler and Rohr, naval infantry company Steinecker, and naval infantry platoon Braun.11

The British evacuation of Bodø and the collapse of the front in Nordland Province gave new urgency to Norwegian offensive preparations. A report by Colonel Finne, the Norwegian liaison officer at Allied headquarters, also caused unease. He reported that the French plan was to capture Sildvik but not advance any further and that the Norwegians would have to take care of the rest.

On May 30, the division amended its earlier directive and ordered the operations to begin no later than 2400 hours that same day. A phrase in the amendment summed up the sense of urgency, “It is, for the sake of the country, absolutely necessary that the brigades make a renewed effort to bring the Narvik Campaign to a conclusion.”12 The 7th Brigade was asked to report immediately any French failure to participate in or support the attack.

Problems in getting the French on the north side of Rombakfjord to participate in the planned offensive continued. We have seen that Béthouart viewed the troops in the 14th Bn, CA as unfit for offensive operations and that Valentini voiced the opinion that there was no need for haste since the Germans would either surrender or intern themselves in Sweden within two weeks. Both these officers were aware of the evacuation and the prohibition against offensive operations after the capture of Narvik.

The 6th Brigade issued its attack order to the battalions on May 29 at 2130 hours. The 1/16th Inf was ordered to attack the eastern anchor of the German line at Hill 620, while the 2/16th Inf was to advance from its rest area to pre-reconnoitered attack positions and capture, as its first objectives, Hills 456 and 615. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion would support the attack from positions between Kuberget and Skitdalsvann.

The 2nd Bn began its move at 0200 hours on May 30 but the terrain east of Skitdalsvann was mountainous and difficult. The battalion came under intense enemy automatic weapons fire as the units reached the high ground to the north side of the watershed near its objectives. Major Munthe-Kaas viewed the chances of success in a frontal attack as very small and made the first in a series of recommendations that the battalion move into the mountains to the east where the terrain was more favorable. The brigade turned down these suggestions and repeated attempts, frustrated by heavy enemy fire, were made to ford the river or build a footbridge. After wasting almost four days in these attempts, the brigade agreed to move the battalion into the mountains to the east at 1330 hours on June 3.

It will be recalled that the 1/16th Inf was left on the high plateau after the Germans withdrew to new defensive positions on May 22. An eastward movement, to make room for the 2/16th Inf that was getting ready to move forward from its rest area was begun on May 27. The battalion plan of attack called for Co 1 to attack Hill 620 from the east while Co 2 approached the objective from the west, with the machinegun company supporting both attacks. Company 7 was left in its positions on Hill 931 as flank security. The attack was planned for 2300 hours on May 30 but was postponed until 0600 hours on May 31 because of heavy fog.

Company 1 ended up attacking the hill from the north, not east as planned. The first attempts were unsuccessful due to German air attacks and stubborn resistance.

Company 1 reassembled on the northeast slope of the hill and the battalion altered the attack plan by directing Co 2 to attack from the east. Company 1 was to remain in its positions and support Co 2’s attack with fire. Company 2 would move against the German right flank after reaching the plateau between Hills 620 and 698, and Co 1 would then attack Hill 620 on a prearranged signal. Company 2 cleared the plateau by 2300 hours on May 31 after some heavy fighting. The Norwegians were able to hold the gained terrain and Hill 620 was stormed and captured on June 1.

The Germans describe the fight for Hill 620:

From May 31 at 1300 hours, several companies advanced against Hill 620–defended by about 90 men with one machinegun and one