Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

The Norwegians reacted very angrily to the British evacuation of Bodø, leading the British to believe that they were discussing an armistice with the Germans. While there was no serious consideration on the part of the Norwegians to negotiate with the Germans, the meeting between Ambassador Dormer and the Norwegians on May 30 was very heated. Mr. Hambro told Dormer that Norwegians could no longer trust the British and he complained about the apparent lack of cooperation between the British Navy and the British Army. This elicited a sharp reply from Dormer that Hambro was in no position to pass judgment on such matters, and cooperation was in fact excellent. Hambro replied that if this was true, the situation was even worse than he had thought.

In view of these strong statements about the Bodø evacuation, the Allies could not be sure what the reaction would be to far worse news. The carefully worked out deception plan for the evacuation was as much directed at misleading the Norwegians as it was to conceal the operation from the Germans. There were those in Allied headquarters who felt that telling the Norwegians was tantamount to informing the Germans. The movement order, codenamed Alphabet, had an appendix, which informed people privy to the evacuation how to answer questions from individuals who were not in on the evacuation plans. There were three main points: 1) The capture of Narvik allowed forces to be redeployed to better advantage for future operations; 2) A planned move of the Allied base of operations from Harstad to Tromsø to minimize German air threats; and 3) The need to prepared to move forces to the Finnmark Province in case of German or Soviet threats in that area.

Despite concerns by Cork and Auchinleck about worsened relations with the Norwegian as result of not telling them about the impending evacuation, Churchill decided on May 29 that there should still be a few days delay in informing the Norwegians. To soften the blow of the eventual disclosure of the evacuation to the Norwegians, he told Admiral Cork to offer them “the alternatives of evacuation or being left in positions capable of further defence.”6

By the end of the month, it became obvious that the Norwegians had to be informed since it would be next to impossible to disengage French and Polish forces without their knowledge and acquiescence. It was also impossible to conceal all evacuation operations since some of the supplies and heavy equipment were shipped out before the end of May.

Admiral Cork sent a message to London on May 31, stressing the necessity to inform the Norwegians about the evacuation and received the necessary authority to do so that same day.

It fell to Ambassador Dormer to fly to Tromsø to carry out this distasteful task. Dormer gave the bad news to the Norwegians on June 1. Auchinleck’s biographer writes, “…when the truth was told them, the Norwegians reacted with generosity and courage. It is arguable that, even at some risk of security, it would have been wiser, as well as more friendly, to have taken them into confidence earlier.” Admiral Cork wrote that the Norwegians “… after a very natural display of great disappointment continued to co-operate loyally to the end, although they might, with some justification, have decided to lay down their arms at once and so gravely prejudice our withdrawal.”7

The Mowinkel Plan

The message to Admiral Cork from the Foreign Office on May 31 also gave the green light for the Norwegians to explore the so-called Mowinkel Plan. This plan had surfaced earlier but rejected by both the British and Norwegians. The plan originated with the Swedes and it was designed to keep the war in Scandinavia from dragging out with the distinct possibility that Sweden might become involved. At the same time, the plan also protected Swedish commercial interests. It called for the neutralization of North Norway, with both the Germans and Allies withdrawing. Swedish troops would occupy Narvik and the Norwegian King and Government would continue to function in the pacified area. If the belligerents accepted the plan, it would reduce the chance of Sweden becoming involved in a protracted conflict and would protect their export of iron ore to both sides. According to Sandvik, the first approach to the Germans came in early May in conversations that a private Swede Dahlerus had with Göring.

Dahlerus reported his conversations with Göring to the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Lars Mowinkel. Nothing developed until a conversation between Mowinkel and the Swedish Foreign Minister, Christian Günther, on May 13, followed by a visit by the Permanent Undersecretary of the Norwegian Foreign Office to the Swedish Foreign Office on May 14. Günther assured the Norwegians that it was not a question of peace negotiations but hinted at the possibility of a demarcation line in North Norway. He stressed that the suggestion had to come from the Norwegians, with British agreement. Sweden would then present the proposal to Germany. Günther stated that the Germans might be more likely to look favorably on the plan if it called for the Swedish occupation of Narvik.

The reactions by Norwegian officials were mixed. Some were opposed to Swedish military occupation while others opposed the whole scheme. The Norwegian Ambassador in Stockholm had asked the Norwegian Ambassador to Great Britain, Colban, for his opinion and Hambro discussed the plan with the British Ambassador in Stockholm in the evening of May 14. The Norwegian Government also discussed the plan, but in the end, the idea was rejected.

There were two reasons for this rejection. First, the Norwegians did not want to take any action that could be interpreted as disloyalty to their brothers-in-arms. Second, they viewed a demarcation line as a risky proposition, since the forces at their disposal after an Allied withdrawal would be unable to cope with a German breach of the agreement. The British reaction was also negative. While the British Foreign Office expressed interest