Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Henrik Lunde (general ebook reader txt) 📖

in the idea, others felt that the operations in North Norway could be brought to a successful conclusion and suspected that the plan had originated in Berlin.

Churchill was adamant in his opposition to the Mowinkel Plan on May 19 but had changed his opinion by the end of the month. In the May 31 message to Cork, it was clear that the Mowinkel Plan had full British backing. The message pointed out that the time for negotiations was short, and that the Germans would be sure to reject the plan if they had any inclination that an evacuation was contemplated.

The Norwegian Government decided to make the attempt. Foreign Minister Koht flew to Luleå on June 3 and met with his Swedish counterpart. Koth, who had delivered the rejection of the plan a week before, told Günther why his government had changed its position. A proposed agreement was drafted by Koth and approved by Günther. The Swedes were asked to position troops on both sides of the demarcation line as well as in Narvik. Günther stated that he would submit the proposed agreement to his government and hoped to have it on its way to Berlin that evening.

Koth ran into a hornets’ nest when he returned to Tromsø and informed the government of his actions. Most were upset that Koth had found it necessary to tell his Swedish counterpart about the evacuation. Everyone believed that the negotiations would fail and many concluded that this was the best outcome. A formal Norwegian investigation after the war found that Koht acted correctly when he gave his counterpart in Sweden the true reasons for the changed Norwegian position on the Mowinkel Plan.

In their discussion about Koht’s revelation to the Swedes, Berg and Vollan refer to a note made in Lieutenant Rohr’s journal on June 3 about a rumor, brought from the division by a parachute lieutenant. The rumor was a demand by General Dietl that his troops hold out for at least five more days. All were waiting in anticipation for this ‘Miracle of Narvik.’ Berg and Vollan suggest that this indicated that Dietl knew about the evacuation.

This is not so. First, Dietl was completely unaware of the evacuation and did not believe it even when it was discovered that French and Polish troops had abandoned their positions east of Narvik. Second, Koht met with Günther on June 3 and the proposal was not presented in Berlin until June 4. The rumor referred to in Rohr’s journal probably had a basis in the anticipated arrival of the 1,800 paratroopers and 1,000 mountain troops Hitler had ordered be parachuted into the Narvik area.

The Swedes did not tell the Germans about the evacuation. It was not in their interest to do so since the acceptance of the plan would be of considerable advantage to Sweden. The German successes on the western front and in Norway since the idea first surfaced made the Swedish proposal, presented in Berlin on June 4, of little interest and the Swedes received no immediate answer. The German Foreign Ministry believed correctly that the reason for the current interest in such a plan was connected to an impending Allied withdrawal. The OKW did not draw the same conclusion because it was inconceivable to them that the Allies would abandon the venture now that it was so close to a complete success. OKW therefore continued to finalize the plans for Operation Naumburg, to be executed during the last week of June.8

Norwegian Government Opts for Exile

On June 1, the Norwegian Government faced decisions of enormous consequence for the future of Norway. There were three choices: 1) Stay in the country and continue to resist; 2) Stay in the country and seek an immediate armistice or peace with the Germans; or 3) Go into exile and continue the war.

Ruge, when he received the news of the evacuation from the British liaison officer, was eager to have the evacuation delayed long enough to permit the final attack on the Germans. He maintained that Dietl could be brought to terms within a few days if all the Allied troops were used in the attack. The Norwegian troops could only carry on the war alone if Dietl was first driven across the Swedish border or surrendered. Even under these circumstances, the Norwegians would need Allied air support and supplies.

Cork and Auchinleck responded to Ruge on June 3. They pointed out that all arrangements for the evacuation were made and that a postponement was out of the question. They also stated that the Norwegians should not count on air support or supplies after the Allied withdrawal in view of the situation in France.9 Generals Ruge and Fleischer were summoned to a meeting with the king and government in Tromsø on June 3. In Ruge’s view, the war should be continued unless there was no hope of further Allied support. In that case, the king and government should go into exile. The two generals found that the government had already made decisions in line with Ruge’s thinking. Ruge recommended in the strongest terms that the attack against Bjørnefjell be allowed to continue.

There was also a discussion about what forces should be brought to England and it was decided to take all capable naval vessels, aircraft, and volunteers. Crown Prince Olav suggested that he remain in the country and try to do what he could for the people and the nation, but his proposal was rejected by the government.

There was also the question of who should be the commander of the Norwegian forces overseas. The government wanted Ruge to fill this position but he was opposed. He pointed out that he had already been required—in South Norway—to leave his defeated troops. He would not do so again. He recommended that Fleischer accompany the government into exile. The government was not convinced and voted unanimously on June 4 to ask him to assume command of Norwegian troops outside Norway. Ruge considered the government action an order but still voiced his disagreement.