An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader with highlighter txt) ๐
- Author: Adam Smith
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would be greater, but their real value would be precisely the same as
before. They would be exchanged for a greater number of pieces of silver;
but the quantity of labour which they could command, the number of people
whom they could maintain and employ, would be precisely the same. The
capital of the country would be the same, though a greater number of pieces
might be requisite for conveying any equal portion of it from one hand to
another. The deeds of assignment, like the conveyances of a verbose
attorney, would be more cumbersome; but the thing assigned would be
precisely the same as before, and could produce only the same effects. The
funds for maintaining productive labour being the same, the demand for it
would be the same. Its price or wages, therefore, though nominally greater,
would really be the same. They would be paid in a greater number of pieces
of silver, but they would purchase only the same quantity of goods. The
profits of stock would be the same, both nominally and really. The wages of
labour are commonly computed by the quantity of silver which is paid to the
labourer. When that is increased, therefore, his wages appear to be
increased, though they may sometimes be no greater than before. But the
profits of stock are not computed by the number of pieces of silver with
which they are paid, but by the proportion which those pieces bear to the
whole capital employed. Thus, in a particular country, 5s. a-week are said
to be the common wages of labour, and ten per cent. the common profits of
stock ; but the whole capital of the country being the same as before, the
competition between the different capitals of individuals into which it was
divided would likewise be the same. They would all trade with the same
advantages and disadvantages. The common proportion between capital and
profit, therefore, would be the same, and consequently the common interest
of money; what can commonly be given for the use of money being necessarily
regulated by what can commonly be made by the use of it.
Any increase in the quantity of commodities annually circulated within the
country, while that of the money which circulated them remained the same,
would, on the contrary, produce many other important effects, besides that
of raising the value of the money. The capital of the country, though it
might nominally be the same, would really be augmented. It might continue to
be expressed by the same quantity of money, but it would command a greater
quantity of labour. The quantity of productive labour which it could
maintain and employ would be increased, and consequently the demand for that
labour. Its wages would naturally rise with the demand, and yet might appear
to sink. They might be paid with a smaller quantity of money, but that
smaller quantity might purchase a greater quantity of goods than a greater
had done before. The profits of stock would be diminished, both really and
in appearance. The whole capital of the country being augmented, the
competition between the different capitals of which it was composed would
naturally be augmented along with it. The owners of those particular
capitals would be obliged to content themselves with a smaller proportion of
the produce of that labour which their respective capitals employed. The
interest of money, keeping pace always with the profits of stock, might, in
this manner, be greatly diminished, though the value of money, or the
quantity of goods which any particular sum could purchase, was greatly
augmented.
In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law. But as
something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought
everywhere to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of
preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury.
The debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for
the risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use,
he is obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties
of usury.
In countries where interest is permitted, the law in order to prevent the
extortion of usury, generally fixes the highest rate which can be taken
without incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above the
lowest market price, or the price which is commonly paid for the use of
money by those who can give the most undoubted security. If this legal rate
should be fixed below the lowest market rate, the effects of this fixation
must be nearly the same as those of a total prohibition of interest. The
creditor will not lend his money for less than the use of it is worth, and
the debtor must pay him for the risk which he runs by accepting the full
value of that use. If it is fixed precisely at the lowest market price, it
ruins, with honest people who respect the laws of their country, the credit
of all those who cannot give the very best security, and obliges them to
have recourse to exorbitant usurers. In a country such as Great Britain,
where money is lent to government at three per cent. and to private people,
upon good security, at four and four and a-half, the present legal rate,
five per cent. is perhaps as proper as any.
The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat above,
ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of
interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten
per cent. the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent
to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a
part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture
into the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus
be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and
advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to
waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is
fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are
universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person
who lends money gets nearly as much interest from the former as he dares to
take from the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands of the one
set of people than in those of the other. A great part of the capital of the
country is thus thrown into the hands in which it is most likely to be
employed with advantage.
No law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest ordinary
market rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of
1766, by which the French king attempted to reduce the rate of interest from
five to four per cent. money continued to be lent in France at five per
cent. the law being evaded in several different ways.
The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends everywhere
upon the ordinary market rate of interest. The person who has a capital from
which he wishes to derive a revenue, without taking the trouble to employ it
himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with it, or lend it out at
interest. The superior security of land, together with some other advantages
which almost everywhere attend upon this species of property, will generally
dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from land, than what
he might have by lending out his money at interest. These advantages are
sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; but they will
compensate a certain difference only ; and if the rent of land should fall
short of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would buy
land, which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the
advantages should much more than compensate the difference, everybody would
buy land, which again would soon raise its ordinary price. When interest was
at ten per cent. land was commonly sold for ten or twelve years purchase. As
interest sunk to six, five, and four per cent. the price of land rose to
twenty, five-and-twenty, and thirty years purchase. The market rate of
interest is higher in France than in England, and the common price of land
is lower. In England it commonly sells at thirty, in France at twenty years
purchase.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF CAPITALS.
Though all capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour
only, yet the quantity of that labour which equal capitals are capable of
putting into motion, varies extremely according to the diversity of their
employment; as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country.
A capital may be employed in four different ways; either, first, in
procuring the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption of
the society ; or, secondly, in manufacturing and preparing that rude produce
for immediate use and consumption; or, thirdly in transporting either the
rude or manufactured produce from the places where they abound to those
where they are wanted ; or, lastly, in dividing particular portions of
either into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who
want them. In the first way are employed the capitals of all those who
undertake improvement or cultivation of lands, mines, or fisheries; in the
second, those of all master manufacturers ; in the third, those of all
wholesale merchants; and in the fourth, those of all retailers. It is
difficult to conceive that a capital should be employed in any way which may
not be classed under some one or other of those four.
Each of those four methods of employing a capital is essentially necessary,
either to the existence or extension of the other three, or to the general
conveniency of the society.
Unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain degree
of abundance, neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could exist.
Unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude
produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for
use and consumption, it either would never be produced, because there could
be no demand for it; or if it was produced spontaneously, it would be of no
value in exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society.
Unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or
manufactured produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is
wanted, no more of either could be produced than was necessary for the
consumption of the neighbourhood. The capital of the merchant exchanges the
surplus produce of one place for that of another, and thus encourages the
industry, and increases the enjoyments of both.
Unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions
either of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit
the occasional demands of those who want them, every man would be obliged to
purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his immediate
occasions required. If there was no such trade as a butcher, for example,
every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep at a
time. This would generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much more so to
the poor. If a
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