William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

Flanders. Early in September he took Quesnoy, and then drew together

his forces for the capture of the intrenched camp at Maubeuge. In this

he seemed about to succeed, when Jourdan's relieving force of 60,000

men, handled by Carnot, drove the Austrians back at Wattignies with much

loss, and thus saved the garrison at Maubeuge, now in dire straits. On

that day, 16th October, the head of Marie Antoinette fell at Paris.

 

As for the Duke of York's army, after remaining in a sorry plight near

Ostend, it moved forward to Quesnoy to prolong Coburg's right; but the

retreat of the main body involved his retirement towards Ostend, near

which town he routed some detachments of French. For a time the Allies

gained a few advantages and recovered lost ground. But the Republicans

more than made up for occasional losses by pouring troops into Flanders;

and, moving under cover of their fortresses, they often dealt heavy

blows. In quality the Austrians and British far surpassed the raw levies

of France; but these, having the advantage in number and position, could

take the offensive along a wide ill-defended front. Wherever Coburg and

the Duke of York attacked, they gained an advantage, soon to be lost in

face of the gathering masses of the enemy. As Coburg pointed out, France

sent forth another horde to take the place of one which perished or

melted away; and the Allies rarely had the chance of taking the

offensive. By this last statement he passed sentence against himself. An

able commander, even with inferior forces, will mass them so as to

strike with effect. Pitt and Grenville continually pressed him to form

some plan of action in conjunction with the Duke of York; but to this he

as persistently demurred.[236] Is it surprising that Pitt demanded the

removal of Coburg?

 

The Rhenish campaign, in which Austria took more interest, also

languished owing to the sluggishness of the Duke of Brunswick. This, in

its turn, resulted from political reasons. Frederick William, in spite

of his treaty obligations to England, refused to move forward until she

guaranteed his late gains in Poland and made further advances of money.

Then, too, he felt no interest in Austria's proposed acquisition of

parts of Alsace and Lorraine. Pitt and Grenville despatched Lord

Yarmouth to the King's headquarters to make a formal protest against the

proposed withdrawal of the Prussian army. Finally, Frederick William

gave the order to advance, but too late to gain the results which prompt

and vigorous co-operation with the Austrians should have achieved.[237]

In short, the course of events in 1793 affords the classic example of

the collapse of vast and imposing efforts owing to division of interests

and the intrusion of jealousies and intrigues. Pitt and Grenville did

their best to keep the Coalition united and active; but a Power which

granted only limited help could not impart that unity of design without

which great enterprises come to naught.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[196] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377.

 

[197] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 565.

 

[198] "Dropmore P.," ii, 378; Prior, "Burke," 368.

 

[199] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 11. Note the statement of George Rose

to Auckland (8th February, 1793): "Our revenue goes on gloriously. The

year ending 5th January shows £300,000 more than the year preceding....

We may suffer in some respects; but we must crush the miscreants"(B.M.

Add. MSS., 34448).

 

[200] "F. O.," Austria, 32 (Stratton to Grenville, 22nd December, 1792).

Cobenzl, Austrian Chancellor, assured Stratton that Francis II would

require from France "l'établissement d'une constitution quelconque

fondée sur les bases les plus essentiels du gouvernement monarchique."

 

In view of these considerations I cannot endorse Lecky's censure (vi,

134) on Pitt's "blindness" as to the character of the war.

 

[201] Sir James Murray, our envoy at Frankfurt, was assured on 1st

February that 138,419 Austrians were ready for the campaign.

 

[202] B.M. Add. MSS., 34448.

 

[203] See Martens, v, 530-5, for the Russo-Prussian treaty of 13th July

1793.

 

[204] Murray to Grenville, 19th January 1793; see "Pitt and Napoleon

Miscellanies," which also contain the new letters of Burke referred to

above.

 

[205] Vivenot, ii, 498-506.

 

[206] Martens, v, 438-42.

 

[207] Hon. J. W. Fortescue, "Hist. of the British Army," iv, 77-83.

 

[208] Pretyman MSS.

 

[209] Chevening MSS.

 

[210] Murray reported to Grenville on 10th and 18th February that the

Allies at Frankfurt were disturbed by news of the negotiation with

Dumouriez. See too, Vivenot, ii, 489.

 

[211] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377-81; "Dumouriez," by J. H. Rose and A. M.

Broadley, 162-75.

 

[212] "F. O.," Austria, 32, Morton Eden to Grenville, 30th March.

 

[213] "War Office" 6, (7); 23rd February, to Duke of York; B.M. Add. MSS

34448, Grenville to Auckland, 23rd February; Calvert, "Campaigns in

Flanders and Holland," chs. i, ii.

 

[214] This letter (for which see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies")

corrects Mr. Fortescue's statement (iv, 125) that Ministers alone were

responsible for the Dunkirk scheme. George III was morally responsible

for it.

 

[215] "Dropmore P.," ii, 387.

 

[216] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Eden to Grenville, 27th and 28th March, 10th

April; Vivenot, ii, 541; Häusser, i, 483.

 

[217] _Ibid._, Eden to Grenville, 15th April. This probably refers to

Alsace; but it may possibly hint at a partition of Venice which had been

mooted at Vienna before. A slice of Piedmont was also desired (Eden to

Grenville, 8th June).

 

[218] _Ibid._, Eden to Grenville, 30th March.

 

[219] The West India expedition was again and again deferred in favour

of that to la Vendée or Toulon (Vivenot, iii, 383).

 

[220] Sybel, iii, 38-40; Häusser, i, 488, 489.

 

[221] Pretyman MSS. I have published the letter of 5th April 1793 almost

in full in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1910.

 

[222] "Dropmore P.," ii, 388-93, 399.

 

[223] "F. O.," France, 42. I cannot agree with Sorel (iii, 405) in

taking the French overtures seriously.

 

[224] "W. O.," 6 (10), Dundas to Murray (now secretary to the Duke of

York).

 

[225] Calvert, 80.

 

[226] Calvert, ch. iii; Fortescue, iv, 111.

 

[227] "Dropmore P.," iii, 493.

 

[228] "Dropmore P.," ii, 436.

 

[229] Sybel, iii, 136, 137.

 

[230] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot (Earl of Minto)," ii, 159.

 

[231] "W. O.," 6 (10), 1st August, to Sir J. Murray, which corrects the

statement in Sybel (iii, 140), that England meant to keep Dunkirk.

 

[232] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 18.

 

[233] Calvert, 119-21.

 

[234] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 160.

 

[235] Pitt MSS., 196.

 

[236] Vivenot, iii, 352, 353.

 

[237] _Ibid._, 320, 321, 339, 379, 380; "Dropmore P.," ii, 470, 536. In

the last passage Yarmouth accuses the King of Prussia of deliberately

thwarting the action of the Austrian army under Wurmser.

 

CHAPTER VI (TOULON)

 

    Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary:

    Then fiery expedition be my wing,

    Jove's Mercury, and herald for a King.

                --SHAKESPEARE, _King Richard III_, act iv, sc. 3.

 

 

The enterprise destined to develop into the occupation of Toulon arose

out of the negotiations for alliance with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples.

By the first of these England pledged herself to send a considerable

fleet into the Mediterranean, as an effective help to the military

operations then going on in the Maritime Alps and the Genoese Riviera.

Indeed, the Court of Vienna made this almost a _sine quâ non_ of its

alliance. On its side the British Government gained assurances of

military aid from Sardinia and Naples, the former of those States

agreeing to furnish 20,000 troops in return for the annual subsidy of

£200,000.

 

Here, then, were the foundations of a Mediterranean policy on which Pitt

and his colleagues began to build in the years 1793-4, with the singular

and unforeseen results at Toulon and in Corsica. Everything favoured

some such design. The French marine was enfeebled by mutiny, and, as the

spring of 1793 merged into summer, there came ominous signs of revolt in

the South against the Jacobin faction supreme at Paris. Accordingly

Grenville urged the Hapsburg Court, in return for British help in

Flanders, to assist an expedition of the Allies to the coast of

Provence. The conduct of the Austrian Chancellor, Thugut, was

characteristic. Far from strengthening the Imperial forces in Italy, he

prepared to withdraw some of them for the Rhenish campaign, now that a

British fleet spread its covering wings over the Kingdom of

Sardinia.[238]

 

Nevertheless the British Ministers persevered with their scheme; but

whether they at first aimed at Corsica or Toulon is uncertain.[239]

Certain it is that Pitt on 19th July proposed to detach three line

regiments from the Duke of York's force in Flanders and send them to the

Mediterranean along with one brigade of the Hessian corps and a body of

Würtembergers. He pointed out that the naval superiority of Hood and the

Spanish fleet in that sea would enable us to strike a telling blow at

Provence if we were helped by Sardinians, Neapolitans, and Austrians

from the Milanese. He admitted the strength of the arguments in favour

of our land forces acting together on one point; but he added: "What I

now mention seems to offer a fair chance of doing something material in

the South [of France], and, if we distress the enemy on more sides than

one, while their internal distraction continues, it seems hardly

possible that they can long oppose any effectual resistance."[240]

 

Pitt wrote thus at the time when Mainz and Valenciennes were on the

point of surrender, and the Bretons, together with nearly the whole of

the South of France, were in open revolt against the regicide Republic.

Equally characteristic of his sanguine temperament is his Memorandum of

23rd August 1793 as to the allied forces which ought to be available for

service against France in June 1794, namely, 30,000 in Flanders, while

50,000 marched thence on Paris; 50,000 to attack Brest, and as many more

to attack Toulon.[241]

 

It so chanced that on that very day the ardour of the Provençaux brought

about a very different situation. The arrival of Hood's fleet encouraged

the moderates to send two Commissioners, representing the two coast

Departments, to seek help from the British fleet. Thereupon on his

flagship, the "Victory," Hood drew up a public Declaration that, if the

ships-of-war in Toulon and Marseilles were unrigged and the French Royal

standard hoisted, he would take those cities under his protection,

respect private property and, on the conclusion of peace, restore the

warships to the French monarchy. He then sent to a Spanish squadron,

under Langara, cruising off the coast of Roussillon, with a request for

help. That officer soon had the promise of 2,000 Spanish troops, to be

detached from the army invading that province. The Jacobin forces under

Carteaux having crushed the moderates in Marseilles, Hood made for

Toulon, though as yet the Spanish ships were not in sight. He cast

anchor in the outer roadstead on 27th August, and landed 1,500 men near

Fort Lamalgue, east of the town. In the afternoon fifteen Spanish ships

arrived, and on the next day landed 1,000 men. On the 28th Hood also

issued a proclamation to the effect that he would hold Toulon in trust

only for Louis XVII until peace should be restored to France.[242] To

this the Toulonese assented; the opposition of some of their sailors and

troops soon collapsed; and a detachment of Carteaux' force was easily

dislodged from a strong position near Ollioules, north-west of the town

(31st August). Toulon therefore seemed a sure gain for the royalist

cause.

 

Yet Pitt and his colleagues were careful not to identify themselves with

that cause. Hood, having implied in his Toulon proclamation that one of

the objects of Great Britain was the restoration of