William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

the French monarchy,

Ministers warned him that "the true ground of the war was to repel an

unjust and unprovoked aggression against His Majesty, and his Allies,

and the rest of Europe, which had been evidently threatened and

endangered by the conduct of France." True, in the course of the

struggle England had supported the French Royalists, and might find it

prudent, especially in view of the events at Toulon, to assist in

restoring monarchy. "But," adds Lord Chatham, "it is to be considered as

arising out of the circumstances and founded on the considerations which

I have stated, and not as making part of the object for which His

Majesty originally took up arms."[243] This gentle rebuke to Hood (an

impetuous and opinionated officer), clearly shows the attitude of the

Cabinet towards that problem. For Great Britain the re-establishment of

monarchy was not an affair of principle, but solely of expediency. It is

also noteworthy that the inhabitants of Toulon retained the tricolour

flag, thus signifying their adhesion to constitutional royalism as

established in 1791.

 

The fortunes of the Republic now appeared desperate; and the Allies

would certainly have triumphed had they put forth a tithe of the energy

developed by the Jacobins at Paris. With ordinarily good management on

the part of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, Toulon might have become the

centre of a great royalist movement in the South. That was certainly the

expectation of Pitt; and Langara, the Spanish admiral at Toulon,

expressed to his Government the hope that the war would soon end with

honour.[244]

 

No one at first realized the difficulties of the enterprise. The

ramparts of Toulon were extensive; and the outlying forts, from Lamalgue

on the east to Mount Faron on the north, and the works on the west and

south-west, spread over a circumference of fully fifteen miles. Then

again the French royalist committee in Toulon was somewhat suspicious of

the Allies. In truth a blight seemed to settle on the royalist cause

when it handed over to foreigners one of the cherished citadels of

France. Loyalty to Louis XVII now spelt treason to the nation. The

crisis is interesting because it set sharply against one another the

principles of monarchy and nationality; and the sequel proved that the

national idea, though still far from mature even in France, had more

potency than royalism. A keen-sighted observer had very forcibly warned

the Marseillais against delivering their city into the hands of the

Spaniards, a crime which must ruin their efforts. Such was the judgement

of Bonaparte in that curious pamphlet "Le Souper de Beaucaire."

 

Other invisible agencies, those of time and space, told against the

Allies. Despatches sent by Hood were at least eleven days in reaching

their destination, and often far longer. Consequently, the plans framed

at home were always belated. The first tidings (received on 7th

September) found the Cabinet half committed to another enterprise, that

in the West Indies, which Pitt very reluctantly postponed owing to the

drain of troops to Flanders and Toulon. A further disadvantage was that

disputes between the British and Spanish commanders at Toulon were known

at Whitehall long after they had come to a head; and the final reports

of the sore straits of the garrison led to the despatch to Cork of

orders for the sailing of reinforcements five days after the evacuation

began at Toulon.

 

In these brisk and giddy-paced times it is difficult to realize the

difficulties which then beset British commanders warring in the

Mediterranean against an enemy who could send news to Paris in three

days. Now the telegraph has annihilated space; but then, as in the

campaigns of Francis I against Charles V, the compactness of France and

her central position told enormously in her favour. The defence of

Toulon was practicable, provided that adequate reinforcements arrived in

time. As will soon appear, Pitt urged the despatch of strong

reinforcements from Ireland; and, but for delays due to the want of

transports, things might have gone very differently at Toulon. He also

expected Austria to send succours if only as a means of protecting her

Italian possessions. In truth, if the Hapsburgs had discerned the signs

of the times, they would have taken steps to defend the Milanese at

Toulon. They were destined to rue their folly.

 

Further, on 14th September, despite bad news from Dunkirk, Dundas issued

orders that 4,000 Hessians, serving under the Duke of York, must be

withdrawn in order to strengthen the garrison at Toulon, their place

being taken by others hired at Cassel. On 28th September Dundas added

that the artillery sent for Dunkirk would be withdrawn from Flanders as

it was urgently needed at Toulon. Thus these two expeditions competed

together, and produced a dislocation of plans and ordering of troops to

and fro, which told against success in either quarter. By 27th October

Ministers definitely decided that Toulon, or la Vendée, was a better

fulcrum for their scanty forces than Flanders.[245] Even so, with all

these dislocations of the Flemish plans, Pitt and Dundas relied too much

upon Austria; and all too late found out that she was a broken reed. The

Sardinians, also, lacking due support from the Court of Vienna, were

afraid to denude their borders and therefore sent an inadequate

contingent, despite the fact that they had promised to place 20,000

troops at the disposal of England free from all expense.

 

Far different was the procedure of the French. Carnot determined to

retake Lyons and Toulon, even if the efforts against Spain and Sardinia

had to be relaxed. Further, on the 16th of September there arrived at

the Republican army west of Toulon the incarnation of warlike energy and

skill. At the bidding of the Commissioners of the Convention, Napoleon

Bonaparte had come from the arsenal at Marseilles to assist the few

artillerymen then before Toulon. On the 17th he was placed in command

of their insignificant siege artillery, and forthwith from the slopes

two miles west of the town he opened fire on the nearest ships. It is

incorrect to claim for him the origination of the plan of sinking the

fleet by a fire from the height behind l'Eguilette; for three days

earlier the Commissioners of the Convention had written that they would

secure a position whence the allied fleet could be sunk by red-hot

cannon-balls; and there was no point but the high ground behind Fort

l'Eguilette which dominated both the inner and the outer harbours.[246]

But it may freely be granted that Bonaparte clinched the arguments in

favour of this course and brought to bear on it that masterful energy

which assures triumph. It was the first occasion on which he crossed the

path of Pitt; and here, as always, he had the advantage of a central

position, and of wielding a compact and homogeneous force against

discordant Allies.

 

The worst difficulty confronting the defenders of Toulon remains to be

noted. There the Sea Power is at the mercy of the Land Power. To attempt

to defend that city at the head of its land-locked harbour, dominated by

promontories, was to court disaster unless the fleet had an army to

protect it. In such a case a fleet is a source of danger rather than of

safety. Its true function is to act where it can, either directly or

indirectly, command the land. It operates with most effect against low

and exposed coasts. St. Jean d'Acre affords, perhaps, the best example

of a town at the mercy of a fleet. Portsmouth, Sydney, Brest, and Toulon

cannot be held by an enemy unless he brings forces sufficient to hold

the neighbouring heights. In occupying Toulon, the Sea Power was

virtually putting its head into the lion's jaw. Only by degrees did the

authorities at home understand this all-important fact. For some time it

was veiled from Pitt; and, as we shall see, the Austrian Chancellor,

Thugut, never did understand it. To those who were on the spot, the need

of occupying the promontory behind l'Eguilette was apparent; and on 21st

September Lord Mulgrave and Rear-Admiral Gravina led a force to seize

the very height on which Bonaparte's will had already fastened. The

Allies crowned it with a temporary work dignified by the name of Fort

Mulgrave. The fortunes of Toulon turned on the possession of all the

heights commanding the harbour, but especially of this one.

 

    [Illustration: THE SIEGE OF TOULON, 1793, from "L'Histoire de

    France depuis la Révolution de 1789," by Emmanuel Toulougeon,

    Paris, An. XII. [1803]. A. Fort Mulgrave. A'. Promontory of

    L'Eguillette. 1 and 2. Batteries. 3. Battery "Hommes sans Peur."

    The black and shaded rectangles are the Republican and Allied

    positions respectively.]

 

Even before the arrival of Bonaparte the difficulties of defence were

very great. A British naval officer wrote on the 14th to Lord St.

Helens, British ambassador at Madrid, that the situation of the little

garrison was very critical owing to daily attacks from the 5,000 French

at Ollioules and the same number on the eastern side. The Allies, he

added, could not wholly trust the French royalists serving with them,

and they were glad to send away on four French sail-of-the-line some

6,000 French sailors who had bargained to be landed on the Biscay coast.

Having only 1,570 British and 3,460 Spaniards, they could scarcely man

the ramparts and forts, several of which, especially those on Mount

Faron, were not nearly ready. The houses of the town were far too near

to the ramparts; but the Allies dared not demolish them until

reinforcements arrived. Fortunately the Spanish Admiral, Gravina, was

alert, intelligent, and trustworthy; and Piedmontese were known to be

advancing over the Maritime Alps into the county of Nice. Part of Hood's

fleet was engaged in intercepting the supplies and stores destined for

the Republicans.[247]

 

The letter brings out vividly the perils of the garrison, which must

have evacuated Toulon had not reinforcements speedily arrived. On 26th

September Hood wrote that the Allies were kept in perpetual alarm by the

French batteries, which must be kept under at all risks, until more

troops arrived.[248] Fortunately the foresight of Pitt and Grenville had

provided the means of backing up operations in the Mediterranean. Apart

from the treaty with Sardinia, there was a compact with Naples, whereby

that Court promised a force of 6,000 men and 12 warships, the naval

expenses being borne by England.[249] By 5th October 1,350 Sardinian

and 4,000 Neapolitan troops arrived, thus enabling the garrison to hold

up against the ever increasing forces of the Republicans. On the other

hand, the fall of Lyons on 9th October set free large numbers who were

available for service at Toulon. Consequently the troops and seamen of

the Allies were persistently overworked, so that Hood was constrained to

hire 1,500 Maltese seamen, to take the place of those serving the

batteries. At first only 750 British troops could be spared from

Gibraltar; but by the end of October, when further help was at hand, the

allied forces (rank and file) stood as follows:

 

  British                           2,114

  French Royalists                  1,542

  Spaniards                         6,840

  Neapolitans                       4,832

  Sardinians                        1,584

                                   ------

                                   16,912

                                   ------

 

So exacting was the service, and so unhealthy the season (it cost

Bonaparte a sharp attack of malarial fever), that the number fit for

duty did not exceed 12,000.

 

It is interesting to compare these figures with the estimate of Pitt

which is in the Pitt MSS. (No. 196).

 

                                                  _September 16._

 

    Force which it is supposed may be collected at Toulon by the end

    of October or early in November:

 

                                                          Rank and File.

 

    British Marines                                              1,500

      "     flank companies from Gibraltar                         600

      "       "      "        "  Ireland                         2,000[250]

      "     Two battalions from Flanders (to be replaced by

              detachments from the Guards)                       1,200

      "     Cavalry from Ireland                                   900

    Hessians from Flanders (to be replaced by the additional

      corps ordered)                                             5,000

    Spanish (suppose)                                            3,000

    Neapolitan                                                   6,000

    Sardinian                                                    9,000

    Austrian                                                     5,000

                                                                ------

    Total                                                       33,200

                                                 [_sic_--really 34,200.]

 

    This Force may be estimated (allowing for some deduction) at

    30,000 men. To this may possibly be added some Force from

    Corsica, and probably early in the spring, an additional body of

    11,000 Sardinians, perhaps also of 10,000 Austrians, and some

    troops of Baden from hence. Possibly also a body of Swiss, and

    in the course of the next summer (if the expedition to the West

    Indies is successful) about 4,000 or 5,000 British on their

    return from the Islands. If 10,000, or 12,000, Swiss can be

    secured, it seems not unreasonable to expect that, by the

    beginning of next year, there may be an army in the South of

    France of near 60,000 men.

 

Pitt, then, regarded Toulon as the base of operations in the South of

France so extensive as to deal a decisive blow at the Republic. The

scheme was surely due to the influence of Bacchus rather than of Mars.

For how was it possible to spare 6,200 men from the Duke of York's

force, then hard pressed after its retreat from Dunkirk? The estimate